

PATRIOTISM

AN ESSAY TOWARDS A CONSTRUCTIVE
THEORY OF POLITICS

BY

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EDUCATION ACT OF 1902"

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PATRIOTISM

CHAPTER I

WHAT IS PATRIOTISM?

THE present essay is, in the first place, an attempt to answer the question—What is Patriotism?

A few years ago this question would have seemed entirely academic, and, for the practical purposes of national life, superfluous. Men were content to be patriotic, as they are content to be truthful and honest, without troubling about definitions or reasons. Patriotism was part of the traditional morality of the nation, and no one challenged its claim to our allegiance. It was not, indeed, a *rational* conviction, if by that we mean a conviction of which the grounds have been clearly thought out, but it was none the less a *genuine* conviction,—generally held and as generally obeyed. It was not a reasoned creed, but an inherited predisposition,—as all the great moralities of life always are, as *all* the moralities of life ought to be,—and, as such, it was instinctively acted upon, without apology and without question. Men had, it is true, but little insight into its nature, but little foresight of its end, but they were, and, for the most part, still are, under a like disability of ignorance concerning other primary sanctities of life, which—as embodied in the family, in the Church, and in the State,—are,

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nevertheless, powerfully effective for the furtherance of man's health and wealth, and are so persuasively divine that the world knows of no higher good. It is true that the spirit of revolt has called each of these, in its turn, a prejudice, but herein, surely, "the spirit that denies" showed itself mistaken, for a spiritual instinct does not rightly come under this condemnation by the mere fact that, as yet, it is uncriticised by thought, or unilluminated by it.

"Weltgeschichte ist Weltgerichte"—world-history is world-judgment,—not only a judgment *upon* the world, but the judgment *of* the world,—a judgment upon the events that make up the manifest course of history, upon the facts that emerge in history,—a judgment, not only by human nature in its generality, but, also, in a certain sufficient sense, by that larger nature in whose organic unity the nature and life of man are integral. Hence, the fact that a given spiritual instinct has achieved for itself historical permanence in human life, and has thus become the dynamic source of much in character and in action that the general conscience of mankind approves as highest,—this fact in itself implies a "world-judgment" of no mean value. An instinct thus vindicated is *not* a prejudice. The worth of it may, indeed, be only conditional and provisional, but this is only to say that its worth is relative to the present character of the evolutionary whole within which the instinct has arisen, and within which it is now beneficial.

An age which finds its life, or thinks it does, in that public play of words which it calls open discussion, is apt to think of judgment as always, and of necessity, the outcome of discursive thought. If it were,

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then, of course, anything traceable to another origin could not be called a judgment, — then, of course, “judgments of Nature,” (if we may borrow a phrase from Reid, without suggesting discipleship to him), because, of necessity, anterior to discursive thinking, would all be prejudices. But, in truth, none of our primary judgments—none of those judgments upon which the practical conduct of life and thought ultimately rests — depend upon discursive thought, or derive their validity from it. It is only in the minor things of life that we can even appear to be rationalists. The greater things depend upon judgments which are implicit in the character and natural determination of the human spirit itself,— upon judgments which are, in fact and for thought, prior to our discursive thinking, and presupposed by it, and possess a validity beyond the power of our formal logic to verify or set forth.

We must be careful, then, not to make the elementary mistake of calling the unreasoned and instinctive Patriotism of the plain man a prejudice, for, whatever it be, that it most certainly is not. Nothing which has been so powerfully, so wholesomely and so nobly formative in life and in history can be thus summarily dismissed. Even if it cannot, for the moment, claim the vindication of discursive thought, the work it has achieved in the world is already a “world-judgment” in its favour of no small weight. As thus vindicated it cannot be a prejudice.

What then is Patriotism ? what is it, that it should claim our allegiance so peremptorily?—upon what grounds does that claim rest, and how far is it valid ? —these are the questions which this Essay attempts

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to answer. Nor can it be said that, to-day, they are either superfluous or academic. They are not superfluous, for there are those in our midst who frankly characterise Patriotism as a vice rather than a virtue, or, at best, as belonging to a moral order which the progressive thought and feeling of the world is said to be rapidly leaving behind, and we who still stand in the paths of ancient right must, perforce, find a reason for the faith that is in us. They are not academic, for, during quite recent years¹ our Fatherland has claimed anew the plain man's gift of steadfast patience and unselfish citizenship, the woman's tribute of tears, and the soldier's gift of life; and, in the face of that claim, members of a great English party (or rather, of a party at one time great)—moved by thoughts and purposes which charity scarcely dare attempt to interpret, lest its very mercy appear harsh,—have boldly taken a political line which the common sense of our sundered but united peoples roughly condemns, and rightly repudiates, as unpatriotic, and men of passing political prominence, who, by the simplest interpretation of private honour and public duty, should have brought to their country's need the statesman's gift of helpful counsel, have earned deserved contempt by empty and enfeebling platitudes, and by a partisan preoccupation

¹ The thought of writing this book first occurred to me during the stress and storm of the recent South African War, and many passages bear marks of the strong feelings then aroused by the ineptitude of the House of Commons, by the dishonourable partizanship of men prominent in the world of politics, and by the extravagances of opposition that disgraced many upholders of a dissentient cause for which much might have been reasonably said. I have left these passages as they were first written, for I am convinced that the passion of those eventful days illuminated truly much that our contemptuous tolerance had ignored, much that the sophistries of a sentimental culture had disguised.

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and a partisan blindness which, in effect, have made their professed patriotism a fruitless and meaningless aspiration. No! these questions are to-day neither superfluous nor academic.

What, then, is Patriotism ?

PATRIOTISM IS NOT EGOISTIC

There are those who tell us that Patriotism is but a wider egoism,—with a wider range of interest and sympathy, it is true, than the narrow selfishness which looks only to the gains we ordinarily call personal, and than the narrow pride which corresponds to this, but belonging ethically to the same order as these, and distinguishable from them only by points which, ethically, are but of slight importance. There are those who tell us this, and sometimes they tell it with a delusive pretence of science so persuasive that the ill-informed and those untrained in thought are led away into fruitless negations which are the more mischievous because apparently enlightened.

It is, of course, easy and natural to reply that Patriotism is *not* this,—that it is not something by which the individual claims his country as his own, for the furtherance of his own personal interests and the aggrandisement of his own personal pride, *but something by which his country claims him*,—claims him rightfully, even though it be to the injury of his business and the humbling of his pride. It is easy and natural to say this, and sometimes it is sufficient to say this,—at least in the first place,—but it is not always sufficient. It were sufficient to say this, at least as a preliminary, if the egoistic thesis were put forward in its simplest and crudest form,—

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if it were maintained that Patriotism is, quite literally, only another form of primitive selfishness, and barbarian self-glorification,—for then, it would be our first and most obvious reply to point out, that, as a mere matter of fact, Patriotism is quite other than this, and if we proceeded to demonstrate a true description our reply would be sufficient. But the case is not always put so simply. A certain complexity is sometimes given to it by introducing the conception of evolution, and this often wins for the egoistic thesis suffrages which would never be given to it in its simpler form. It is then said, not that Patriotism is itself selfish and barbarian, but that, in the course of human evolution, it has arisen from sentiments which are quite certainly selfish and barbarian. But—let us concede for a moment the alleged genesis,—what if it has? Man is what he *is*, and not what he has *ceased to be*. A thing is what it is, and not something else, which was antecedent to it. So Patriotism is what it is, and neither in character nor in worth is it determined by its genetic history. That history can tell us from what beginnings Patriotism has grown,—perhaps, how and why it has grown,—but, because genuinely a history of *becoming*, it characteristically sets forth the present fact as something other than its genetic original. Why, then, should we not take the present thing—the thing as we now know it—for what it is now worth? The fact that something else was, *ex hypothesi*, ancestral to it, is, surely, quite irrelevant. Genesis determines neither meaning nor value. It shows how and from what origin a given thing has come to be what it is, but *what* that given thing has come to be we must allow the thing itself to tell for itself, undisturbed by echoes from genealogy.

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Observe, too, that this argument, if valid, cannot be confined to Patriotism. It applies equally all round. It applies to every form of unselfish life,—to the thinker's enthusiasm for truth, to the "disinterested interest" of the artist, to the self-denying labour of the missionary, whether in a foreign country, or in the dark places of our homeland. It applies not only to Patriotism, but to love,—to the mutual love of husband and wife, of parents and children, to the martyr's love for his God, or for the truth which for him stands in the place of God. All these forms of unselfish devotion are, on the evolutionary hypothesis, as truly derivative as Patriotism, and if the moral value of Patriotism is to be reckoned by that of its first beginnings, these must all submit to a like estimate. But this would practically involve the ignoring of all ethical distinctions—at least, as of important significance,—other than these which we had reason to suppose existed for primitive man, or, it may be, for the earliest Protozoa. But this ethical nihilism were possible only through a radical misunderstanding, and misuse of the theory of development.

The doctrine of ethical evolution is, of course, an application to the domain of ethics—to the spiritual life of man—of those general conceptions of evolution which have so profoundly and fruitfully influenced biology. Just as living organisms are said to be genetically connected, and each individual form is held to be derived, by natural processes of variation and selection, from antecedent forms which differed from it, and, ultimately,—in the case of any one of the higher organisms,—from antecedent forms which differed from it in all the characteristics that biological classification takes to be of primary importance, so

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the existing moral judgments and capacities of man are said to have been in like manner derived from more or less widely different antecedents. Whatever be the present facts of man's moral life, they are to be genetically referred, we are told, back, beyond all historical record, to the hypothetically posited facts of the moral life of primitive man, and even beyond these, beyond even the remotest limit of the geological record, to the psychical life, also hypothetically posited, of the earliest living forms.

According to this doctrine it is in a high degree probable that in the spiritual life of civilised man to-day there is nothing *quite* primitive. We may hypothetically trace that life back to the simplest psychology of the earliest Laurentian protozoa, but probably no one psychical fact of that far-off age is precisely reproduced in us. Even if we content ourselves with a narrower comparison, we shall find abundant dissimilarity between our present ethical feeling and capacity and whatever in the way of moral nature and moral life we are led hypothetically to attribute to our earliest human ancestors. Of their ethical furnishing probably but little has come down to us quite unaltered. Even the primitive instincts are probably not *quite* the same in us as in them. On the other hand, we have much that they certainly had not. For instance, they can have known nothing of love,—of love, that is, as later ages have seen it in the divinest forms of human affection, and in the highest ranges of religious devotion. Neither, of course, had they Patriotism, for they had no *patria*. But we have both love and Patriotism. How, then, are we to judge of these? Are we to allow each to speak for itself and tell us what it to-day actually is, or

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are we, Procrustes-like, to insist upon forcing them into the measure of those different facts, whatever we suppose them to have been, from which, according to the doctrine of evolution, they sprang? The answer, surely, is obvious. They must speak for themselves, and must be judged according to what they are, and not according to what they are not. In the endeavour to reconstruct and interpret the psychological history of our race, our point of departure must be the present that we more or less adequately know, and not the remote past which, just as certainly, we do not know. We must read the unknown past in the light of the known present, and must be content to posit therein whatever seems rationally necessary to explain the existence of our present-day facts. It is radically unsound to reverse the process, as so many seem to, and to deny the existence of this or that element of worth in human nature and in human life to-day, because in some imagined figure of primitive man, no room can be found for it, or for anything that can account for it. It must not be forgotten that of the psychology of primitive man, to say nothing of earlier forms, we know practically nothing but this,—that, if human nature as we now know it is to be genetically explained, then primitive human nature must have contained every element necessary for the explanation. We must not be afraid of reading back from *now* to *then*. Our present is not to be impoverished because we cannot reasonably imagine a past rich enough to account for it.

In any given case of evolution, then, the present fact must be allowed to speak for itself. Questions as to derivation are irrelevant to the estimate of worth, for the true character of a developing nature is seen,

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not in its earliest history, but in its latest, and, if one is to be interpreted by the other, then it is the past that must be judged by the present, and not the present by the past.¹

If, then, we are told that Patriotism has developed out of selfishness and pride, we need only say, "What of it?" The assertion is probably, almost certainly, wrong; but, even if it be true, it is irrelevant, for we are attempting to discover, not the genealogy of Patriotism, but its nature and worth, and nature and worth are neither determined by first beginnings nor wholly disclosed therein.

The doctrine of evolution, then, gives no support to the contention that Patriotism is but another kind of egoism. If that contention be true it must be possible to interpret Patriotism in terms of Egoism, to resolve it into egoistic factors; but this is precisely what cannot be done; for Patriotism is as unselfish as Love. "It is not something by which the individual claims his country as his own, for the furtherance of his own personal interests and the aggrandisement of his own personal pride, but *something by which his country claims him*,—claims him rightfully, even though it be to the injury of his business and the humbling of his pride."

PATRIOTISM AS LOVE OF COUNTRY

Let us now return to our original question. We have seen that Patriotism is not egoism: what, then, is it? Probably most people would reply: Patriotism is love of country, love of one's own

¹ This doctrine can, of course, quite easily be expressed in teleological form, but as it stands in the text it is not teleological.

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country. But this also stands in need of explanation. Does the word "love" here bear its ordinary meaning? Is it meant that a patriot loves his country as a husband his wife, or a mother her children? If so, what is it that makes one's country thus lovable? And why one's own country rather than another?

The first and second of these questions must, I think, be answered in the affirmative. When the plain man says that Patriotism is love of country, he means the word "love" to be understood in quite its ordinary sense,—he means that the patriot's devotion to his Fatherland is genuinely comparable with the love that hallows marriage and our family life. Whether he is right or wrong in meaning this is another matter, but that he *does* mean this, there can, I think, be no doubt. He feels that no other name than love can adequately characterise that deep and sovereign devotion—strongest, often, when most clear-sighted—which leads the patriot to find in his country's service his holiest work, which leads him to hold as secondary all that men ordinarily most earnestly seek and most highly prize, even life itself, when compared with his country's weal. Thus far, then, his definition is to be taken in quite its literal sense, but, of course, nothing has yet been said as to the truth or adequacy of his definition. Up to the present our concern has been simply with its meaning.

We now come to our third question:—What is it that makes one's own country thus lovable? Certainly, not the mere fact that it is one's own.

Let us take a simpler case. What is it that makes a man love his native village,—makes him love the very colour of its ploughed-up fields, the whitewashed

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cottages with their casemented windows and old thatch, the broad High Street, and the mossy tiles of the old-world houses bordering it, the sturdy labourers and playing children, the narrow path by the river, and the patched brown sails of the slow barges? Why does he love all this? Not because he *owns* the village,—perchance he has not the freehold of a single yard of land in it,—but because of far more intimate ties, because it is veritably part of his life. He does not love it simply because he lives there,—one may work all day in Whitehall and live in a London suburb and yet love neither,—but *because it lives in him*; because, whatever his life knows of strength and refreshment and peace, whatever it knows of earnest work and saving hope, whatever of tender memory and hallowing sorrow, has been found *there*,—in the fellowship, in the opportunities, in the duties of that village life. In that and through that life—by its strengthening and chastening discipline, by its multiform sacramental experience,—he has grown up into whatever measure of manhood he has attained, and to-day his life is rooted there, to-day he finds, in its associations and in its work, whatever glimpses of divine reality ennoble his life, whatever makes the present sacred and the future hopeful. Of course he loves it, for in it he most truly finds his life,—his deepest life and his highest life.

Now, all that such a man finds in his village, the patriot finds in his country. That country is not merely a geographical expanse around him: it is his home. It is not merely the bulwark of his home,—the shelter which protects his household hearth and the dear sanctities enshrined around it,—it is not

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merely the bulwark of his home; it is itself his home,—the home of his best and largest life. And the men of it, his fellow-countrymen,—to him they are not merely servants, or co-operators in life's lower industry, but fellow-citizens, sharing with him in one life, one work, one hope,—comrades, it may be, in high endeavour, or resolute endurance. His country is his home, and although one spot in it is pre-eminently this, yet the sanctity there most clearly seen and most intimately known is not there localised. There, truly, is the ark of its more especial presence, but not there alone does he know its nearness, nor there alone find the refreshment of its informing power. His household hearth is to him Life's Holiest Place, but although uniquely, it is not solitarily sacred, for his whole country is holy,—hallowed by the same Presence, ministrant of the same grace. Not out of phantasy of thought, or by curious mastery of words does he call his country his Fatherland, for truly his country has begotten him,—it has made him what he is, and in and by its present life he lives out his own. His country has made him what he is. The manhood of the bygone years—its courage, its self-sacrifice, its patient resolution,—has not lapsed fruitlessly into the void. It has built up a living tradition of manhood upon which patriotic citizenship has been bred and nurtured, a tradition which has silently and unobtrusively moulded character and inspired purpose, and is now around us like our native air,—like it, richly potential unto life; like it, strengthening, refreshing, exhilarating. Into this living tradition all the manhood of the past has entered. It has come down to us, not only from our country's illustrious dead,

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whose names are held in perpetual remembrance for the saving and the making of a people, and who, from their several resting-places (from within the sacred walls of Westminster, and from that rock-hewn grave on the far-away Matoppos Hills), yet speak to us the words of civic life,—it has come down to us not only from these, our foremost and our worthiest, but also from all the Empire's nameless and unrecorded dead, who, in peace and in war, in doing and enduring, have spent and been spent for this our Fatherland.

It is this helpfulness to life that is the very ground and occasion of Love, for Love is the soul's response to life—a response in which, without any of the niggardliness that seeks an equal measure of exchange, life and whatever life can be or do is given in return for life. When we think of love between individuals, we speak, half-mythologically, of a "spiritual affinity" and "complementary natures," but these words are only a disguise for the ultimate truth that, wherever Love is, there life, or something that makes for life, is given and returned. The "spiritual affinity" and the "complementary nature" bring into the kindred life something of vital worth that it aforesaid lacked,—quickenings it to new achievement, to new hope, to new reverence, and to new trust,—and, to this ministry of life, Love, which consecrates the quickened life to reciprocal service, is the soul's natural response. The spirit of man was not made for solitary self-sufficiency. It lives, even as his body does, by what it receives,—by good that comes to it, as in a sacrament, from a life other than its own. Nor should this good be received selfishly. In the unspoiled heart it awakens an affection of dependence that cannot rest until it find

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expression in a reciprocal gift, which, although different, is yet similar, for it also is a gift of life, or of things that make for life. This affectionate response we call Love, and, because Patriotism is such a response, we say that Patriotism is Love,—love of the Fatherland from and through whose life the quickening gifts of life have come.

Patriotism, then, is the correlate of all that binds a man, in sympathy and interest, to the past and present history of his country,—the correlate of all that makes him participant for his good in that general environing life which, as distinguished from his own, we call national. He may not understand this connection,—he may not even recognise it, but it exists, and it becomes silently determinant of responsive feeling, even if it do not waken an articulate faith. Any kind and degree of participation may evoke the response of patriotic feeling, provided only it be helpful, but, other things being equal, the fuller the participation the fuller the response.

Patriotism is not an unconditioned virtue,—given arbitrarily, or by some unintelligible wisdom of Providence, to a chosen few. It is conditioned by the helpfulness of a nation's life :—where there is no helpfulness we cannot expect to discover Patriotism. Those of us who believe that Patriotism is the chiefest source of a nation's strength find in this—in the very nature of Patriotism as ethically conditioned—the strongest immediate ground for a broadly generous humanism in education and reform. As patriots we may not and cannot be content until this commonwealth of England be genuinely a commonwealth,—ministering the treasured greatness of its life with an equal charity to all that bear the English name.

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Patriotism can live in the midst of untoward surroundings—it can live, despite ignorance and long denial of right, in the unkindly isolation of the dormant country-side, and amid the grey monotony of an industry that seeks unhallowed gains through waste of life, and even there it is an ennobling inspiration, but it will live best where life is fullest and manhood noblest,—where a generous freedom gives full opportunity, where civic fellowship is a magnanimous brotherhood, catholic and impartial in its helpfulness, and where the common devotion of an equally reciprocal charity makes the common tradition a common benediction, and enriches that tradition with the informing power of a yet higher manliness, that it may yet more nobly and more effectually serve the Fatherland.

Patriotism is love of country, and love is the response of life to quickening and informing life. The life of Patriotism, therefore, is a communicant life—the patriot lives by the grace that comes to him from the life that environs him and informs him, and he receives that grace precisely in proportion to his participation in that life,—precisely in proportion as his own life becomes part of that helpfully besetting life in reciprocal service.

Once more, Patriotism is love of country. It is a responsive ministry of life by souls that have already received life. But the life received is an individual gain. It is a grace that edifies individual lives,—quickenings, strengthening, ennobling and enlarging them,—and the reciprocal gift of life is similarly beneficent, and similarly finds its term, not in some separate entity called the State or Nation, but in individuals.

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Now, the interests and sympathies through which Patriotism is nurtured, and through which, also, it makes its reciprocal gift of life, are the essential ground and constitutive bond of national unity. A nation is a whole, not simply because of the common dwelling-place of its members, but because of the common life that informs it, and it is by this common life that Patriotism is quickened, and in this common life that Patriotism lives. This characteristic unity of reciprocal service brings us near to the thought that the nation is not *merely* a political or an industrial construct, but distinctively an *ethical organism*. What this thought means, and to what conclusions it points, we shall, I hope, sufficiently discover before we reach the end of this Essay.

CHAPTER II

THE NATION AS A MORAL ORGANISM

I

OUR first chapter has left us with these conclusions : —Patriotism means, as it is generally understood to mean, love of country, and this love is the natural response to some felt spiritual value in the Fatherland, —a value that makes citizenship in the Fatherland helpful for life, and for the purposes and aims of life.

This value is not something extrinsic to the nation, —something put into it, as it were, from without,—nor is it a mere accident of the nation's life. The helpfulness that makes Patriotism possible has its ground in the very facts that make a nation truly a nation. It comes to us from human lives,—from the lives of those who, by fellowship in sympathy and work, have, in times past, built up the fabric of our state, and formed that national tradition of manhood which lives in and around us to-day as a benedictory strength,—from the lives, too, of those who, in our own time, so serve the Fatherland that the citizenship they share with others becomes, for those others, an abiding and transforming inspiration. It arises out of the helpfulness of man to man, and that helpfulness, as it lives in common sympathies and in common work, is the constitutive bond of national unity, and the source of a nation's constitutive life.

The Nation as a Moral Organism

A nation is not a physical or quasi-physical aggregate,—nor is it constituted by the fact that the individuals who compose it share a common geographical dwelling-place. A common country they must, indeed, have, but the bond that makes them a nation is not merely or distinctively geographical. Primarily and essentially, a nation is a *community*, and, what is more, a community of persons. Now, personality is an ultimate fact in the universe of contingent Being. We think of it as indiscernible and impenetrable, and our more searching analysis reports it irreducible, so that we cannot conceive of it as at any time arising out of antecedents that were merely *things*, or as at any time losing itself in an impersonal Absolute. It can only cease to be what it is by ceasing to exist. Thus, it stands for ultimate and essential separateness of being, for ultimate individuality. And yet crude individualism is not a possible faith, for the individuals who, as personal, seem to be essentially refractory to our integrating thought, do, in fact, form organic communities in which the whole has rights that sometimes override, or seem to override, individual rights, and ends that sometimes are or seem to be in conflict with individual ends. How, then, are these separate units thus bound together and built up into an all-embracing polity that acts as though it were rightfully sovereign. It cannot be by mere juxtaposition,—by the sharing of a common country. This might, perhaps, give us a horde; it would not by itself give us even a crowd, from which the thought of a common interest or purpose is inseparable,—it certainly could not give us a true community,—it could not give us a nation.

The gulf between *this* individual and *that* can be bridged only by sympathy and by copartnership in

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purpose and in work: in any place and at any time it is only through these that communities of men subsist. Nor does history, even in its widest survey and longest retrospect, show us any time or any place where these were not present. Civil communities did not arise by mutual contract between men who, before that contract, knew no fraternity,—who, before that contract, knew neither civil ties nor common interests, nor aught of associated endeavour or general purpose. They came first, not by art or device of man, but by the silent policy of Nature, which, from the very beginning, made man social.

It is a misleading dream to fancy that history began with individuals, for in the very dawn of history men were grouped together into societies. Even if we look back, beyond all that can properly be called recorded history, into those unchronicled centuries and millenniums that connect human history with geological times, the essential facts remain unaltered. Even then, in that far-off past about which we can do little more than surmise, man was not solitary, but social: even then the historical unit was—not the individual, but the group. We may say, if we will, that the earliest human past has a long history behind it,—that the first beginnings of human nature were framed and fashioned in brute bodies when as yet there were no men upon all the face of the earth. Be it so, but, in that undated past, Nature, in her pre-human laboratory, was preparing the material, not for a new species of merely atomistic individuals, but for a species of which the very nature would be social, so that the first men, when they came, were not solitary, but bound together in families or in groups.

The fact which was thus characteristic of the very

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commencement of man's history has been characteristic of it ever since. Always and everywhere it has been a history of life in society,—a history of common purposes and common hopes, of common sufferings and common achievements,—a history, in fine, of social evolution. And this social history has given us the nations of to-day,—has given us them, not as accidents, or as by-products, but as its characteristic result.

We think of the first men as pursuing a savage industry, for the bare necessities of life, in small and scattered groups. By what means, out of those rude beginnings, were the nations of later history developed? By increase of numbers, by common interests and by mutual helpfulness therein, and by common sympathies. Conquest has often brought separate peoples under one sovereignty, but it has made them one nation only in so far as it has made them partakers in one life,—only in so far as it has given to them a common vocation and a common loyalty. In some given case the unifying vocation may seem to be wholly practical,—it may seem to be only a vocation to build up and maintain a given form of industrial or commercial polity,—but it becomes constructively effectual in nation-making, not as merely practical, but through, and only through, the interests and the sympathies it awakens and develops. It is these human interests and human sympathies that are the true bonds of human society,—not the seemingly material business of a nation's daily life, but the interacting and co-operating spiritual activities by which that business is carried on,—not the currency of a common law, but the common life which that presupposes and helps to foster.

Each existing nation has behind it a long history,

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during which it has been slowly built up into oneness of life, and the effective agents in that movement of synthesis have been—what? Simply the activities, the interests, the sympathies of individual human lives. It is thus that differences of class and province have been overcome,—thus that men have been made “members one of another,” have been joined together in a common purpose and a common allegiance.

It is true that the outward appearances of history seem to have been largely shaped and determined by non-ethical agents,—by the accidents of geographical situation, by the vicissitudes of war, and by economic changes. If, however, we are careful to use words strictly, we find ourselves constrained to say that these external things, in and by themselves, are never agents in history. They become operative in a nation's life only through the human interests they awaken and foster, through the human sympathies they develop, and it is these interests and sympathies—not their external conditions—that are the real agents in historical construction and change. It is through these, and only through these, that men possess a common life,—through these, and only through these, that they are linked together in the organic unity of national order. Nations are built up, not by physical agencies, but by spiritual activities,—by a spiritual synthesis that joins life to life in common interests, in common sympathies, and in reciprocal co-operation. Nations exist through the helpfulness of man to man. Each is held together—informed and constituted—by the distinctive common life which this helpfulness creates, and it grows as this helpfulness grows.

External circumstances—geographical, economic, and political—become formative in history only in

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and through human personality. Human history is a creation of the human spirit, and historical growth is always a spiritual growth,—a growth of the human spirit into new and wider forms of associated life. External circumstances, as such, do but furnish that spirit with opportunities, and constitute the conditions within which its life has to be acted out,—within which it is to seek self-realisation. They become operative in history only through human interests, and those interests, simply because they are human interests, are always distinctively spiritual—distinctively ethical,—even when their immediate concern is with “the bread that perisheth.”

If we could imagine a society organised only for material ends as such,—without any reference to or any influence upon any human interests, and without either place or provision for those interests,—such a society might or might not be a more or less effective industrial machine, but it would not be a true community,—most certainly it would not be a nation.

A nation, therefore, is the outcome of a spiritual process,—a product of spiritual agencies. These agencies, it is true, have worked upon a definite geographical theatre, but the result is what it is—a true community, an ethical organism—not because of the theatre upon which it has been wrought out, but because of the forces that have thereon fashioned it.

Take, for example, our own English history. What is it that makes us English folk truly one people? Not the bare fact that for a thousand years and more we have lived together between the Cheviots and the Channel, but because, between the Cheviots and the Channel, we have found a common work, and wrought out a common life,—because the wasteful discipline

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of war, fruitful co-operation in peace, long fellowship in suffering and endeavour, and comradeship in many a fight for freedom, have overcome the differences which first armed Northumbria against Mercia, Wessex against West Wales, Saxon against Dane, and both against Norman, and those also which later, within the one polity of the mediæval kingdom, made the country-side half-servile, the Church half-alien, and the baronage an armed oppression. It is because of these past victories of developing brotherliness over the particularism of class and province,—not merely because our forefathers were neighbours,—that we who to-day live upon English ground are all fellow-citizens in one free commonwealth, partners in a common industry, inheritors of a common tradition, sharers of a common hope. We are a nation because, in some sufficing measure, we have grown together into unity of life,—because, within our borders, hostility has given place to brotherhood,—as yet, indeed, far from perfect, but even now effectively real,—because the mutual helpfulness of man to man has made this English land of ours truly our home, and because, within that home, we, as members of one family, have become knit together by common interests and by common work, by common purposes and by common hopes, by common sanctities and by common ideals.

“Objectively,” therefore, as a fact upon the theatre of history, a nation exists as a distinctively spiritual construct, or, more accurately,—since “construct” suggests a process of “putting together” which is entirely and merely mechanical, and has no illustration in the vital processes by which history builds up nations,—as a distinctively spiritual growth.

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It is another aspect of the same truth to say that the individual consciousness of nationality is, also, fundamentally spiritual, for it is fashioned out of elements that belong, distinctively, to the spiritual life of man, and have their ground in that spiritual personality which constitutes his essential nature. A common sense of nationality arises out of common charities and enmities, common hopes and fears, common loyalties and aspirations, common sufferings and achievements, and these common experiences are distinctively spiritual experiences, these common activities are distinctively spiritual activities.

Let us take an example. What is it that a man affirms of himself when, with full meaning and clear consciousness, he says, "I am an Englishman"? He means, not simply that he is a native of English land, but that, with all others who bear the English name, he is a co-heir of English history, a fellow-labourer in the broad fields of English life,—a sharer with them in a common vocation, in a common sympathy, and a common practical loyalty. He has his part, and knows that he has his part, in the co-operating activities that maintain the fabric of the English State,—in the mutual helpfulness in life and industry that makes Englishmen truly one people. He shares in whatever makes English life generally valuable for English folk—he shares in it, and he contributes to it. It is this community of interest and of work that makes him truly English. Even if, in some particular case, this fulness of meaning be not consciously his, there must be present to his thought some more or less clear reference to a larger life in which he participates, and to which he contributes. However narrow his

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individual life, there must be in it something that lifts him out of the separateness of his narrowly personal concerns and gives him community of interest and sympathy with those around him. That "something" may not amount to very much,—a hundred years ago the most conspicuous element in it may well have been hatred of the French or loyalty to King George,—but whatever it be, and however small it be, it makes its possessor consciously part of the nation,—it gives him a sense of nationality, whereby he is not simply a man, but an Englishman.

COUNTRY AND FATHERLAND

Because the history of a nation is thus, essentially, spiritual, the territory upon which that history is enacted ceases to be merely the nation's dwelling-place, and becomes its Fatherland.

I have spoken of a nation's country as the theatre upon which the story of its life is acted out, and, at first, when the nation is only in the making, its country is little more than this,—little more than the theatre of its life. And a theatre, of course, it always remains, but it does not remain *simply* a theatre, any more than a house in which a man has long lived remains simply a house. The house—because of the memories that gather round it, because of the present beneficence and informing sanctity of the life it shelters,—becomes a home, and, in a quite similar way, the country becomes a Fatherland. Each takes up into itself, as it were, somewhat of the sacredness of the life it enshrines, and, to imagination and affection, it becomes a symbol of that life's helpfulness. A symbol? Yes, and more than a symbol, for, in

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whatever degree a country or house is truly home-like, it becomes identified in our feeling with the life that makes it home-like, and itself becomes a partner in that life's beneficence.

II

THE NATURE OF A MORAL ORGANISM

The nation is, as we have seen, the characteristic result of a history that is distinctively spiritual,—it is characteristically a spiritual growth. This description is, however, only preliminary, for the nation is not only a spiritual growth,—it is essentially an ethical organism.

Now, why do we so speak of it? What is it that makes the nation, not only an organism, but, characteristically, an ethical organism?

We might seek an answer by immediately analysing either our own idea of a nation, or some actual form of national life made known to us in history. Ideas, however, are always one remove, at least, from "fact." They are abstractions,—formed by abstraction for certain immediate purposes of thought,—and, as such, they belong to that "work of the mind" which the English tradition in philosophy distinguishes so emphatically from the "work of Nature." On the other hand, every actual form of national life is so complex that it will be well if we can begin by examining some simple case that falls under the same category.

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Fortunately, we all know such a case intimately, for we ourselves are severally, not only organisms, but ethical organisms.

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(1) In the first place, however, what do we mean by "organism"? Negatively, I think, we may describe an organism as something that is not a machine.

It is characteristic of a machine—essential in the idea of it as a machine,—that it is always a tool,—that it always subserves some end outside of itself. But an organism is its own end,—it exists primarily for its own sake. If it be conscious and intelligent, we say that it is self-determined,—determined by the idea of itself; if it be not conscious, we say that the co-ordinate activity of its several parts subserves the maintenance of its own life, and subserves that only. This co-operant work may have other results than this,—perhaps, many and important,—but these others are only incidental and extraneous: the organism does not exist for the sake of them, nor does it, strictly speaking, subserve the end or ends for which they are useful.

Now, the personal life of man is characteristically thus self-determined. Man—the individual man,—is always an end in himself: he has no other end,—no end not subservient to his own life. However many and however various the practical ends that from time to time immediately determine his conduct, those ends are ends only because thus subservient. Even when the servant of another's will, he is never *merely* a servant, but always has rights which morally transcend every claim that any one else can possibly have upon him. He is always intrinsically valuable; in the world of practice he has an intrinsic primacy, and can never be rightly used as a mere tool.

But this moral primacy is not, in itself, sufficient to constitute man an organism. A perfectly simple being might have a like primacy, but it would not be an organism, for an organism must always be structurally

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complex—it must always have parts, or, at least, more than one constituent. This complexity we find in the personal life of man. We ordinarily, indeed, think of that life as essentially unitary, but it is never a simple unity, for many things—activities, thoughts, purposes, emotions—enter into it as constituents. Human life on its subjective side, is indefinitely—I had almost said “infinitely”—complex, but however various and however numerous the elements that compose it, they are embraced within the personal unity of the individual subject, and embraced therein, not as a mere congeries—an unordered manifold,—but as a system. Moreover, the system thus constituted is determined, both in the arrangement of its parts and in the co-ordination of its complex activities, by the nature of the personal subject, and is governed by its ideals,—subordinated to its individual ends. “Governed by its ideals!”—then, after all, it may be said, the constituents of human life are only *instruments*,—subservient to ends which are not immediately their own? The criticism is just, but it is only verbal. The various elements in man’s personal life are not separable, save in thought, from the self which calls them its own. They are not external to the self, and possessed by it as a man may possess a hundred sovereigns. They are the self’s own in a much more intimate sense, because they *are* the self. In all activity, the soul is acting; in all thought, it is thinking; in all purpose, it is purposing; in all emotion, it is feeling. All these are forms of the soul’s own life, disclosures of its inner character, and, because the soul is not a chaos but a cosmos, all these inevitably fall into a systematic order which expresses, more or less completely, the nature of the soul, and is governed by the soul’s own end.

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Therefore, in the organic unity of personal life there is no subservience to extraneous ends. The activities of the soul are the soul itself variously in act; because the soul is self-determined, they are self-determined. The soul is a self-determined unity. Therefore, the soul's life is unitary and self-determined, and its unity is precisely that of an organism. The several "parts" of the soul manifest in the constituents of its continuous life are determined by the soul itself,—by the "whole" in which they are integral,—and they subserve the self-determined end of that "whole." Therefore, their unity is the unity of an organism.

(2) The life and nature of man were, however, to illustrate not only our conception of an organism, but, also, our conception of an ethical organism. Do they do this?

Let us again begin with definition. What do we mean by an ethical organism? We mean, I think, an organism self-determined to self-realisation.

(a) Now, obviously, self-determination means at least *this*,—determination by the nature of the agent. If, however, this be its full meaning, it cannot, by itself, indicate the characteristic difference between a machine and an organism, for nothing—neither machine nor organism, the human spirit nor a printing-press,—can act contrary to its nature.

It will, perhaps, be said that self-determination carries also with it the thought of determination from *within*, as distinguished from determination from *without*,—that the end of a self-determined agent is appointed for it by that agent's own nature, and not imposed upon it by external authority or force. This, again, is true; but this further definition also stops

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short of the characteristic note of an organism. That note we have found to be "determination to itself as its own end." An organism is determined by its own nature to an end appointed by that nature, and that end is the organism itself. Herein we have the full idea of self-determination, and we can now complete our definition in this way:—Self-determination means, not simply the determination of an agent by its own nature, but the determination of an agent by itself—or by its own nature,—to itself as its own end.

Now, self-determination may be either conscious or unconscious. We ordinarily think of the lower animal organisms as unconscious, or, at least, as destitute of self-consciousness. When we speak of one of these organisms as self-determined we mean only that its activities are co-ordinated to subserve its own life. But if the agent be self-conscious,—as man is,—what does self-determination imply? In man it implies self-realisation.

(b) In self-realisation we have the second factor in the idea of an ethical organism. What do we mean by it? We mean the realisation of the self by the self. Evidently, then, it implies a transition of the potential into the actual, whereby the potential becomes "real." In other words, self-realisation is a process of development. But the development which takes place in self-realisation is not precisely comparable with that which—according to the doctrine of evolution,—is creative within the biological series. It may be true to say that all the higher forms of animal life are descended from Protozoa; it were, however, not true, but, on the contrary, misleading, to say that in those earliest Protozoa the distinctive characteristics of their higher descendants were

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potential. Those characteristics, until they appeared, were, not potential, but simply non-existent.

By what changes in an organism is biological development carried on? By new cell-growths, by the re-disposition of existing cells, by cell-atrophy, and by intimate atomic and molecular changes which are, I suppose, nothing more than changes in position or vibration,—in the position and vibration of the atoms and molecules themselves or of yet more ultimate constituents of matter. None of these changes, however, involve any transition of the potential into the actual,—any passing of potency into act. A group of cells produces a new cell-growth—incited thereto by external stimulus or by inner physiological determinants. But this production is only a form of *re*-production. It takes place by cell-division, and the power of reproduction by division is a common property of living cells. The group that commences a new structure has no unique character determining it to be creative, nor can we say that the new structure had any pre-existent being in it. Is it said that the new structure existed therein as a potentiality? Not so, for a potentiality is something actual which has not yet grown into the completeness of its nature, and in those originating cells, before they became creative, there was no actual existent that could be described as the embryo or incomplete form of the later growth. Had we then made exhaustive inquiry into their nature nothing had rewarded our labour but the structural and physiological facts determinant or constitutive of their then actual character and life, and in those facts, had we analysed them, we had not discovered anything not expressed in that then present character and life. Is it said that we had discovered the possibility of

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change? But what is a possibility of change—of biological change? It expresses at the most, I think, nothing more than the fact that, under new conditions, a given number of atoms, or of other ultimate or penultimate forms of matter, will re-arrange themselves,—will take up new positions,—or will vibrate differently. But this cannot, without mischievous license, be said to constitute a potentiality, for potency must always be something more than indefinite possibility of change. Professor Tyndall's originating fire-clouds could not have contained the promise or potency of anything.

Therefore, biological development—according to that view of it which is, I suppose, orthodox,—is not a process of self-realisation, for it does not disclose or involve that characteristic transition of the potential into the actual which is the distinctive note of every process that can be rightly so named.

On the other hand, we cannot rightly interpret the spiritual development of man—whether we view it upon the narrow theatre of an individual life or trace it through the uncounted millenniums of history,—without supposing it to involve that transition.

It is characteristic of human life that it has ideals. These embody man's desires,—they set forth what he desires to be. Some of them, indeed, immediately set forth what man desires to *have*, but even these possessory ideals have their term in man himself,—in some better or more desirable kind of life. We desire this or that good thing, not for its own sake, but for ours,—because possession of it would, we think, enhance the felt value of life, and, by making experience more pleasant, or in some other way, would make life more worth living.

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Our ideals, therefore, are not only ideals *for* life ; they are, also, ideals *of* life. Some of them, too, have this further characteristic,—they set forth not only what man *desires* to be, but also what he *ought* to be. Of these, some are ideals of duty, and are immediately normative for conduct. Others, however, set forth, not an external claim upon man,—be it God's or society's,—but man's claim upon society and—dare we say upon God, or shall we rather say upon the ultimate order that conditions his life ? Such an one, for instance,—not the highest, but sufficiently representative,—is the ideal of happiness, which sets forth, not something to be *done*, but something that is *due*, or that is conceived to be due.

In such an ideal there is latent the significant conclusion that man finds the norm of his life in his own nature,—in his nature as a whole, or in some particular capacity of enjoying or of doing. That normative nature or capacity claims full opportunity,—claims it as a right,—and will assert its claim against the most imperious limitations of circumstance. Nor is this claim merely academic : it passes into action, and becomes one of the most destructive and creative forces in history.

An ideal of duty, precisely because it is an ideal of duty, seems, at first sight, widely different. It indeed sets forth a claim, but a circumscribing, not an emancipating claim,—a claim *upon* man, not a claim *by* man. It points to a norm of life which appears to have its ground, not in human nature, but in some external authority,—in divine or human legislation, in the customs and expectations of society. But that authority—however it be construed,—is recognised by man himself as valid : his conscience re-affirms the code that he is

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required to obey. He knows that he *ought* to be what this or that ideal of duty *calls* him to be. Where, then, is the ultimate ground of this recognised validity, of this confessed obligation? Is it not here,—in the fact that obedience to an ideal of duty enhances the felt value of life, and, by the specific character it gives to life,—through its constraining discipline, and through the new experience and service to which it leads,—makes life more worth living?

All man's ideals of life, then,—ideals of duty no less than those informed by as yet "unmoralised" desires and claims,—rest upon an authority intrinsic in his own nature, and presuppose that nature to be normative of its own life.

As we have seen, all ideals have their term in some better or more desirable kind of life,—that is, in some more satisfying exercise of human capacity, in some more satisfying expression of human nature. They set forth our better possibilities, and are, therefore, ideals of self-realisation. In so far as we achieve them, potency passes into act.

In what way potentialities exist in man we do not know. That they do exist is certain. They are the ground of his ideals; their felt and promissory worth (making evident the value of the actualities, the better ways and completer forms of life, they denote) is the sanction of those ideals; through aspiration and discontent they powerfully affect conduct, and issue, not only in the unobtrusive re-ordering of private lives, but now in the triumphs of martyrdom, and now in the turbulence of revolution.

All man's ideals, then, are ideals of self-realisation. But, because his nature is unitary, his ideals, to be practicable, must be concordant. As first fashioned

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by the promptings of his nature, they are variously informed;—some by conceptions of duty, some by claims of right, and some by desires for happiness, for the gladness of life. These three groups, if taken separately, would be diversely determinant of conduct, of character, of manhood. But human nature, because it is an organic whole, cannot be determined to ends that are inconsistent with each other, and, because it is an organism, it can have but one end,—itself. How, then, are the original differences between man's ideals overcome? They are overcome in the normative conception of completeness of life.

Nor is this reconciliation merely verbal. It is brought about by a true synthesis of ideals, and not by playing with their common term,—self-realisation. Yet that common term is at once the ground of reconciliation, and the means by which it is brought about.

To us, who have inherited twenty centuries of Christian tradition, conscience is sovereign over the whole of life, or, more accurately, perhaps, it reveals values that are universal, and an authority that is omnipresent. Right and Wrong, Good and Bad—the characteristic predicates of ethical judgment—are not limited to acts of momentous choice, when difficult alternatives compel us to deliberate, or when embattled temptations make the instant fateful for Eternity. They range over the whole of life, and are applicable to every aspect of character. Similarly, the authority they disclose is not one that touches only an isolated province of life; it is present everywhere, and everywhere claims an undivided allegiance.

But all this has become known to man only through gradual discovery. At first the Court of Conscience was a provincial court, and the code it applied short

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and fragmentary. In the widening of its jurisdiction and the development of its code we have characteristic notes of ethical progress.

This widening of the range and increase in the *corpus* of ethical law has been intimately connected with a progressive change in man's thought concerning the authority articulate in that law. That authority has been successively thought of as external and internal. So long as men conceived it to be external, and did not attribute any definitely moral character to the subject in whom they thought it inherent, the commands and prohibitions of the moral code could be thought of only as arbitrary, and ethical value could be recognised only in particular acts of obedience or disobedience, and in these taken, not as expressions of character, as disclosures of an informing spirit, but as *mere facts*. "Ritualism" in morals is the natural result of an "unmoralised" doctrine of God.

But, as men came to think of God as righteous,—of His nature as essentially good,—they saw that He cannot be satisfied with such externalism, and that His legislation cannot be arbitrary or unjust. This prepared the way for two of the most important developments in ethical thought,—for the conception

(a) that ethical value is found only in character, and

(b) that even Divine law must be determined to the good of man.

Because, however, ethical values are found throughout the *whole* of life, and because human life is essentially unitary, the true subject in ethical predication is character as a whole, or, more accurately, the spiritual personality as a whole.

This, we know, is the plain teaching of Christian ethics. The Christian salvation is for the *whole* man.

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"In Christ" we become, not merely different in this or that particular, but "new creatures": through "the power of His resurrection" we are "born again" into "newness of life."

How, then, does Christianity reconcile man's various ideals,—his ideals of duty, which sometimes seem conflicting, his ideals of happiness, his claims of right? It reconciles them in and through Love, in which the fellowship of man with man becomes complete,—in which all other forms of fellowship are consummated. Claims of right are protests against injustice, but Love is solvent of injustice, and gives a kindlier liberty than that our discontent would seize. Love calls us often to arduous and lonely service, along ways remote from the pathways of desire, but, for the refreshment of our hope and the renewal of our strength, it daily repeats that first miracle at Cana and turns Life's desert-waters into Eucharistic wine, and, at the end of the long day it gives us—let those who know it tell!—a gladness beyond utterance and a peace none other than the perfect peace of God. Rightfully, indeed, is Love said to be "the bond of perfectness," and rightfully do we think of it as the informing spirit of that Living Body which is the Everlasting City of our God.

But, because Love is verily "the bond of perfectness," it is more than that. In the life of Love our manhood becomes complete. Everything that we can be or do is made perfect in or through Love. Through Love, Industry becomes most serviceable, Art most revealing, Thought most helpful: in it every affection and sympathy is consummated, every interest ennobled, every heroism made complete. It is the strength alike of faith and of hope; through it Life's charities become more gracious, Life's equities more

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generous; by it every sovereignty is made a primacy for service, and every service is made God-like.

This, then, is the Christian ideal,—manhood grown into its own completeness in and through Love. In this ideal all other ideals of self-realisation are unified and consummated. But, because this ideal is consummating, it is also sovereign, and, because sovereign, it is also the end to which man as an ethical organism is characteristically self-determined.

But why is man self-determined to that ideal, and how does it become operative in his life?

The last few pages have, I hope, made the answers obvious. Man is self-determined to the ideal of his life's completeness—that is, to the moral ideal—because, in that completeness, all that makes his life intrinsically valuable to him,—all that makes it worth living,—would be completely beneficent.

Of the consummating beatitude of that consummating life he has, already, hints. His ideals, as we have seen, have their ground in his own nature, which is not, like God's, pure act, but an organism of potentialities,—an actuality incompletely developed. His potentialities, however, are not passive. They are themselves actualities, as potentialities must ever be, and, as such, are the determinants of his present life, and the ground of his present experience. And his present life, although incomplete, has its own intrinsic value,—moments of buoyant gladness and deep content, of ennobling achievement and sanctifying service,—and in this present value he may see, brokenly and dimly, "as in a glass, darkly," how great a thing his life would be were all its possibilities completely fulfilled. Nor is this all. The potentialities, the unfulfilled possibilities, of his life are the actualities

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that now determine it,—each reaching out after its own good,—and in this endeavour somewhat of potency is ever passing into act. But these dynamic potentialities are not so many isolated energies that can work out through different histories to separate and different ends. They are integral in a living organism,—in a nature that is essentially unitary. Each, then, is conditioned by the others, and the gains of each are for the “whole,” and are co-ordinated in the life of the whole. In all endeavour after particular forms of good, it is the soul itself that is acting: in every transition of potentiality into actuality it is the soul itself that is becoming more completely “real.”

The moral ideal, then, is operative in life through the potentialities of human nature. Indeed, it has its ground in those potentialities, and does but set forth their complete actuality. As a recognised ideal it is yet recent upon the theatre of history, but although only lately explicit in Thought, it has, from the beginning, been implicit in Life, for it is the immanent and determining form of man's essential nature. The history of his ethical thought is the history of his discovery of it: the history of the world is the record of his progressive realisation of it.

(c) Man, then, is a self-determined organism,—an organism determined by its own nature, determined, also, by and to its own ideal, by the thought of itself as better or more perfect. But why do we speak of that organism as moral? Why do we call it an ethical organism? In effect, because it is governed by the moral ideal. That ideal is always an ideal of self-realisation,—always an ideal in which the soul itself is conceived as better or more complete.

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The true object of moral preference is, not some abstract good extrinsic to the soul,—it is the soul itself conceived as acting in some more excellent way, or as possessing some better or more desirable character. Even when this ideal is not explicitly confessed, it is yet implicit in the very nature of the soul, and silently operative in its life,—building up character and determining choice and action.

Openly or occultly, then, the moral ideal is the true architect of history and of life. The end appointed for man by the very constitution of his nature, and pre-determined for him before history began, is not an external end, unrelated to his interests and desires. It is none other than the completeness of his own nature, and in that end all that makes life valuable to him will be made perfect. He has thought of that completeness in many ways,—often in very imperfect ways,—but, whatever the passing fashion of his thought, behind and in all his morality and all his art, behind and in all his politics and all his religion, there has always been the living potency of his own nature reaching out, through particular forms of good, towards the full actuality of the ideal that has informed it from the beginning.

Nor is this progressive self-realisation narrowly egoistic, for, in and behind all the achievements and all the architecture of history and of life, the *natura naturans* has ever been a spirit that can attain completeness only in and through Love.

THE NATIONAL ORGANISM

Let us now turn from the individual to the nation. Just as the individual man is an ethical organism,—

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"an organism self-determined to self-realisation,"—so, also, is the individual nation. But there is one obvious and characteristic difference. In the one case it is the integrals in an individual nature—the capacities of an individual self—that are coefficients in the unity of the organic whole; in the other case it is individuals. In other words, the nation, in contrast with the individual man, is a *discrete*, not a *concrete* organism.

This contrast, however, immediately suggests a preliminary difficulty. If the nation be an organism, it can have no end other than itself,—other than its own distinctive nature and life. But, on the other hand, every individual constituent of the nation is also self-determined,—self-determined by himself to himself, to the completeness of his own individual nature and life, as his characteristic end. As members of a body politic,—as integral in a political organism,—the individuals thus self-determined are participant in a common life which is sovereign over them, or, more accurately, sovereign in them; but, for each of them, the particular end of his own individual life is also sovereign. How, then, are these two conceptions reconciled,—the conception, on the one hand, of the self-determined nation, and, on the other, that of the self-determined individual? They are reconciled in and by the moral ideal. That ideal is, primarily, an ideal of the completeness of individual life, but the completeness it sets forth is that of manhood made perfect in and through Love. Therefore, it is an ideal that cannot be reached by any solitary endeavour, however long-continued, for Love cannot live in solitude. Her home is among the clustering dwellings of men, and if, perchance, she be found far-off in the wilderness, some sweetness of human fellowship had

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redeemed the silent sands from loneliness before she ventured forth. Therefore, man can grow into likeness to his ideal only in and through society,—only in and through sympathy and co-operative endeavour. A practicable ideal that can be realised only in the life of Love presupposes a society instrumental to the nature determined to that ideal.

But can we verify this presupposition? I think we can. The proof is twofold,—derived, in part, from the importance of the opportunities and influences of social life as factors in the moral development of the individual and of the race, and, in part, from the very nature of society as a spiritual construct or growth.

(1) The first of these sources of proof needs little exploration. Each one of us knows how largely his own individual life has been shaped, how largely his character determined, his manhood developed or restricted, by his social environment. Each is what he is because the lines have fallen unto him in *this* place and not in *that*. More or less of capacity—capacity for thought, for feeling, for various forms of practical activity,—is, of course, original in each one of us. But capacity can be exercised only in so far as we have opportunity, and our opportunities are determined by our environment,—partly by our natural environment, but partly and chiefly by our social environment. Society, moreover, is not a dead environment,—it is a besetting life, and its life affects our own not only through the opportunities it gives or withholds, but through thoughts that interact with our own, through feelings that awaken responsive feelings, and through its immemorial tradition of manhood which lives also in us as regulative and normal. Even if some have achieved success seemingly in spite of their

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surroundings, it is only because they have made use of more difficult opportunities, not because they have been independent of opportunities.

Nor are we of to-day unique in our relation to the society around us. At all times and in all places man's life has been conditioned, for better or for worse, by his environment. All that constitutes civilisation, as he has hitherto known it, is a social product; Art, Science, and Philosophy have been built up as society has given opportunity and invitation; the world's natural religions are social growths, and even "super-natural" religion is mediated through social life and social institutions. Whatever gain of character and manhood has been wrought out in man, since the first unrecorded beginnings of his history, has been wrought out, in and through (if not always *by*) society.

(2) The second proof, however, carries us beyond such empirical generalisations. A nation, as we have seen, is an organic growth. It has arisen out of the mutual intercourse and co-operation of men;—in part inadvertently, as a natural result of concurrent and co-operant lives; in part through design, for the protection or furtherance of particular practical interests.

Now, in so far as it is designedly fashioned by human interests, the nation is obviously an instrumental construction, determined to human ends. But is it also instrumental in its unintended nature and activity?

I have spoken of the nation as a construct, a growth, a result of the associated and interacting lives of men. But we must be careful to avoid the dangers of a false realism. The nation is no more separate or separable from the individuals who constitute it than are psychical states from the individual self that knows them as

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its own. In each case separation is possible only in thought, and, in each case, if separation be made, the result is, not anything actual, but only an abstraction,—an abstraction that has, indeed, *being* in the mind that conceives it, but not *existence* in the world of "fact." Just as a psychical state has actuality only in the personal self which it momentarily makes manifest, so a nation has actuality only in its constituent individuals. National life is but an aspect of individual life; its perduring history is but the history of successive generations.¹ A national tradition lives only

¹ History, indeed, is other than biography, for it is the record, not of single, but of associated lives,—of national achievements and vicissitudes, and not of individual fortunes and work, except in so far as these obviously affect national life. But, as thus defined, history, like every other special science, deals, not with the concrete facts of existent Reality in their actual integrity, but with only one particular aspect of them. In other words, it obtains its subject-matter by abstraction. History is the biography of nations, but, as the argument in the text is intended to show, a nation exists only in its constituent individuals. Therefore, the history of a nation is the history of a certain group and succession of individuals, and, because the lives of men are so intimately associated and so variously reagent one upon the other, a complete history would presuppose a complete "Dictionary of National Biography." Of course, no such dictionary exists or can exist. Fortunately, however, for the purposes of the historian, men act in groups and crowds. Large numbers have common interests, and the events that, for better or for worse, affect one life affect many lives. Therefore, one biography, if properly written, is widely illustrative. Moreover, certain individuals are, because of the pre-eminence of their station, so central, and, because of the range and character of their influence, so predominant, that their biographies have unique value, and, as historical documents, would quite outweigh the life-records of thousands of the unremembered and undistinguished.

Nevertheless, the history of a nation is more than a biography of great men, and an illustration of general causes. It is the biography of an organic society, and can become complete only as it takes account of all that has been integral in the life of that society. It is the history of a people, and nothing that illustrates that people's life—whether derived

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in individual hearts and minds; a national custom is but an established way of private behaviour; a national policy but the expression of certain individual opinions and wills. Even institutions, which seem the moulds of life, are forms of life. They are ways of grouping, modes of association, determinations of individual duty and purpose. They have historical reality only in characteristic relations between individuals, and these relations have their ground in the thoughts and feelings of individuals. Monarchy, Parliament, the Family, Trades-Unions, and learned Societies,—all alike have no other reality and no other ground. The concrete reality of all that a nation is and has exists only in individual lives. Except as an expression of individual natures, an aspect of individual lives, the nation has no existence.

If this be true, it follows—

(a) That national life is a form of individual self-realisation, and, as such, is determined to the moral ideal;

(b) That the nation, as an organism,—no less than its constituent individuals,—is informed by the potency of that ideal.

Thus far, however, we have not discovered any ground for attributing to the nation, as an incidental construct or growth, the instrumental character presupposed in it by the moral ideal. But, as yet, we have considered the nation from only one point of view,—that of its constituent individuals *as a whole*.

from the biographies of the great or the fragmentary records of the poor, from the journals of Parliament, the rolls of a rural manor, or the inventory of a parish church,—is alien to it.

The actual dynamic factors in the world's life are not nations but individuals.

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Let us now ask—In what relation does it stand, not to that numerical whole, but to the single individual?

Our point of view now is that of the individual constituent, and we immediately discover in the nation a separateness that we could not discern from our earlier standpoint. The nation, as we have seen, does not exist separately from its constituent individuals as a whole: it lives only in them. But, because it lives only in *them*, we cannot say, concerning the individual constituent, that it lives only in *him*. It truly lives in him, but it lives in others also, and its separateness from him is nothing else than the separateness between man and man—between one constituent individual and the others.

When we English men and women were severally born into the world, we were not born into solitude or chaos, but into the midst of the English nation. That nation had been built up in the past by individual English lives, and we found it a presently existing fact in the lives of those around us. From our earliest days we have been environed by a life other than our own, and this environing life has not been neutral,—it has been, by turns, helpful and hindering. It has afforded us certain opportunities, and denied us others. It has informed us, more or less completely, with its traditions, and these, it may be, as they have reached us in our several places in the body politic, have not been wholly good. Its thoughts have shaped our own; its sympathies have evoked and exercised our own; the interests dominant in it have, in part, become our own, and, in part, have furthered or obstructed our own.

Now, all this illustrates the relations that characteristically subsist between the individual and the nation,—between each individual and the body politic

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in which he has part. But the individual, each individual, is, as we have seen, self-determined,—determined by himself, to the completeness of his own individual nature, as his characteristic end. Moreover, this end, as we have also seen, is consummating and sovereign: it has no peers, for it can have only instruments. This end is also man's ideal, and does but set forth the completeness of that which is already present in him as a developing potency,—or, more accurately, the completeness of that developing potency which constitutes his present actuality. Therefore, the norm of his life has its ground in his own nature, and not in his environment. That environment, it is true, limits and more or less controls his life, and thereby shapes his proximate ideals, but those proximate ideals are ideals only because they are forms of self-realisation. They are not imposed upon man from without, but shaped by him out of the possibilities that seem attainable, and the ground of their limited and subordinate sovereignty is in the nature that fashions them, not in the environment that restricts them.

Now, because man, the individual man, is determined by his own nature to the completeness of that nature as his sovereign and consummating end, it follows that life—his own personal life,—is the one thing that has intrinsic value for him.¹ Nor is this merely a fond persuasion of anthropocentric thought. Man is an end unto himself, not, primarily, because of a voluntary determination of his thought, but because of the involuntary determination of his essential nature,—a determination brought about, not by any act or purpose of man, but by the act and purpose

¹ Here, of course, "life" denotes a spiritual activity and experience, not merely existence in the body of this flesh.

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of God. To a self-conscious nature nothing can be more valuable than its own states,—the content of its own experience,—and God, whose providence is ever guided by His love, has appointed to the souls he has created an end wherein all that they hold valuable will be made perfect, and has, in each one of them, made the developing potency of that perfection the informing and determining principle of its life.

This gives to man, to the individual man,—to each individual man,—primacy in the world of created existence. Nature is not his prison, nor society his tyrant. The apparently heedless sequences of nature—cold even when beneficent,—are in the hands of that Creative Love which has given unto man his nature, and appointed unto him his end, and *this*—because it verily is Love, and not Irony,—will not disappoint the hope it has itself quickened. In society, man is himself sovereign, for the forms and usages of society are, as we have seen, expressions of man's own life, and are plastic to the spirit that informs them.

However august, then, the separate reality in which the nation confronts the individual, that reality is subordinate to him. It has ethical character¹ only as related in helpfulness or hindrance to his individual life, and ethical value only as it subserves that life. What is true of one individual is true of every individual. Therefore, the characteristic relation of the nation to its constituent individuals is that of instrument to agent. Only as instrumentally serviceable have the institutions and forms of society ethical value to man, and a rightful claim upon his allegiance.

¹ Ethical character belongs only to the modes and instruments of self-realisation, and to the latter, not in themselves, but only as instruments.

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The nation, therefore, is a moral organism because thus subordinate to individual ends—to the moral ideal of man's individual completeness of nature and life.

The preliminary course of our thought in the earlier part of this chapter had led us to think of the nation as an organism, and as, therefore, self-determined to itself as its own end. But we had also been led to think similarly of each of its constituent individuals, and out of the apparent inconsistency of these two conceptions there arose a difficulty. That difficulty has now been finally resolved by our discovery that the nation is characteristically an instrument,—subordinate to individual ends, even as it is the expression of individual lives.

The nation is a spiritual construct or growth because built up by spiritual processes, and constituted by facts that are, in themselves, essentially spiritual. It is an organism because it is determined to itself as its own characteristic end. It is an ethical organism because its end is not merely one of self-maintenance, but one of self-realisation,—the self-realisation of each of the individuals constituent in it, in whom alone it has concrete reality.

In this subordination of the body politic to individual ends,—to the completeness of individual life,—we have the ground of Patriotism, and in proportion as this helpful subordination becomes complete, Patriotism becomes complete.

This part of our argument may fittingly conclude in two inferences which will, I hope, be deemed obvious.

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(1) No existing nation is perfect.

(2) National polity and national life can become perfect and complete only as individual manhood becomes perfect and complete,—in and through the life of Love.

The nation is an ethical construct: only in and through Love can the sympathies and fellowships that edify it become complete. The nation is an ethical organism: only in and through Love can the natures it subserves become complete. The nation is an ethical instrument: only in and through Love can its helpfulness become complete.

In and through Love, and only thus, can Life, whether individual or national, be consummated, and History, which is the record of man's progressive self-realisation, is also the record of Life's increasing consummation.

Love, as we now think of it, and as some of us know it, is a late emergent upon the fields of history. In the first beginnings, indeed—ere Libyan workers in flint had laid the foundations of Egyptian civilisation, and when scattered groups of savage hunters roamed the valleys of the then larger Thames and Seine,—we cannot suppose it present. But, even then, though Love was not there, the potency that issues in Love was there, and through all the long succeeding ages that potency has been developing, lifting man's hope and purpose more above "the dark edges of the sensual ground," drawing men together into ever-widening fellowships. The first foundations of civil polity were, it may be, laid in life's poorer sympathies and lower interests, but as the work progressed it grew nobler. Now, Love herself is working into the

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fabric many a priceless stone. Her work is not yet finished, but it has been well begun, and the power that has commenced it, is able to complete it. Indeed, only through the work of Love can the building become complete. Other workers, with poorer tools, have wrought long and strenuously, but their work was only preparatory,—preparatory to that of the master-craftsman, and by the master-craftsman alone can the building be finished. Finished it one day will be, and then, History, which until now has been the Epic of Love, will become its perfect and eternal lyric.

III

CITIZENSHIP AND THE ETHICAL COMMUNITY

The nation being, as we have seen, distinctively an ethical organism, it follows that citizenship—membership in the nation—has, just as distinctively, an ethical vocation. Citizenship is not merely a franchise for the protection or furtherance of purely private interests,—a duty, privilege, or right which may, with a clear conscience, be neglected or exercised according to the varying individual incidence of public policy. A franchise, indeed, it is, but the freedom which it brings is freedom for service, and not simply for private gain. In other words, citizenship is a freedom for duty,—for a duty which is never *merely* self-regarding,—and (in a land like ours, where the essential liberties and humanities of life are slowly but surely becoming a common heritage), can only, very rarely, be *directly* self-regarding. For what is our duty? To become truly and completely men, to grow into the measure of the stature of the fulness of life

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made known to us in that ideal of manhood which is rightfully the sovereign of our lives. And that ideal is a catholic one, because it exists, not for the private benediction of this man or of that, but for the good of all. It is a catholic ideal, and, therefore, our allegiance to it pledges us to social helpfulness. It is, indeed, primarily, an ideal of the completeness of individual life, but the completeness to which it calls us is not selfish, but selfless, and can be attained only as we pass beyond the narrow circle of our own immediate personal concerns, and seek to help into fuller manliness and completer manhood all who confess the same allegiance. "All who confess the same allegiance?" The phrase came naturally, but it is not wide enough. The Moral Ideal is sovereign over *all* lives,—not only over those who confess its authority, but also over those who disregard that authority, or are unaware of it.

A common loyalty is indeed a bond of brotherliness but it does not limit brotherliness, for, deeper than confessed loyalty to one ideal, are those essential facts of human nature and of human life which make that ideal—whether it be confessed or not confessed,—the true goal of every individual life. A right faith makes brotherhood closer and more helpful, but it is not a necessary condition of brotherliness. Rather, if it be absent, is the need for brotherly helpfulness the more urgent. Therefore "our bounden duty and service" does not stop at those who are openly our fellows in a common loyalty; it goes out, also, and with the more industrious charity, to those who, along the darker ways of life, are groping after a good they cannot see and cannot name, and to those who, in yet deeper darkness, know not whether there be in life

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any good other than that which ministers to the lower needs of the passing hour. As our ideal is catholic, so also should be our service, and it is for such service—for nothing narrower, and for nothing poorer,—that citizenship makes us free.

In civic life, then, we have a loyalty to the moral ideal in its catholic significance. So long as men are narrowly and merely self-regarding, genuine community of life is impossible, for, to self-love, other lives are interesting only as possibly or actually the instruments of its own selfishness. But in so far as one so thinks of them, he does not share with them a common life,—there is no community of sovereign purpose, no equal fellowship in a common work. While *he* may so think of them, it is impossible for *them* so to think of themselves.

No man can regard himself as, of right, *merely* an instrument for another's gain, and in proportion as that other so thinks of him, and is able to make his thought good in practice, precisely in that proportion is there a denial of that equality of individual right upon which alone a true community can be founded.

Genuine community of life is possible only because the moral ideal is genuinely catholic. Apart from a catholic ideal, we could have, at the best, but an unstable equilibrium of conflicting selfish interests. Only because the ideal is truly catholic is brotherhood possible: only through the ideal as catholic is complete brotherhood attainable. In civic life, then, we have, not only a following of one ideal, but, in proportion as we enter into the true spirit of citizenship, we have, *as the especial characteristic of that life*, a common ministry of fraternal helpfulness. If, then, in the language of practical religion, we speak of citizenship

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as a trust, we do but emphasise, and that not unduly, its essential unselfishness.

Political selfishness is not merely a private failing, it is a public crime. It of necessity involves a denial of right to some one,—perhaps, to many. In so far as it prevails, it destroys all that makes a nation better than a horde or a slave-gang, and, in a healthy state of society, it would, if persistent, become penal,—as rightfully penal as overt treason.

Citizenship, then, means not only membership in a political society,—it means, also, unselfish devotion to the common good. Civic life is a collective following of the moral ideal. From the final interpretations of our reflective thought we know this "following" of the ideal to be, ultimately, for ends that are the ends of individuals; but, as we are intimately familiar with it in the dynamic unfolding of life, we know that, immediately and practically, it is for ends that are social,—that are for the general good, and not merely for this or that man's private good. Often, indeed, it is for ends that are, directly, *only* for the good of others, and not at all for the private gain of those who are actively working for them.

Helpful citizenship, therefore,—and unhelpful citizenship is not worthy to be called citizenship,—is but private goodness, private loyalty to the moral ideal, working through the forms and institutions of civic life for civic ends,—for the good estate of all sorts and conditions of man in the body politic. It is, then, distinctively ethical, and, what is more, it is an ethical vocation. It comes to us, not merely as opportunity, but as duty. Hence, it is more than a right, for rights may sometimes lawfully be waived, but duty always speaks in a present imperative which may not

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be set aside. Public duty is as binding upon us as private duty. Indeed, it *is* our private duty, for the adjectives "public" and "private" do not distinguish between two kinds of duty, but only discriminate between the two spheres of human interest or human activity over which the one law of Right is sovereign. Whatever immediate sanctity of obligation attaches to the duties we call private, that same immediate sanctity, and that same immediate obligation, attach to those we call public, for both are integral in the good life,—both are covered by that one ideal to which, before the tribunal of conscience, we can none of us refuse an undivided allegiance. To do right or to abstain from doing it—in other words, to do right or wrong—is, indeed, within the practical competence of our will, but it is not within the limits of our lawful choice. The thought of duty leaves nothing to our option, save the alternate possibilities of honour and disgrace.

In whatever sense, therefore, we are severally called unto righteousness of life, in that same sense—with the same fulness of meaning, and under the same august sanction,—we are called to civic helpfulness, for *that* is an essential part of private righteousness. Therefore, we rightfully speak of citizenship as an ethical vocation.

Citizenship, however, not only brings with it a duty,—it confers a right. The nation, as we have seen, is an ethical construct for an ethical end, and that end is—what? Simply this, general helpfulness. The nation is never an end in itself; it is always a means to an end, and that end is always individual good,—the personal good of each of the several individuals who constitute the nation. We may say, in other words, that in national life men come together

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in mutual helpfulness in order that, by such co-operation, they may severally enter into a fulness of life greater and more beneficent than any that is possible to solitary manhood. Only in so far as the helpfulness of its corporate life becomes general does a nation become a community, and, in so far as it is not a community, it is simply a non-ethical accident of history,—without any moral claim to either loyalty or service.

In a true community there is no room for merely tributary classes. Such a community presupposes a common life—common interests and common aims,—and it is characteristically held together by equal reciprocity of service. If, in any form of social life, there be service that is not returned, or not adequately returned, that inequitable form is, at the very best, only a community in the making. Because of the unrequited service, it exists, not for the equal gain of all its members, but for the greater gain of some. Its members are not co-ordinate constituents, as they would be were it a true community, for some are tributary and not co-ordinate,—instruments for others' gain, and not coequal fellows in reciprocal helpfulness,—and this inequality precisely measures the divergence of the inequitable form from the ethical ideal of human society. It is an index, too, of the instability of the particular social group in which it is found. More august than all institutions, greater than all usages, is the living spirit of man by which institutions have been built up and usages created, and by which institutions and usages, as they cease to be serviceable to its need, are alike set aside or transformed, and that spirit can never rest content in a life that is in any degree merely tributary. The accidents of history

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may, indeed, for a time condemn men to a servitude more or less complete, but only for a time, because, in the long-run, Right will surely vindicate itself,—because, however strong the forces that now make for Privilege, they will not, in the long-run, prove stronger than that living spirit which, into whatever society it enter, is always, in all essentials of worth and right, *primus inter pares*, and one day, sooner or later, will most certainly come fully into its own. The only stable foundation for society is that of perfect equality of moral right. If in any society there be inequality of recognised right, that society contains within itself forces that will one day destroy it or transform it. Meanwhile, whatever be the degree of inequality, precisely the same is the degree of instability.

The ethical primacy of the individual which, in relation to the surrounding immensity of nature may seem little if anything more than an academic postulate, is, in relation to human history, not only speculative but practical. However many and however various the forms and usages of social life that history calls into being, they all exist for the service of man, and only in so far as they helpfully serve him have they a claim upon his allegiance and a right to exist. "Be serviceable, or thou shalt perish," is the law of life enforced by history upon all that history creates.

Whatever obligation of service, therefore, citizenship brings with it, that obligation is always matched by a corresponding right. As a member of an ethical community a citizen is bound to civic helpfulness,—to unselfish service to those who stand with him in the organic unity of national life. This

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service, however, is always reciprocal, and is rendered, not in the compulsion of merely tributary servitude, but in free co-operation for a common purpose and a common aim. Service is the very essence of citizenship as a practical vocation, and, because this is true in every individual case, it follows that the co-operative serviceableness which constitutes national life must always be reciprocal. That it must always be *equally* reciprocal, is a necessary consequence of the ethical primacy of the individual, for, if in any case it be unequal, in that case the individual whose service is not fairly requited is not a co-ordinate factor in the nation, but tributary, and herein is a denial of right which is inconsistent with the essential character of the nation as a moral organism. In the life of citizenship, therefore, obligation and right go hand in hand, and the civic right which is thus always the correlate of civic duty is—what? A right to find the nation's life always availingly helpful to the individual life,—helpful, not only in everyday matters of merely practical moment, but, also, for the sovereign purposes of life. This right is inherent in citizenship, and nothing can lawfully claim to override it. It is not dependent upon any privilege of station or of class,—it follows immediately from the fact of citizenship. Simply in virtue of his citizenship—because he is, in truth, a member of the nation—a man has a right to demand that the national life, and the institutions and usages of national life, shall be helpful to him, helpful in all ways that make for fulness of life and completeness of manhood. Moreover, this right is ultimate, and, as I have already said, nothing can lawfully claim to override it,—no adverse privilege, no inherited disability from the past,

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no plea of State-policy or administrative convenience. The individual is bound to serve the nation. True, but the nation is equally bound to be serviceable to the individual, and, if in any given case it be not effectually and equitably serviceable, it should be made so. Thus, citizenship brings with it, not only a moral vocation, but also an inalienable and a sovereign right.

IV

PATRIOTISM AND THE MORAL STATE

We saw, in our first chapter, that Patriotism, in its practical forms, means helpful service of the State,—service by which the polity of the nation is helpfully built up and the life of the nation made generously humane, so that polity and life alike become effectually ministrant to the fulness and completeness of individual life. We saw, too, that this patriotic service is a natural response of the individual to the availing help that, for the enriching and strengthening of his own personal life, has come to him through his citizenship,—through his organic connection with his country's life. In the present chapter we have seen that it is precisely in and for this serviceableness to the individual that the nation exists, and that the duties of citizenship are precisely those which we had already found to be characteristic of Patriotism. Therefore, because the nation is, in truth, a moral organism, that lives by the co-operative service of all its constituent members, Patriotism is, in equal fulness of truth, the very breath of its life. In Patriotism we see what all citizenship ought to be, and, when

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the hopes of Patriotism become fully articulate, we learn what each and every country ought to be. It should—in fact, and not merely in words; completely, and not in part;—be a true Fatherland for all who, whether by birth or by adoption, become sons of it.¹

¹ See Appendix I. "Naturalisation and Patriotism."

CHAPTER III

NATIONAL VOCATION

I

I HAVE said, in effect, that the common spirit which we call the spirit of nationality arises out of a common practical vocation, and out of the common interest and sympathies which this implies and fosters. By "practical vocation" I mean simply practical work conceived as a duty. Ordinarily we speak of a man's individual work as his "occupation," and, in itself, that name has no direct ethical significance, but the work with which a man is occupied also constitutes his duty, and it thus possesses a distinctly ethical character which is essential in our thought of it, and with which we characteristically concern ourselves whenever we endeavour to think completely about life. Our completer thought of human life is always distinctively ethical and, to that thought, the work which constitutes duty—whether individual or national—is not only an "occupation," but a "vocation."

NATIONAL WORK

But what do we mean when we speak of a nation's work? It were easy to say that when we so speak we are thinking of all the work of all the several individuals constituting the nation, and wish to designate it as a whole. Or, again, it may seem natural to say that

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we then mean the work undertaken in the nation's name for national purposes,—work undertaken for national ends by representatives of the nation acting as such.

But neither of these possible answers would bring out quite clearly the full meaning of our words. The first suggests no reason for calling work "national" beyond whatever is furnished by the fact that the persons by whom it is carried on constitute a nation. Moreover, if this answer were adopted, we could not, consistently with it, adduce any immediate ground for the distinction we constantly make, within the nominal whole called "national work," between work that is specifically individual, and work that is specifically national, except, it may be, the intention of some individual speaker at a given instant to indicate either the whole *as a whole*, rather than any or all of its parts, or one or more of those parts thought of, for the moment, without reference to their character *as parts*. This conception of national work would, however, be sufficient for certain merely statistical purposes. It would enable us to estimate the national income (if by that we did not happen to mean the receipts of the National Exchequer), or to arrive at the total value of the national imports or of the national exports,—but it would not be adequate for the higher problems of ethical and political thought. For instance, it cannot help us in the matter we are now discussing.

The second answer may, at first sight, seem more satisfactory. It fails, however, to suggest the vital connection that undoubtedly exists between individual and national work, and, moreover, the view that it gives of the latter is not only too restricted, but is dangerously restricted. According to this answer,

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national character is given to national work only by representative agency and by a distinctively national end. It limits the denotation of "national work" to official undertakings.

According to this definition the Uganda Railway is "national" and the Canadian Pacific "private." Yet, for Imperial policy and for the daily business of the Empire's practical life, the latter is, obviously, by far the more important. It is, of course, genuinely a private undertaking,—private in the sense in which the writing of a novel is a private undertaking, and the construction of a naval dockyard or of new batteries for the defence of a coaling station is not. Yet, this notwithstanding, as a factor in the Empire's policy and in building up the fabric of the Empire's life, it is one of the most valuable instruments of our Imperial polity. Owned by private individuals, and administered by them for private gain, its actual serviceableness is, in many important ways, conspicuously imperial.

We shall find presently that "serviceableness"—"national serviceableness," is the characteristic note of national work. Meanwhile, we may notice that the definition which would permit us to recognise as *national* only that which is *official* receives abundant illustration in our common usage. Thus, we speak of the English mines and railways as private, and of the State-railways of Austria and the Dam at Assouan as national. But this passing convenience of speech is not the index to a general utility. On the contrary, the definition which thus serves our momentary convenience has but a narrow range of usefulness. For instance, it can never be applied to foreign policy, either as criterion or as guide, without

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the gravest risk—a risk which, in many cases, would amount to certainty—of mischief and mistake. This risk would be greatest in England, because no other “world-power” is content with an official activity which lags so far behind the non-official industry of its people as does the official activity of the English government behind the industry of the British peoples; and no other foremost people have to contend with such official apathy and incompetence as that which we English folk tolerate with such contemptuous long-suffering.

Russia, for instance, is extending her influence and building up the outward fabric of her Empire by an official activity which accepts no rebuff and knows no pause, which freely uses Russian resources for Russian ends, and (always in advance of the present industry of the Russian people,) is unceasingly preparing a broad domain to be the home of Imperial generations yet unborn. Now her work is more than half accomplished, and¹ her statesmen probably think her assured of that supremacy in Asia which, but for our rulers’ sins of ignorance, feebleness, and short-sightedness, had certainly been ours, by every right that makes Empire just.

France and Germany, too, have each a record of successful official enterprise which an Englishman can scarcely read without disquietude and somewhat of shame. France, finally secondary as a merely continental power, has shaken off the hesitancy which gave us Egypt, and, purely and simply by the action of her government, has won for herself—partly at our expense—a position on continental and insular Africa inferior only to our own, and in the farthest East

¹ Her present misfortunes in Manchuria notwithstanding.

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of Asia has acquired a dominion which, already respectable, may one day broaden to magnificence,—unless, indeed, an awakened China teach Europe modesty. The German Colonial Empire is not, in itself, of any considerable importance, but it suffices to bring into the arena of world-politics not only the German legions, but also the growing German navy,—grimly eloquent of unavowed ambitions. This Empire, also, has been built up entirely by official action. More important to Germany, however, than her Colonial Empire, and of more vital significance for us, is the rapid advance of German industrial enterprise in the four quarters of the world. This advance is primarily due to the well-directed and well-equipped energy of the German people themselves, but it is an advance which, in no small degree, has been rendered possible by the preliminary educational enterprise of the German government, and, *outside the German colonies*, all the resources of German statesmanship assist it.

Contrast all this with the apathy and incompetence which permitted Madagascar and so much of West Africa to become French; which to-day hesitates at the frontiers of Persia, while Russia is rapidly building up her influence in the very centres of Persian life; which could find no better equipoise to the fortifications of Port Arthur than a sanatorium at Wei-hai-Wei; and, until an alliance with Japan gave a momentary semblance of strength, could oppose to the effectively unscrupulous diplomacy of Russia only the alleged rectitude of our purpose.

Alone among peoples we, the plain working-folk of the British race, can justly say that our enterprise and

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industry have built up a world-empire: alone among the greater peoples of the world we find our imperial ministers—whatever their party allegiance and by whatever fairness of promise they attain office—a hindrance rather than a help, a source of weakness rather than of strength.

The recent troubles in South Africa have shown with what unwavering loyalty we support even an incompetent administration which we believe to be, for once, earnest to do its duty. Even those troubles, however, have given but a slight indication of the resources of effectual manhood that we could bring to the direct service of our Imperial Fatherland did our rulers permit. But only *men* can rightly make use of men, and, for the most part, our rulers are but half men;—estimable members of an aristocracy that has lost the habit of leadership; mere politicians, easily content with the poor victories of Parliamentary rhetoric; clever mediocrities, raised to office by private favour and the irony of Fate; reformers, zealous only for domestic details; and lawyers, worshipful of words,—poor counsellors (surely?) for a manhood that lives by deeds and finds a sufficing right in effectual work. Of course, rulers such as these readily incline to a doctrine which permits only that which is official to be called national. Doubtless they do so honestly,—the incompetent are often conspicuously honest,—and when, through their incompetence, the commonwealth suffers loss, their honesty enables them to make a fine show of virtuous and genuine indignation at adverse criticism, and to find an easy solace in Commissions of half-hearted inquiry. It is true that, from time to time, the abler among them appear to recognise that their failure calls

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for explanation, but how shall we estimate an ability which, as we have recently seen, can do no more than impenitently plead the difficulties of the British Constitution,—of a constitution which would make a strong man master?

The way is now clear for our final definition of national work,—for the definition relevant to the purpose of the present chapter. National work is simply this,—work that furthers the nation's life.

Every organism has a distinctive life of its own, which, although constituted by the co-operating activities of the individual units that make up the nation, subserves the "health and wealth" of *the organism as a whole*. It subserves, also, of course, the well-being of each co-operating unit, but subserves it as integral in a larger entity,—subserves it through the organic connection of the individual with his fellows in the vital unity of the organism. There are no specialised units set apart as the exclusive instruments and agents of that common life which makes the national organism truly a whole. All the units constituent of the organism are contributory to its life,—are instruments or agents of its life. Nor is this account in the least degree arbitrary. It follows immediately from the conception of an organism as a co-operative unity of "self-determined" individuals. The unity of an organic whole, be it biological or political, is brought about only by co-operation, and an individual can have place in that unity only by taking its part in the synthetic activity by which that unity is constituted.

If we apply these thoughts to the definition of national work, we shall find that all individual work by which the national life is built up is properly called

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"national" work, for it is the work characteristic of the nation as a political organism. Certainly, we shall find no reason for limiting our conception of national work to the undertakings of official persons. These are, for certain purposes, representatives of the nation, they are also depositories of its executive power, and instruments of its formally expressed will, but, certainly, they are not the sole contributors to its life. If they were, how starveling a lot would be ours in England!

It may, perhaps, be said that this definition is virtually identical with the first of the two already examined and rejected, because it makes national work the sum of individual work. This, however, is precisely what it does *not* do. If we allowed the word "sum" to pass without challenge,—despite its denotation of merely arithmetical addition, which makes it inappropriate to express the synthesis by which the activities of individual units become co-ordinated integers in a common life,—it would still remain necessary to point out that, according to this third definition, only that work is national which subserves the nation's life,—which subserves the life that makes the nation an organism. It is true that, because "none of us liveth unto himself and none of us dieth unto himself," all that each individual is and does in some way affects, either for good or ill, the general life of the nation to which he belongs. The distinctive thought in our third definition, however, is not that of vital relatedness, but of helpful relatedness. That which affects the national life must, of necessity, possess national significance, and possess it in a degree proportionate to its effectiveness, but it is not properly called "national" work unless it affect it helpfully, for

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only so does it positively contribute to the nation's life.

Thus, the arts of vanity—however prominent they be,—do not form part of national work, for they are not contributory to national life. They have, it is true, a very real influence upon the national life, for, wherever they are supreme, character becomes unhelpful, and life barren of serviceable good, but, precisely because that influence is destructive and not constructive, they are not part of national work, for *that* is work by which a nation lives, and *they* are instruments of Death.¹

Again, education is rightly regarded as one of the most important branches of national work, for its immediate aim is to form a character serviceable to the commonwealth, and to equip it usefully for the practical work by which the commonwealth is built up. The self-education, however, by which the devotee of Thought, or of Knowledge, or of Art, enriches the privacy of his own life, *and that alone*, is not a part of national work. It is not without influence upon national life, but that influence is mischievous, for it helps to establish a thoroughly false ideal of culture divorced from service,—an ideal which, in so far as it is dominant, injures not only national life, but also the individual manhood of the votaries whom it misleads, and even the very pursuits it professes to encourage. Thought is the appointed guide of Life, Knowledge the one sure foundation of achievement, and Art, though it gives not strength, abounds in other helpfulness, and all these, by their several disciplines

¹ The industries subsidiary to those arts, in so far as the demand that they satisfy is foreign and not domestic, are, of course, as genuinely part of national work as shipbuilding or commerce.

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of inquiry and practice, build up manhood into a serviceableness of aptitude and judgment which is valuably and practically helpful in Life's everyday policy and work. The informed mind, the trained judgment, and the habit of efficient work, are among the greatest of the gifts of character and manhood that can be brought to the service of the commonwealth, and these gifts come to one man through the exercise of Thought, to another through the quest for Knowledge, to another through the discipline of Art. But however valuable these gifts, so long as they are used *merely* for the gratification of private taste, for the adornment of private leisure, the industry by which they are won is no true part of national work. It is, indeed, genuinely related to national life, but only unhelpfully, for the serviceable manhood which it trains and informs subserves only the privacy of an individual life and not the common good. The national life becomes poorer by this subtraction from its resources,—by this exclusive devotion to individual pleasure of gifts which might and should effectually serve the commonwealth. Moreover, this impoverishment, once commenced, tends to increase. It arises out of the divorce of manhood from service. Now, this divorce is not, in these cases, merely incidental: it is due to a false ideal,—to an ideal of Culture or of Knowledge for its own sake, which, once established, wins wide allegiance, and, as it widens its sway, draws more and more upon the vital resources of national life,—upon those resources of capacity and character which should be directly helpful to the general well-being. I have said that this ideal is a false one, but, although false, it is not ignoble,—at least, not in its first beginnings, in the devotion out of which it springs. Probably, every

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one who has given whole-hearted allegiance to Beauty or to Truth has felt the power of this ideal. In the frequented ways of everyday life, Art is in bondage to convention, to primitive sentiment, and to a corrupt tradition of Truth, and Truth itself is obscured by "the resurrection of the obsolete, the survival of the unfit, and the prominence of the irrelevant." When thus hampered and hindered, Art and Knowledge alike have but a feeble and precarious life, and are only poorly profitable, whether to the individual or the nation. It is, therefore, but small matter for surprise that one who has seen something of Art in its native freedom, or who has caught a glimpse of Truth without the heavy veils that hide her from the crowd, and who has known in his own life the living helpfulness of that vision, should, in the hope that he may thereby win a fuller measure of that goodness, turn aside to solitary practice or research,—remote from the conventions of the market-place,—and profess allegiance to an unfettered ideal that speaks to him of nothing but Art in its free completeness, or of Knowledge in its unalloyed integrity. And this separation from things that hinder and obscure is wholly good, but it should be a separation *only from those things*, and not from the living sympathies and interests that veritably make men members one of another and bind them together into one life. It is *ignorance* that fetters Art and hinders Knowledge,—ignorance, not fellowship, for fellowship is the true *Fons Vitæ*, and without it, in the long-run, no fully effectual work is possible. Human sympathy and human interest—herein is the living spring of the world's noblest life and most helpful, most effectual work. If this be cut off, Art gives to him who follows it in private for his private

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gain nothing but an enfeebling and a fading grace, and becomes sterile of larger and higher good, while Knowledge, no longer the instrument of helpful service, becomes a useless and uninteresting furniture of the mind,—ultimately useless and uninteresting even to its possessor.

The fresh enthusiasm that leads men out into solitary paths is an enthusiasm for Art or Knowledge as helpful to life. It springs out of some foretaste of the goodness of Art or Knowledge,—a foretaste in which he who, for the sake of that goodness, renounces the world, found, while he was yet in the world, the promise and the pledge of a fuller and completer life. But this enthusiasm, although it may keep a man from absorption in things that the world calls "practical," and from fellowship in the world's cruder work, should not, and will not, so long as it remain unchanged, separate him from the common life which has so largely helped to make him what he is. Implicit in his enthusiasm, as, in moments of sincere reflection, it will be explicit in his thought, is the conception of the sovereign worth of life,—of the sovereign value of completeness of life,—and this conception, unless it be depraved, will never lead to selfishness. At first, indeed, it may have a reference which immediately is only individual,—the devotee of Art or of Knowledge becomes solitary in order that he may win for himself a yet larger measure of the goodness which has, in foretaste, already valuably ennobled his life,—but in that reference a catholic philanthropy is latent, for the felt goodness of a noble life issues, of necessity, in charity, and perforce makes a man missionary. Solitary for and because of his individual gain of good, the devotee, by the very urgency of the

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enthusiasm that makes him solitary,—an enthusiasm which, in its essential nature, is an enthusiasm for life,—becomes an evangelist to those who, in and for themselves, know no such gain,—an evangelist of ennobling Art, of liberating and helpfully informing Truth. He remains a devotee, but he is solitary only that he may the more effectually serve. The enthusiasm that at first separates him from his fellows—from the hindrance of their besetting ignorance,—ends by linking him anew to them in the deepest sympathies and highest interests of life. Thus, enthusiasm for the goodness of life's completeness passes into "enthusiasm for humanity," and in this alone,—not in the adornment and furnishing of a merely private life,—can Culture and Knowledge find complete and abiding fruition.

Thus interpreted, this enthusiasm affords no basis for an uncharitable ideal,—for an ideal of Culture or of Knowledge divorced from service. That ideal can arise only when the devotee's first enthusiasm becomes corrupted by self-seeking,—when it is taken to be an enthusiasm not for the completeness of life, but for the personal gratification or content which growth in manhood brings. When thus misunderstood it becomes merely an enthusiasm for pleasure, and its end is epicureanism, and, in the enervating atmosphere of that ignoble creed, strenuous endeavour, clear insight, and magnanimous disinterestedness—by which alone genuine achievement in Art, in Science, or Thought can be reached,—are alike impossible.

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THE NATIONAL DUTY OF CULTURE AND KNOWLEDGE

Because the gifts of character and capacity won through the disciplines of Culture and of Knowledge are so valuably serviceable to life, it is the bounden duty of all who are themselves enriched by these gifts to use them for the common good,—for the building up of the nation's manhood into broader charity and more serviceable strength.

Unfortunately, however, such men are, as a rule, reluctant to enter public life. Nor is their reluctance wholly unintelligible. Local affairs seem so trivial as to be quite uninteresting; and national affairs, although interesting, are so involved with popular ignorance, prejudice, and passion, that men of scholarly mind and cultivated temper are not easily drawn to take part in them. They find no attraction, but abundant repulsion, in vulgar and wordy conflict, and in the partisan rhetoric and second-rate dialectic of the House of Commons, and they are not eager to measure themselves against the clamour of misrepresentation, whether this come from the press, the platform, or the pulpit. But, in so far as they permit this æsthetic dislike to prevail, they are not patriotic, but selfish, and through their selfishness the commonwealth suffers harm. It is the bounden duty of every citizen to serve his country with whatever resources of manhood or of wealth he possesses. Patriotism is not an occasional enthusiasm evoked by foreign menace; it is a life-long devotion, and its characteristic work is found in peace, and not in war,—in that patient building up of the good estate of the body politic to which defence against foreign

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aggression is only subsidiary. To form the nation's mind, to guide its judgment, to develop its manhood and humanise its life,—to do this is a duty as incumbent upon patriotic citizenship as the defence of the Fatherland against a foreign foe. In this peaceful building up of the nation's manhood and the nation's life we see the characteristic work of Patriotism, and the armed enthusiasm of war-time is patriotic only because this living architecture of Peace is rightly held to be of sovereign worth. In this constructive Patriotism of Peace every citizen who can help is bound to help. *Æsthetic* dislikes may be natural and intelligible, but they are not supreme. Clearly sovereign over all merely private dislikes and private preferences is that helpful service which every one who truly knows himself to have part in the Fatherland owes to it.

To-day, when the national life is changing so rapidly, —organising itself for new interests around new centres, when so many new factors are becoming operative in the world's industry and life—to-day, England has need of the service of all her sons, and not least of the service "of those who know." The conditions of public life are repellent. True, but the living spirit that breathes and works in that life is not repellent, for it is our brothers', and, through all the coarse turmoil that repels us, that spirit is reaching out after good,—after the good that we think we have, after the truth that we think we know. Shall we, then, who, as Englishmen, owe so much to the uninformed heroism and service of the past,—shall we to-day refuse to that labouring fraternal spirit whatever help may be ours to give?

There are some who, apparently, would be willing

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to help were the nation's work entrusted to an aristocracy of Culture which, without disturbance from the noisy irrelevance of representing and represented ignorance, would be able to work in some way for the common good. But for these men the true home is in Russia, not in England. We Englishmen are pledged to man's highest political ideal,—to an ideal that can be realised, not in obedience to external authority, but only in active self-government. We are well content that a people should learn to govern itself by actually governing itself. It is customary to say that good government is the ultimate end of all forms of civil polity, but, if we accept the narrow meaning usually given to the words "good government," this is not true. The sovereign political end is not good government, but life,—the formation of true character and complete manhood,—and to us Englishmen this end seems more likely to be achieved along the noisy and dusty paths of popular self-government than along the quiet and ordered ways of obedience. We believe in free institutions, not because they govern well, but because they make men. We accept the practical inconveniences of freedom for the sake of the moral result, and in this we are entirely right. But those practical inconveniences would be greatly diminished if all Englishmen manfully and loyally took their part in the nation's affairs. From those affairs no one has a right to hold aloof merely because he dislikes some of the concomitants of popular self-government. Those concomitants are, indeed, repellent, but they are not necessary,—they are not irremediable, and, if each man brought the full service of his manhood to the nation's work, they would be largely remedied. The ignorant and the informed,

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the cultivated and the uncultivated, differ, not in kind, but in degree. One manhood is common to them all, one ideal is sovereign over all, and is dynamic in them all. The crowds who applaud partisan untruth do so, not because it is untrue, but because they think it true, and if that which is genuinely true be as forcibly brought home to them, and as clearly set before them, in the long-run *it*—the genuinely true, and not its false simulacra,—will prevail. It may not prevail immediately,—it probably will not, for the apprehension of truth is a moral act, and cannot always be achieved by all at a bound, but in the free contest of Truth with Error the souls of men are widened, and that which aforesaid they thought to be false they will at length know to be true, and with that knowledge will come allegiance.

Parochial affairs may, indeed, often be trivial, but local self-government is not trivial. Through it liberty—which, in the broader fields of national citizenship is so valuably the handmaid of Patriotism,—brings a new helpfulness into the intimate life of the town and countryside. The new interests which it awakens widen the horizon of many a life, and this, in itself, counts for something in the development of national character. Through local franchises each citizen becomes more effectually and completely his own master, and this, also, is no small gain, while the responsibility which those franchises entail do much to make citizenship consciously ethical, for they awaken a sense of membership in a larger whole,—a whole in which we may truly be said to live and move and have our being, and which, therefore, rightfully claims our service,—and this consciousness is the very foundation of healthy, helpful citizenship, and, also, of active Patriotism.

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Thus, local self-government—the smallness of its practical concerns notwithstanding,—is an effectual school of manhood and of practical citizenship, and the lessons taught by it, the character formed in it, are as valuable in national as in local affairs. It is, indeed, not too much to say that Patriotism is never so strong and so helpful, national life never so healthy, as when the foundations of the national polity are broadly and securely laid in local liberty.

In Parliamentary life, too, and its concomitants, there may be much that honestly repels, but in these our English freedom finds characteristic political expression, and through these we English folk have received no small share of whatever political intelligence and helpful Patriotism we now possess. These, also, are schools of character,—schools second in value to none that secular history has wrought out. The atmosphere of those schools may seem turbid and tumultuous, the methods of instruction crude and wasteful, but the character shaped in these schools has been no small agent in forming that English tradition of manhood of which we are justly and honourably proud, and in building up the fabric of English greatness. Not by the higher counsels of Wisdom, nor by the finished methods of scholarly work, has our world-wide Empire been established and knit together into one life, but by the plain thought and plain endeavour of plain men. That thought has often been halting and obscure, marred by ignorance and clouded by prejudice,—that endeavour, often clumsy and ill directed, but plain thought and plain endeavour have done their work, and done it soundly. Say, if you will, that we have blundered to success. The blunders have been but a

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temporary tribute paid to Fate as the price of freedom : the success has been due to the character disciplined and built up by freedom.

Our Fatherland is rightly dear to us, and rightfully claims the best service of our manhood, but, whatever its claims upon us, those claims inhere in their fulness in the institutions which have done so much to make our Fatherland what it is,—the home of “the lordliest life on earth,” the home of a free manhood which is second to none in the opportunities awaiting it, and the vocation that has come to it. Against those claims, æsthetic dislikes cannot for one moment be allowed to weigh. All the sons of the Fatherland must bring their best to the service of the Fatherland, else are they “bastards and not sons”; and in this tribute of love those of us who have passed through Life’s higher disciplines of work dare not (unless we would prove ourselves unworthy) be niggardly or slothful. But we shall not adequately do our part if we content ourselves with an infrequent vote for this candidate or that, nor will it be sufficient to seek election to Parliament or a local Council. We must take our part, not only in political life, but in all the national life of our time,—not to exercise lordship over it, but to inform it, so that the gifts of Culture and Knowledge and Thought, which, at present, are but a benediction of the few, may not only guide the many, but may, to some helpful degree, be shared by the many. To achieve this will not be easy, but the work is a noble one,—worthy of our greatest, worthy the entire consecration of power, time, and worldly fortune.

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II

We are now, perhaps, in a position to see more clearly in what sense the words "national work" are used in this chapter. National work is work that builds up a nation,—not only work that builds up the visible framework of its industrial and political activity, but work that sustains and fosters its life, that builds up its people into serviceable manhood. A nation is a living organism, and it exists for ends which (although many of them may seem, at first sight, to be entirely "practical,") are all contributory to one consummating end that is entirely spiritual. That ultimate end is this:—the formation of individual character, the development of individual manhood into the likeness of the sovereign moral ideal. In other words, the nation exists as a means to individual self-realisation.

INDUSTRIAL SELF-MAINTENANCE

The law of life, then, is the same for the nation as for the individual. But that law, although in itself purely spiritual, has to be carried out in a world which, characteristically, is not what we ordinarily call spiritual.

Man, like every other living thing in the world, has first of all to sustain his bodily life, and, whatever the opportunity he afterwards finds for work that is more openly spiritual, that opportunity can become usefully his own only in so far as he has won such mastery over the natural resources of the world that his primary wants are no longer of instant urgency.

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The basis of national life, as of individual life, is, therefore, industrial, and the primary—the nearest—duty of the nation, as of the individual, is to win for itself a sufficiency of the physical means of sustenance. A nation is, therefore, primarily—in the first place—an industrial organism.

THE SUBORDINATION OF INDUSTRY

Although the nation is thus necessarily industrial, it is not *essentially* industrial. In its constitutive nature it is, as we have already seen, essentially spiritual, and its industrial preoccupation is only incidental,—incidental upon the temporarily inseparable connection between the spiritual life of man and his physical body and environment. Therefore, among the ends of national policy, industrial ends are only subordinate. They are important only because and in as far as they subserve ends higher than themselves. They exist, as national ends, and industry forms part of national work, *only* because, in the present order of the world, man must eat to live.

From this there is an easy transition to a highly important conclusion:—Political Economy is but an abstract and subordinate science, and "The Wealth of Nations" is but a secondary treatise in the philosophy of Politics.

We are all familiar with Ruskin's impassioned protest against the unrelieved materialism which he discovered, or thought he discovered, in the ordinary presentations of economic science.

As therein set forth, Political Economy seemed to him to be concerned only with and for "the bread

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which perisheth," and to regard *this* as furnishing the regulative end of national policy, and men and women as only instruments for gaining it.

Therefore, to him,—profoundly and rightly convinced that man is not merely an industrial tool, and that he lives not only by and for "bread," but, also, and characteristically by and for things of quite another and higher order,—the teachings of Political Economy appeared not only erroneous, but irrelevant, and when supreme primacy of authority was claimed for them—as sometimes it seemed to be,—his indignation made him the burning prophet of a nobler counsel.

His indignation was righteous, and his cause just. Because man is essentially spiritual, his vocation cannot be *merely* industrial. Because the politics he builds up through his sympathies and hopes are organic to his distinctively spiritual life, they cannot be governed by any merely industrial ends. Industry is subordinate to life,—it has, indeed, only an incidental place in life,—and the men and women who, because of a temporary necessity, are occupied with it are not its tools, but its lords. They have a nature greater than it presupposes, and ends higher than any it can immediately fulfil.

Yet, within the industrial order, industry is fundamental, and industrial ends primary. Fundamental? Yes, but *only* fundamental. Primary? Yes, but not *primatial*,—not chief, not ultimate. Man's life is not complete when he has earned his bread. His characteristic life, indeed, only then begins. His material industry is but preliminary and incidental to a higher spiritual industry wherein is his true vocation.

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If nations were artificial constructs,—established by deliberate convention for specific ends, and possessed of only limited and delegated powers of action,—it might be possible to represent them as constituted solely for Life's lower policies and humbler service,—solely for police protection and for physical sustenance. But nations are not artificial, but natural, not constructs but organisms, not constituted by some intending act, but built up by age-long growth, and they are built up by the indivisible spirit of man, which, in and through all its changes of activity and interest, is ever one spirit, variously manifesting one nature, and variously expressing one life. The true agent in nation-making and in national life is the human spirit as a whole, and not merely a part thereof,—could such a thing exist. A nation is built up by the congruence of human lives. Each stage in its growth may commence in and be determined by some particular sympathy or interest, but the result is an organism of *individuals*,—of individuals in their indivisible entirety and integrity. And this living community, built up by the spirit as a whole, is organic to life as a whole. By no conceivable *Kenosis* can men determine it to any less use.

Political Economy, therefore, cannot exhaust Politics, nor can it even exist as a separate science except by abstraction,—by taking certain phenomena and certain interests out of their natural context in the concrete reality of life, and dealing with them for an end which, also, it, in like manner, artificially isolates. The science of wealth, as regulative of conduct and policy, is intrinsically subordinate to the science of life, even as industry itself is normally subordinate to life.

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But, although industry be subordinate, it is, nevertheless, primary. What, then, are its functions?

Immediately, of course, it subserves man's physical needs: it wins for him food, shelter, and clothing. But these, although necessary, are only preliminary. Man has other than physical needs, and his nature has urgent possibilities which the exercises and fruits of industry cannot satisfy. Nor are these unsatisfied possibilities incidental: they are characteristic, and mark out for man his characteristic vocation. When, therefore, man's necessary industry is finished, his true life begins.

From this we can easily reach a significant conclusion:—

Industry exists to give man opportunity to live,—to live his distinctive life as man.

Suppose a country lying in the world's less kindly latitudes, and inhabited by a people among whom the industrial arts were so poorly developed that barely to supply man's physical wants required *all* his time and strength. His unremitting industry would meanly build and poorly furnish the material house of life, but he himself would not have time to live. Such industry would penuriously subserve its primary—its immediate—end, but, except in so far as its own poor exercises informed and disciplined character, it would fail entirely to subserve its ethical end. A nation constrained to such industry were little better than a community of ants.

Nor would such unremitting industry be ethically more successful if the provision won by it were abundant and delicate, instead of scanty and coarse,—if it clothed its drudges in broadcloth instead of fustian, and gave them the choicest confections of

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M. Benoist instead of beans and bacon. The true fruit of industry is *leisure*, and that industry is the most successful which, after making all helpful provision for man's needs, leaves most time unoccupied by its business and untroubled by its cares.

"All helpful provision,"—but the provision should not be in excess, should not be luxurious. It is not impossible to conceive of universal luxury, but were such luxury actual, the industry that supported it would be monstrous, — a cancerous overgrowth in the body politic, consuming, in Life's lower policy and ignobler pleasures, time and manhood that ought to be given to better things.

In historical communities, however, luxury has always been the privilege, often the maleficent privilege, of the few,—a privilege paid for by the servitude of the many. Such luxury injures alike those who enjoy it and those who provide it;—the former, if in no other way, at least by the limitation and consequent impoverishment of their charity; the latter, by depriving them of opportunity to live,—to live man's characteristic and nobler life. And in both these ways it injures the body politic, for national life is healthy only in proportion as it is informed by charity, and equitably beneficent in generous opportunity.

The right to live—to live truly and completely—is a right inherent and essential in each individual. No individual and no class can rightly be used as a mere industrial tool, and the polity that involves such degradation gives advertisement of its own impermanence. However long-continued in strength, or notable in achievement, it must change or die. History has no abiding place for harmful privilege.

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INDUSTRY AND POLICY

Industry, however, although subordinate, is necessary, and, because the needs to which it ministers are primary, it also is primary. It is the foundation of every national polity, for without industry man cannot live.

(1) At present, national industry is chiefly carried on by means of privately-owned capital for private gain.

This, of course, suggests many interesting questions,—questions that centre round the words Individualism, Socialism, Collectivism, Co-operation,—but, these, although attractive, are too important to be dealt with as incidental in a larger discussion. For a time, therefore,—but I hope not for a long time,—they are postponed. But whatever the industrial polity of the Fatherland, Patriotism has therein a perfectly clear vocation :—Industry must be made broadly and generously helpful to life, and must bring forth its harvest of beneficent opportunity not for a few, but for all.

(2) Although nations are necessarily industrial,—for without industry *they* cannot live,—few have hitherto taken part in international history as distinctively industrial communities. Until quite recently,—outside purely or predominantly commercial states like Carthage, Genoa, and Venice,—industrial factors have played but a small part in the foreign policy of nations. The wars of early and mediæval England, for example, were none of them industrial, either in origin or aim. Germany, it is true, is now winning for herself a foremost position in the world by the industry of the German peoples, and, on the

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broad theatre of international affairs, German policy is the unresting handmaid of German industry, but the German Empire, although conspicuous among the Powers of the world as self-consciously an industrial organism, is the creation of a foreign policy which was neither initiated nor determined by industrial forces.

Hitherto, then, economic factors, although largely constructive in History, through the interests and later sympathies of men, have only rarely been openly determinant of national policy. To-day, however, they are becoming obvious in the diplomatic intercourse of nations. Emulous Powers,—roused by Germany's success, and moved by needs similar to hers, although later recognised,—have braced themselves to similar enterprise. Like her, the nations are awaking to industrial self-consciousness, and their several foreign policies—herein, at least, like hers,—are largely determined by actual or expected industrial opportunities.

The extension of economic influence has been brought about chiefly by the increasing dependence of our modern industrial states upon foreign trade.

Commerce—the interchange of commodities between places—probably goes far back towards the first beginnings of human history. Even neolithic communities had their foreign trade, and in the remote Bronze Age Europe had its well-established trade-routes. Only within recent times, however, have the principal peoples of the world become largely dependent upon it,—dependent upon it, not only for the conveniences and pleasures of life, but, also, for its very necessities. At first, the industry of a district was primarily for the immediate supply of local needs.

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Production for the purpose of foreign trade, in so far as it existed, was usually upon a small scale. It was not the principal occupation of large communities, nor the principal source of their sustenance. This, however, is precisely what it has now come to be. England, for instance, lives by her foreign trade. To her, transmarine markets are a vital necessity. Without them, her crowded population would starve.¹ It is true that, in this matter, her position is exceptional, but, in all the principal countries of the world, foreign trade—the export of natural products and manufactures—is becoming a more and more important factor in the national economy. For all of them, in varying degrees, foreign markets are either necessities, or highly desired conveniences which, if the existing tendencies and conditions of industry continue, will soon become necessities. It is, therefore, no longer sufficient for a Government to foster production at home: it must also do what it can to secure for the commerce of its people full opportunity in the markets of the world. This has inevitably led to serious international rivalry, and it seems probable that, in the years immediately ahead of us, this rivalry will greatly increase,—will become more active, and cover wider areas.

But a Government owes service, not only to the Present, but also to the Future.² It is not enough that the industry of the moment have sufficient opportunity

¹ It is said, I know, that by proper methods of cultivation, England could produce enough food for the whole of her people. The indubitable fact of her present dependence is, however, sufficient to illustrate my argument.

² Unfortunately, our English Governments are contemptibly apt to fail in this larger service.

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in foreign marts. A generation hence the dependence of any given nation upon its foreign trade will probably be greater than at present, and the competition of the nations will be keener. Therefore, essential national interests imperatively demand that markets be secured in advance. Now, the existing order of the world provides only one sure way of accomplishing this,—annexation.¹

Within the existing order, then,—and the words express an important limitation,—industry, through its dependence upon commerce, has become an active principle of expansion in national life,—a principle that will become more and more important as nations become more and more dependent upon foreign markets for the means of industrial self-maintenance. If, for momentary convenience, we distinguish industry, as productive, from commerce, as distributive, we must say that this principle of expansion is commercial rather than industrial. A nation does not need to seek new markets, and to extend its dominion in order to secure them, simply because a vigorous industrial life has grown up within it, but because its industry has developed in such a way that foreign markets have become necessary to provide its people with the

¹ British statesmanship, which is rarely *quite* practical in its dealing with foreign affairs, prefers to trust to—what? Apparently to the chapter of accidents! A few words on parchment,—which make, it is true, an incident in history, but do not control events,—these, and a headline or two from a Free Trade copy-book, have hitherto been the recognised supports of British policy, the familiar guardians of British interests! Relying upon these, and upon our innocence, we calmly face a world in arms, . . . and expect to succeed? Hardly! Expect to—but the expectations of an English Foreign Minister must often be as far beyond prediction as those of a child!

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necessaries of life, or with the conveniences that are virtually necessities. If a country produced a sufficient quantity of everything needed for the comfortable sustenance of its inhabitants, its industry would not act as a principle of national expansion. A foreign commerce might or might not exist. Probably it would exist, but it would not be essential to the welfare of the community, nor would it be very extensive, for it would be carried on only to obtain articles of exceptional convenience and luxury that could not be produced at home, or, at least, could not be profitably produced there. But no great country is in this seemingly fortunate condition. England, for example, does not produce nearly a sufficiency of even bare necessities for her inhabitants. Even if she could provide food enough, she would still be dependent upon other parts of the world for other things,—if not for manufactured goods, at least for raw materials, such as cotton, and to pay for these she must trade. It is the existence of great industrial populations dependent upon foreign markets for their daily bread that makes industry, to-day, a principle of national expansion. Industry, in itself, is not a principle of territorial expansion: it becomes one, owing to the characteristics of the existing order, through its dependence upon commerce.

“Owing to the characteristics of the existing order.” Here, once more, we have the limitation already indicated, and to it we will now turn.

Commerce between nations depends ultimately upon one or both of two conditions:—upon the diversity of the trading countries—(1) in natural resources, and (2) in actual productiveness. These conditions, however, do not make it a principle of national expansion. It

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inevitably gives rise to foreign *interests*,¹ but it tends towards the organic extension of a national polity only because the natural opportunities for foreign trade are, in the existing order of things, greatly limited by protective duties.

I do not propose, here and now, to examine anew the case for Free Trade against Protection. It will be sufficient for my purpose to notice

(1) That, in the opinion of many, Protection, if wisely used, has results that are valuably conservative and constructive, and

(2) That all the great industrial nations, except England, make use of Protection to obtain these results.

Protection, it is true, is not costless,—whatever its gains, those gains have to be paid for, but in the opinion of many, they are worth the price. They are, or are held to be, worth their price, because, *ex hypothesi*, they *are* gains,—because it is believed that they build up the material fabric of national life, and in the present separateness of the nations, *this* is a result that statesmanship cannot afford to neglect.

We may, indeed, and do—in the exercise of our private faith,—look forward to a time when the

¹ The protection and development of these interests—which, although immediately private, are genuinely national,—ought, of course, to be a primary object of foreign policy, for it is an essential part of a nation's primary work of industrial self-maintenance. For instance, wherever the enterprise of English people has built up such interests, the diplomacy of England should be vigilantly protective, and there, too, upon due occasion, the armed strength of England should be both sword and shield.

Unfortunately, our ministers have been all too prone to regard that only as a national which is formally official, and, because of this mischievous distinction between the British state and the creative life of the British peoples, our imperial commonwealth has more than once suffered loss. But it is surely time that this superstition ceased? *Macht geht über Recht! Life transcends forms!*

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isolation of the peoples will be overcome in brotherhood, and when national differences will but furnish so many different opportunities for the expression of a common life and for the exercise of a common charity; but that time, although we think its advent certain, is not sufficiently near to determine the course of a sober policy. To-day, each of the greater Powers of the world, except England, endeavours, from its own chance resources, to win a maximum of unfraternal strength,—as if it were an unrelated unit, compelled, if it would live, to be self-sufficient,—and if there be a price to be paid, it is prepared to pay. Even in England this economic particularism has recently received powerful advocacy. Mr. Chamberlain,¹ for instance, seems to be dominated by the thought of the Empire as a self-supporting unity. Not content with the temporary reason or plausible excuse furnished by a transient phase of history for a policy of Protection, he makes that transient phase the foundation of a new and permanent ideal of Imperial separateness. The Empire's trade, he appears to think, should be wholly for the economic building up of the Empire; in so far as it is carried on with foreign countries, it is diverted from its proper channels and its proper use.

Now, even if this new ideal were valid, we could only very gradually approach it, for it is quite certain that, at present, our colonies and dependencies could neither take all our exports nor supply all our imports. But the ideal itself is radically wrong. We are surely upon far safer ground when we say—(1) that the world

¹ I hope to deal with the contrasted proposals—or are they related proposals?—of Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Balfour, and with other matters relating to our imperial polity, in a separate Essay.

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as a whole, and not any separated part of it, is the true economic unit; and (2) that the economic factors in history will, in the long-run, prove stronger than all our artificial barriers. Is it, indeed, too much to say that not the least important work of those factors is to break down those barriers, and to make all the peoples, now separate and rival, free copartners in a common industry for the world's common good?

This at least *seems* a not unreasonable or unworthy faith,—to hold that in those economic factors the powers that work for the world's redemption are presently operative—"making straight in the desert a highway for our God"—and that they *will* work out their way, transforming the life of peoples and the constitution of States, breaking down international barriers and bridging international distances, until, by a logic of material facts as inexorable and as inevitable as Fate, the nations now competing forget their selfish rivalries in the helpful brotherhood of an industry which will then be, no longer the tyrant of life, but manifestly and benignantly its handmaid.¹

Thoughts such as these, however, take us far from the domain of practical politics. We may, indeed,

¹ Mr. Chamberlain claims to be a missionary of the Empire. Not a few of those who find his last conclusions full of difficulty—I do not say "of insuperable difficulty"—are not a hair's-breadth behind him in devotion to that great cause. But the Empire of which they are the missionaries is not a proudly-isolated and self-sufficient unit,—unrelated, save in hostility or indifference, to the rest of the world. Rather, is it a generous brotherhood that knows itself part of a yet larger family, for which it holds in trust the world's noblest secular tradition,—the tradition of a free manhood in a free State,—and with every other member of which it hopes to be one day united in the complete helpfulness of a perfect charity. Temporary circumstances may temporarily constrain our policy: they should never impoverish our ideal or narrow our hope.

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believe that the days of international atomism are gradually passing away, that the peoples are already nearer to each other than are their governments, and that, one day, when the irrationality of war is over, they will use the resources of the world fraternally,—each contributing to the general wealth that which it can best produce,—we may believe this, and rightly believe this, but the times of consummation are not yet near, and meanwhile nation is divided against nation, and many seek a solitary strength by exclusive policies.

THE COMMERCIAL NECESSITY FOR ANNEXATION

Because of this exclusiveness, industry—through its dependence upon commerce,—has become an important principle of national expansion. Were Free Trade universal—were all natural opportunities for trade freely open,—commercial success would depend only upon industrial efficiency. In the present order of the world, however, commercial opportunities are artificially narrowed by protective duties. Therefore, industry, to be commercially successful, requires, to-day, not only intrinsic efficiency and *natural* opportunity, but also *political* opportunity. Now, *this* can be permanently secured only by political sovereignty. Therefore, territorial expansion, marked by annexation, is the natural correlate of Protection. Only by this means—although not by this means only,—can a great industrial Power effectively secure itself in the present, and effectively provide for its near future. Nothing else can give permanent assurance of safety.

An agreement between competing Powers, to accept from or enforce upon the government of a territory

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commercially in dispute a policy of Free Trade or of innocuous Protection,—under which import duties would be, in effect, only revenue duties,—might, from our English point of view, seem equally satisfactory,—not because of our national tradition of Free Trade, but because, under the conditions of equal foreign opportunity which such an agreement would secure, English industry would probably secure valuable success. But would all the rivals in a given case be willing to make such an agreement? I think not, or, at least, it is quite easy to conceive circumstances in which they would not. For instance, let us suppose there are only two competitors, A and B. Let A be one of the chief manufacturing countries of the world, accustomed to work and to win in foreign fields under all the disabilities imposed by foreign Protection. Let B be a country of only second-rate or third-rate industrial importance,—a country whose industries are still young, whose industrial resources are only very imperfectly developed, whose commercial equipment is yet far from complete. Further, let them be equally remote from the disputed market. Obviously, an “open door” or “non-preferential” agreement would amount to an abandonment of the field by B, for in an open or unbiassed market, her manufacturers and merchants would be easily beaten at every point by those of A. B can secure the market for herself only by annexation and by subsequent protective duties,—by duties sufficiently high to exclude the competing products of A.

The interest in disputed markets is, however, not always entirely or even primarily industrial. In a given case it may well happen that, besides the industrial competitors, other Powers conceive themselves to

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have interests in the territory concerned,—interests which are neither primarily nor directly industrial.

For example, in addition to the trade rivals we have already supposed, A and B, let there be also C and D, —two strong military Powers which already have possessions adjacent to the theatre of dispute. Further, let A, C, and D be, not merely States of respectable political importance, but leading world-empires, and suppose that while A is chiefly concerned with industry, and with the internal development of her already sufficiently wide domains, C and D are militant,—extending their rule by might wherever and whenever the faintest shadow or pretext of right can be found to prepare the way for the unsheathed or half-sheathed sword. Let us now further suppose that a partition of the disputed territory between C and D—followed by annexation, —would, because of the strategical position of that territory between the domains of A and those already belonging to C and D, decisively exclude A from the premier position in that part of the world, and let us yet further suppose that, if annexation were followed by the establishment of seriously intended protective duties, those duties—without, it may be, appreciably helping the industries of C and D,—would materially injure A by excluding her manufacturers and traders from a valuable market.¹

Now, what probability would there be of C and D concurring in a policy of “the open door”? They might not be prepared to proceed immediately to partition and annexation, but they would be little likely to enter into an agreement which would permit A to monopolise the new opportunity for trade, and to build

¹ The supposed situation may seem complex, but the intended parable is, I think, easily intelligible.

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up material interests which would soon become so considerable and so important that her Government, however slow to move, would be compelled, if they were threatened, to defend them by force of arms. But, if a "Fair-Trade" agreement cannot be made, what alternative is left to A, if she wish to secure the market, but annexation,—if not formal, at least virtual, if not immediate, at least proximate?

It may, perhaps, be said that she could acquiesce in partition and annexation by C and D if they bound themselves not to erect protective barriers against her trade in their new possessions. If they were *effectually* bound to this, A would probably be well content, but, unfortunately, they could not be effectually bound. By annexation a country passes under the sovereign power of another State, and, in the case we have supposed, even were annexation conditioned by a "self-denying" agreement, either of the annexing Powers might, at any moment, claim that the tariff affecting its new province came, as a matter of domestic policy, entirely within the plenitude of its own sovereign authority. Annexation, as an act, may, indeed, be conditioned, but, once accomplished, the new political situation which it creates is unconditioned,—for by it a territory passes under the sovereignty of a new master, and, the transition once made, the new sovereignty is unconditioned. After annexation, the annexed province forms part of the territory of the annexing State, its inhabitants are subjects of that State, and, within its own territories,—and over its own subjects and their affairs, the right of a sovereign State cannot be conditioned from without.¹

¹ All this has been illustrated by the action of the French in Tunis. That action seriously and adversely affected British commercial interests, but all the protests of the British Government proved quite ineffectual.

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It may, perhaps, be said that this conclusion has, at the best, only a temporary and provisional validity, and that, if international society were organised as it ought to be, and as one day it will be,—if it were a true commonwealth,—annexation would no longer be necessary. Probably not, but in practical affairs we have to deal with facts as they are,—not with facts as they may be or will be in the remote future. When we attempt to form a general theory of the world or a general doctrine of life, we rightly take into account the whole course of evolution, in so far as we can discover it, or can reasonably divine it. It is not then sufficient to take the facts of to-day simply as they are. We must ask what they mean and whither they are tending, and it will be the *end* of the time-process—not its present phase,—that will determine the essential character of our thought. When, however, we deal with “practical” affairs, for immediately “practical” purposes, our outlook is much more limited. *Then*, we are not concerned with the final issues of History. Our object is simply to find a serviceable way through its present difficulties, and, in our quest for such a way, the possibilities of the distant future will not and cannot help us. Success—save for accident,—will be ours only in proportion as we clearly perceive wherein present serviceableness consists, and accurately adjust our conduct to present facts. To permit our practical conduct to anticipate that better future for which we hope, were not to hasten the advent of that future, but to postpone it.

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"COMMERCIALISM" IN FOREIGN POLICY

We are sometimes told that the industrial determination of foreign affairs almost inevitably involves the degradation of foreign policy by "commercialism." But what is meant by "commercialism"? Not merely rightful devotion to rightful commercial interests, but, rather, an excessive, and, therefore, an unscrupulous devotion to interests which, because made inordinately important, are monstrous. Industry issues in political "commercialism" only when, becoming indifferent to all interests other than those obviously its own, it depraves public policy to the level of its own lower purposes, and makes use of men as though they were only its appointed tools. Even then, however, it is not wholly bad. Even then it does something towards building up the material fabric of national polity,—does it basely and blindly, if you will, but none the less does it. Even then it subserves the industrial self-maintenance of the nation,—subserves it ignobly and unintentionally, if you will, but none the less subserves it.

History is informed by the purpose of God, and works towards an end that He has determined for it. But God acts mediately,—through human instruments, and those instruments are often broken and blunted, and are often turned by the passions and selfishness of men to lower uses than those appointed for them. But the disabling is never a complete disabling, the perversion never a complete perversion. The spoiled and misused instruments still do some of their appointed work, and, although the architecture of History is sadly marred, and the fields of History

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weed-grown, already many a chamber in the house of Life is sweetly habitable, and already many a heart is ripening to a nobler harvest than tares.

CONSCIENCE AND FOREIGN POLICY

Suppose that "commercialism," or some other of Life's baser policies, becomes sovereign in the conduct of a nation's foreign affairs, what is then the duty of patriotic citizenship?

To the practical righteousness of everyday common sense—impatient of discussion and of fine distinctions—the answer may seem obvious. To support one's own country (right or wrong), and the substantial interests of one's own country, against all attack, and in the face of all menace,—this, it would say, is the sovereign duty of citizenship, a duty so manifestly sovereign as to be beyond the reach of all criticism save that of cowardice or knavery. Now there is truth in this,—somewhat of truth even in the closing comment. Indeed, so true is this rough and ready dogmatism of the plain man's faith, that, for the immediate purposes of practical politics, it would be difficult to give the ordinary voter more wholesome counsel, or more helpful guidance. Yet, largely true though it be, it is not obviously final, for there are ethical questions involved in it which not the most robust conscience can ignore, nor the most confident refuse to discuss.

To support one's country, and one's country's interests, if its policy be right, and its interests righteous, is, confessedly and by universal consent, the plain duty of patriotic manhood. But suppose that, in some particular case, its policy seems wrong

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and its interests unrighteous. The duty of support is not then so obvious. Indeed, it would, at first sight, seem that, in such a case, a higher moral obligation would compel a rightly scrupulous conscience to incur and accept, for righteousness' sake, the reproach of being "anti-national."

We need not be concerned to refute this—indeed so long as we are dealing simply with general principles and maxims it is impossible to refute it; for, however fully we may admit, and however highly value, the claims upon us that arise out of our practical position as citizens of no mean state, it is of course true, beyond all possibility of doubt or question, that the claims of the moral ideal, in so far as they are different, are higher.

We rigidly reject, however, as unsound in thought and mischievous in practice, the sterile formalism which would make morality a matter of copy-book headlines. Such headlines may be of unimpeachable orthodoxy and of universal truth, but, as often as not—perhaps more often than not,—they have been made universal only by being made unserviceable,—unserviceable, that is, for positive help and guidance in circumstances of practical difficulty. Except in the last emergencies of conduct, morality is always practical,—always governed by practical ends and determined by practical conditions. Ordinarily our practical duty is adequately defined for us by the practical factors of the situation, in which, at a given moment, we find ourselves. Ordinarily, the concrete sanctities of life—Home, Church, and Fatherland—are supreme. Therefore, we rightly think of the sovereign righteousness of the world as immanent in the world,—meeting us as duty in the exigencies of circumstance, hallowing

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Life's practical ends by the indwelling and transforming light of Life's ultimate ideal. It is only as thus determined by circumstance and end that the thought of goodness is immediately helpful. A general formula may be serviceable for certain purposes of Thought: ordinarily it is not immediately serviceable for the practical purposes of Life, for serviceableness in Life depends upon precise adaptation to particular practical conditions, and it is only by abstracting from all such particular adaptation that a moral truth becomes general. When this abstraction has been made, there is something inviting in the resultant universality, and sometimes, and for certain purposes, it is convenient to make a precept thus general; but the convenience is for Thought, and not for Life, and it has been purchased by the sacrifice of practical usefulness. Therefore, we rightly distrust the phantasy, be it academic or pietistic, that would abstract the righteousness of the world from the concrete particulars of situation and purpose, in which alone it ordinarily becomes helpfully significant to us, and that, in place of the concrete sanctities of practical duty, can give us for our practical guidance nothing better than abstract formulæ.

But, all this notwithstanding, the fact remains that morality though genuinely immanent, is always transcendental. Family, Church, and Fatherland may, as governing ideals, mark out for us the practical path of righteousness, and determine our practical duties, but behind and above every particular form of righteousness and of duty there is a higher good, which these particular forms do but illustrate, and upon which they depend for the goodness that makes them what they are. It is embodied in no institution, and finds utterance in

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none of the counsels of the world's practical policy, for it is greater than all institutions, and makes for an end other than and higher than any intended by the world's practical foresight, and to it lies man's ultimate appeal.

That appeal, however, is genuinely an ultimate appeal. Frequently made, and frequently necessary for the purposes of Thought, it is rarely made, and yet more rarely necessary, for the practical purposes of practical Life. The highest Good transcends all the concrete forms of reality, but those forms are subordinate to it, and, according to their respective "degrees of reality," they severally interpret it, and they exist that they may subserve it, or, rather, that they may subserve our human endeavour and aspiration towards it. As thus ancillary to Life they rightly command our allegiance, and that allegiance is annulled only when helpfulness is at an end,—only when some form, which was aforetime interpretative and ministrant of the good, becomes useless or debased to lower ends. The Fatherland, however, is a highly complex unity. It touches individual life, not at isolated points, but everywhere. It besets us behind and before, and the ways and modes of its beneficence are as many and as various as are the sympathies and activities that connect us with it. We may occasionally, in thought, and for the purposes of Thought, separate these several ways and modes, but the Fatherland is a concrete whole, and these are but forms and expressions of its invisible life. It is as an indivisible whole—as an organic unity, as a concrete existing thing, that the Fatherland commands our allegiance because of its helpfulness, and until, *as a concrete whole*, it ceases to be helpful, that allegiance is sovereign and rightfully sovereign. From that allegiance, no mistake in foreign policy can absolve us.

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It may be that, at some given moment, in our private thought, there is a higher conception of national and international righteousness than is then manifest in our country's policy. But, probably, to that higher thought, the Fatherland has been largely contributory, through the inviting opportunities and informing grace of its life, and our duty as patriots—and also, I think, as Christians,—is, not to throw ourselves on the side of our country's enemies, but so to labour that our private thought shall become, in our country's history the controlling spirit of a new time.

Now, surely, to be "anti-national" is, for the practical purposes of missionary endeavour, the worst possible form of zeal. Every defect in the body politic is an appeal to our Patriotism to become more earnestly reformatory. We mischievously and weakly abuse our opportunity if, in the presence of failure or shortcoming, we turn anti-national. We are then fanatics—enthusiasts of the baser sort,—and not missionaries.

We must remember that our country is our Fatherland because of the humane helpfulness of its common life. Now, of that common life, foreign policy is only one expression. It does not summarise the national life, or draw to itself all that makes the Fatherland organic to moral ideas and moral influences. However detrimental a given foreign policy may be, it will still remain true that we live by and in our country's life,—*by* that life, because informed by its tradition and pervading spirit; *in* that life, because therein we find the practical opportunities that invite our manhood, and the civic vocation that calls out our charity into active brotherliness.

Reform and improve that common life we may,—nay, as patriots, if grace for this work be given to us, reform and improve it we must; separate ourselves

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from it we cannot ; take sides with those who would work it harm, or would injure the polity wherein it lives, we dare not ! We may, indeed, go into voluntary exile, and cut ourselves off from outward communion with that life, but without our leave it will go with us, for it is incorporate in the very structure of our being. We may find ourselves constrained, by our highest allegiance, to become dissentients from some temporarily popular policy ; this may and should arouse our Patriotism to a new enthusiasm for national righteousness ; it cannot rightly make us "anti-national." If we become so, our country is not to blame, but our extravagant emotion and ineffective thought.

POLITICAL SELF-MAINTENANCE

Industrial self-maintenance is, as we have seen, the primary duty of a nation,—an immediately practical part of its national vocation.

But national vocation, even in its practical aspect, is wider than national industry. An organism's primary end is to live, and, for this purpose, it must not only obtain food, but must, also, maintain itself against adverse forces in its environment, and, unless it do this effectually, it will perish or degenerate, however well supplied it be with food. A nation, therefore, must not only—through the "private" activities of its people, as well as by the vigilant care of its government,—foster the industries by which it lives, it must also maintain its position in the world. It must safeguard itself against menace, and be able to defend itself against foreign attack.

Therefore, commercial interests are not the only national interests that are of immediately practical

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importance. For instance, on the north-west frontier of India we have interests which, if not wholly military, are chiefly military, and at any time untoward events in Tibet or Southern China may bring into an undesired prominence similar interests upon other frontiers. Already the Tibetan expedition has given us warning, and we cannot think that our present success will be final. Again, we have important interests of a like nature in Persia and the Persian Gulf, in Morocco and the Mediterranean, and for these, and for all interests such as these,—no less than for our immediately commercial interests,—“the armed strength of England should, upon rightful occasion, be both sword and shield.”

Diplomacy, it is true, may do much, if only it be a diplomacy very different from that which we English folk have learned so thoroughly to mistrust,—if only it be strong, sane, and far-seeing,—but words are of little use unless behind them be an effective force ready to strike. Even an indisputable right is of small avail in a world where the ultimate “practical” decision so often rests with Might.

We know that aforetime men often dealt with the fortunes and aspirations of peoples as though Expediency and Force were the supreme factors in history, and, although the world has progressed in many ways since then, the evil tradition of those days still thrives in present-day diplomacy,—more especially on the Continent, where those who find their avocation in diplomacy rarely permit their work to be complicated by purely ethical considerations. Our English diplomacy has, perhaps, shared more than any other in the ethical progress that has made so many usages and ways of thinking obsolete. Unfortunately, it has

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not learned—not even yet—that Right, when naked, or clothed only with her innocence, is helpless in the midst of armed nations. If she is to triumph, she, also, must be fully panoplied and resolute to act.

III

ETHICAL VOCATION

Safety and sufficient sustenance, however, although primary alike for the nation as for the individual, are in neither case ultimate,—they are not the only ends of national vocation. “Man doth not live by bread alone,” and this is true of him whether we think of individual men or of communities. It is true of each individual in the ultimate separateness of his personal vocation and responsibility,—it is true of him, also, as a member of society,—as husband, citizen, worker,—for, whatever the position he holds among his fellows, and whatever the business incidental to it, through that position his personal vocation has to be fulfilled, in that work his personal responsibility is sovereign. “Man doth not live by bread alone,” nor does he live *for* bread alone, and this, also, is true both of individuals and of nations. For the individual, we know, the ultimate end, to which all else is morally subordinate, is, not bread and the things that bread may be held to symbolise,—things pertaining to man's bodily enjoyment and well-being,—but character; and since the nation, in so far as it has abiding worth, is but an instrument of the moral ideal,—a means for the fulfilment of individual vocation,—that same end is ultimate for it also. A nation has, then, besides the “practical” vocation we have already discussed, an ethical vocation, and of this we can say at once

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that it is the higher,—sovereign for the nation, as the moral ideal is for the individual.

To contend that individual men and women owe allegiance to the moral ideal,—an allegiance so complete that their lives should be ruled by it, is happily a work of supererogation. That allegiance can be doubted or denied only by the most decadent in times of decadence, and, happily, our own day, despite its manifold shortcomings, is not decadent. But not so long ago it would have seemed to many a strange thing to assert that the nation *as such*, no less truly than the individual, has a definite ethical work to carry on, a definite ethical vocation to fulfil. In those days Thought was predominately atomistic. For all the purposes of Life and Thought the individual, as an individual, was taken to be the ultimate unit, and every form of social organisation was regarded as an incidental device or growth subserving only certain limited purposes. Thus, the family was thought of chiefly as a link between the passing generations; economic organisation was supposed to have only narrowly economic ends, so that, in the domain of Economics, Ethics could appear only as an intruder, and the nation itself was regarded as existing primarily for internal and external defence. Our point of view to-day is far removed from this. We acknowledge, it is true, that each form of social organisation has its own special work, but we now perceive what, aforetime, many did not,—we perceive that each form of social organisation, however limited or special its immediate function, is ancillary to human nature as an organic whole, and not simply to this or that isolated part of that nature. We say, and rightly say, that they are all instruments of individual

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self-realisation,—that, besides the ends they immediately subserve, they are all contributory to character as a whole, and instrumentally subordinate to the moral ideal, which is sovereign in character.

The primary and determining error of the older thought is, perhaps, to be sought in its doctrine of human nature, rather than in its view of human society. It did not perceive the organic and essential unity of the individual. It had not discovered that in human life we have, not a mere and incidental complexus of variously conditioned activities,—each of them independent in right and autonomous,—but an organic unity of co-ordinated powers, each of which, whatever its special and immediate end, is essentially contributory to the good of the whole, and is subordinate to the moral ideal,—subordinate to it because that ideal stands for the good of the whole, because in that ideal the good of the whole is completely set forth.

Human nature is essentially unitary, and not one of its various powers subsists in independent separateness. Each is contributory to the well-being of a nature which, because it is essentially one, cannot know an ultimate plurality of ends, or ultimate plurality of good. It is only because the individual is thus essentially a unit that the moral ideal can rightfully claim sovereignty over the *whole* of his life. If this fact of ultimate and essential unity be overlooked, the moral end will seem but one end among many,—possibly *primus inter pares*, but even that only by individual idiosyncrasy of temperament,—and moral good will seem to be the consummating benediction, not of human nature as a whole, but of only one part of that nature,—of one of the several factors incidentally

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integral in that incidental complexus called the individual man. Religion might, indeed, dignify that one part as the most excellent, or as alone ultimately worthy, but this exaltation of one part would make only more apparent the separateness of each several part, and would illustrate yet more conspicuously the doctrine of ultimate pluralism. Moreover, if this doctrine were true, Religion—however highly it might exalt this or that part of life,—would never be able to make valid claim to sovereignty over the *whole* of life, for, *ex hypothesi*, each factor in the individual complexus would be essentially independent of each and every other, and would pursue its own ends in its own way. It is true that, in individual cases, the religious factor might be strong enough to exercise a more or less effective hegemony in life,—using the other factors as instruments of its will, disciplining them into an activity more or less rebellious. But, once more, this would be but an accident of individual temperament, and would not—because, *ex hypothesi*, it could not,—set forth a general rule of right. A temperament not dominated by the religious factor would not issue in the religious life, and would not acknowledge the ideals of that life. It would act along its own lines for its own ends, and, *ex hypothesi*, it would be right in doing so.

Nor is the dependence of life upon temperament merely an academic contention of the schools. It is a practical truth that finds ample illustration, not only in this and that personal experience, but also in that world-wide record of experience which constitutes the foundation of history. Temperament and opportunity are, indeed, the immediate lords of Life's practical issues, and of these temperament is the greater, for one man, through indifference, weakness, or inertness,

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will miss opportunities that another will use fruitfully, and one will wait until opportunity becomes patent and obtrusive, while another will be prompt to seek it out while it is yet hidden in the undisclosed possibilities of Circumstance. It makes of one man a painter; of another, a musician or a poet; of another, a metaphysician; of another, a politician or a trader; and, whatever the vocation to which a man's bias of temperament leads him, the practical ends of that vocation always tend to become the chief interest of his life, and sometimes they become so potent as to exclude all thought of higher good, or wider duty. For instance, there are many professional and business men who will say that they are not politicians, and who think that by this disclaimer they excuse or justify their neglect of the primary duties of citizenship. Similarly, in days not yet remote, there were many leaders of industry whose opposition to the Factory Acts presupposed the plea "We are manufacturers, not philanthropists." Not only had their daily occupation become their absorbing interest, but its methods were accepted as a sufficient rule of conduct, and criticism from without was resented as an infringement of right. Conceptions of a higher morality,—springing from the explicit acknowledgment of the moral ideal as, of right, immediately and effectively sovereign over the whole of life, and not merely over some particular part of it,—are, it is true, slowly making their way, but separate occupations and pursuits (house-owning and land-owning, law, diplomacy, journalism, the material industries and trade,) still claim and still exercise a large measure of autonomy,—a measure which permits a man to do without shame in the course of his business what

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he would unreservedly condemn as wrong in purely private affairs. If we are asked to trace this back to its ultimate philosophical foundation, we must attribute it to a psychological pluralism which has not yet been wholly overcome.

Sometimes uncontrolled bias of temperament leads to critical idiosyncrasy so marked as to call for apology or excuse. The artistic temperament, for example, is fruitful in moral extravagance. We can all recall the names of men distinguished for artistic achievement who, by their private lives, have sorely taxed, sometimes the understanding, and always the charity of their admirers. In these cases we are asked to accept temperament as a final fact, and to make allowance for its excesses. This, after all, is only an excuse,—a plea *ad misericordiam*,—it is not an apology, and does not profess to be a justification. Sometimes, however, a bolder line is taken. The same initial plea is put forward, but no concession of charity is asked for. Rather is it contended that none is needed, for temperament, it is said, gives the final law to life. A man can but act, so it is urged, according to the bias of his individual nature, and no one has a right to censure him. Sometimes this contention is confused by the addition of the argument that Genius is always rightly and necessarily autonomous, and that the plain man has no title to sit in judgment upon it. Genius, however, is one thing: bias of temperament quite another. Genius is, always and characteristically, insight and capacity, and these in quite extraordinary degree. Its distinctive work is the achievement of new truth, and for the new truth reached by genius we rightly claim complete authority—not, however, because of the exceptional power that achieved it, but simply because of

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its truth. The exemption from common censure which we thus rightly allow to the work of genius does not, however, extend to the private conduct of the man of genius. The sins of genius are rightly felt to be stumbling-blocks, no less than those of the more ordinary delinquents who can only plead predominant bias of character. This bias is, it is true, often a concomitant of genius,—sometimes, indeed, it would seem to be a condition of genius,—but the ordinary moral sense of the world refuses to recognise it as exempting the conduct of genius from common censure, and the most ardent admiration of genius thus aberrant rarely rises to more than a plea for charity. But sometimes, as I have said, bolder apologists take a bolder line. Charity is neither sought nor desired, and no protection is claimed from the exceptional prerogative of genius, but the right of each individual to live according to the promptings of his nature is freely and unreservedly asserted. This is humanism of the baser sort,—naturalistic humanism, as we may call it,—and, precisely in the cases that most characteristically and clamantly illustrate it, the end of that way is death. Yet it sometimes has a historical genesis sufficiently worthy,—a genesis upon which no breath of adverse criticism can rightly pass,—for, not infrequently, it arises from the natural and rightful revolt of the spirit that has discovered in life some hitherto unsuspected goodness against the fetters of traditional thought and practice that would prevent enjoyment.

Each of the several powers of man ministers to him somewhat of the goodness and helpfulness of the world,—brings to him something in which he finds at least a passing satisfaction and content,—something

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which, at least for a moment, makes his life richer and more complete, and the native conviction of his heart is always that each of these several powers has righteous use, and that the good it brings to him is lawful. Special disciplines, such as those of Thought and Faith, may at times deny this, and seek to confine him to a narrower way than that which Nature, by the inner possibilities of his life, and the outward opportunities of the world around him, has made plain for him, and for a time they may succeed in imposing their restrictions upon him; but, in a very real sense, the human heart is its own master, and, in the long-run, always proves itself stronger than the devisings by which men seek unnatural lordship over it. Whatever success may, for a time, seem to attend the evangel of narrowness, revolt is inevitable, and sooner or later it will succeed. The spirit of man is the greatest natural factor in the universe of created being,—if, indeed, we can call that natural which is but little lower than the angels,—so far is it above the confessedly natural powers that environ it, and neither political institutions nor forms of Faith or Thought can rightfully confine it within narrower limits than those which its own nature marks out for it. Of all the rights of man, the right to live—to live out his life to its completion,—is the most fundamental, the most essential. It is the right which is characteristic of him as a living spirit, and not even Divine ordinance can lawfully restrict it, or restrain him from exercising it.

The revolt of man against limitations that impoverish his life is, therefore, profoundly natural, but, in itself, it is not naturalistic. When judged broadly, apart from the irrelevant details of individual motive and conduct, that revolt is always seen to mark

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a stage in the spiritual progress of man,—a stage in his outward movement towards that spiritual ideal of life's completeness which is rightly and ultimately sovereign over him, and in which, as he draws near to it, he finds consummating benediction. It is true that Progress is often unfortunate in its evangelists and forerunners. Too often men, not knowing the true greatness of their cause, give needless occasion of misunderstanding and offence, and illustrate lawless license, or unhelpful extremes, rather than serviceable freedom. But historical movements are not to be judged solely by the personal merits or defects of the men who are agents in them. The order of the world is essentially a moral order, but, not infrequently, the lines of its advancing movement diverge from the expectations of our orthodoxy, and the incidents of its advance break through the narrow circle of our proprieties. Not by genesis, but by meaning, must we judge of the events of history, and meaning is determined, not by the idiosyncrasies of individual conduct, but by the inner spiritual facts out of which events arise, and by the new possibilities of life those events open up.

The revolt of "humanism," then, is always profoundly natural. Sometimes, indeed, it is, also, in its immediate consequences and aims, naturalistic; but, when this happens, it is because of the very pluralism we have been considering,—because men lose sight of the organic and essential unity of their nature, and permit the revolting power or capacity to be a law unto itself,—to be independently autonomous, without regard to its true position in the ordered hierarchy of human faculties.

New discoveries may bring to us new forms of the goodness of Art, new forms of the saving helpfulness of Truth or Knowledge, and after these the human

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spirit naturally goes out,—goes out with a fulness of right that nothing can finally restrict,—but neither Art nor Knowledge nor Truth are the whole of life, nor are the capacities they severally content the whole of human nature. It is human nature as a whole that gives the true law of human life: no one part of it, however important and valuable, can, without mischief that may easily become disaster, act as though it were the whole, or as though it alone were of worth. It is when the pioneers of Progress neglect this truth—when they permit the interest of their discoveries (whether in Science, in Art, or in Thought), to become exclusive, and the temperament which those discoveries gratify to become sovereign—it is then, and then only, that they make shipwreck of life; then, and then only, that the first-fruits of Progress seem to be excess. Mischief does not come from the new goodness wherewith Progress enriches Life; it comes from the undisciplined and unenlightened heart that knows not its own true nature, and that unlawfully allows the new interest of the moment to become the master of life, and the faculty active therein to have uncontrolled way. Once again, the mischief arises from a pluralism not yet entirely overcome.

Religion has, it is true, always claimed for herself an undivided sovereignty in life; but, in seeking to establish an unshared rule, she has too often enslaved her peers, and acted as though the things she herself called spiritual were alone of value. It is, of course, true that only the spiritual has abiding worth, but it is also true that every human interest is spiritual, for it is an interest of a nature which, essentially, is, not "matter," but "spirit." Religion has not erred in her first principle, for it is entirely true that only in the

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spiritual do we find abiding value. Her mistake, when she has made one, has lain in a too narrow definition of the spiritual. The practical rules which she has framed for the governance of men have too often embodied a conception of the spiritual so narrow as to de-spiritualise the greater part of human nature and of human life. Although claiming for herself the sovereignty of life, she has often acted upon the postulate of pluralism,—as if human nature were not essentially one nature, and as though the several powers and capacities of man were, severally, essentially independent, and were only incidentally associated in the merely apparent unity of earthly individuality.

The mischief of this has been manifold and far-reaching. Religion herself has suffered not a little. Her message has lost in attractiveness for men, for although a message of salvation, it has also been a message of loss. Religion, narrowing herein the assurances of Faith, has too often spoken as though only one particular part of man's complex nature could attain everlasting life, and since, to all appearance, it is not through the part so privileged that we know and taste the fair goodness of the world around us, and have part in that world's healthful interests and helpful activities, men have felt that, in the view of Religion, all these—the goodness that we know most intimately, the interests wherein we have found our life, and the work that has ennobled life,—are but temporary accidents, pertaining only to our earthly sojourn, and that in the world to come there will be no place for them, nor anything of correspondent worth. What wonder if men have sometimes thought Earth more homelike than the Church's Heaven, and have deemed Religion, as the Church has taught it,

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but a shadow upon the present fairness of the world and over the unknown possibilities beyond.

Thus, Religion, as a missionary force in the world, has suffered no small loss, and the religious life has, in equal measure, failed to attract men,—failed to attract those very men whom, did they but know it in the fullness of its true reality, it would most abundantly bless. And it has failed—why? Because it seemed to promise men, not fulness of life, but only a shadow of life.

Nor, indeed, has this estimate been wholly wrong, for if the world has lost by the failure of Religion, Religion itself, as a practical rule of life, has also suffered loss from the untrue restrictions of her thought. Through the false narrowness of the way in which Religion has so often understood, or, rather, misunderstood, the nature of the spiritual, the religious life has become, not only in appearance, but in reality, poorer and less valuable to man. Divorcing itself from the practical interests and activities of earth,—which its true mission, did it but rightly understand it, is to redeem,—Religion has too often withdrawn her followers into a narrow round of devotion, observance, and discipline. Now, these—the outward expressions and instruments of Religion,—although of worth as the handmaids of life, are not, in themselves, the end of life, not even the practical end. They may help the believer, in certain private needs of his inner life, but they are not immediately contributory to the spiritual activities by which the world's everyday life—itsself, a process distinctively spiritual,—is carried on, nor do they make the divinely appointed helpfulness of the world more serviceable to man. And yet the helpfulness of Religion is immediately for earth and for the affairs of earth,—to make men better citizens, to

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humanise their industry, to complete their Thought, to ennoble their Art, and, in doing these things, to make men more completely what they ought to be, by fulfilling the divinely given possibilities of their nature.

To be thus humanely helpful is the characteristic work of Religion, and it is a work that cannot be performed in aloofness from the world, but only by becoming the informing spirit of its life. One can hardly insist too strongly that human life is wholly spiritual, that all human interests are spiritual interests, that, in all its forms, the goodness of the world is good because in and through each one of them it contributes to the building up of manhood into completeness of life. The religious life should be not the negation of earthly good, but the completion of it, and it can complete earthly good, not by renouncing it,—that, surely, were impossible,—but by taking it up into its own larger life of loftier aspiration and more prevailing love. Unless it do this, it must surely fail in its appointed work. If it hold itself aloof from the world, the world will indeed lose that most helpful benediction of completing grace which Religion can give,—but Religion herself will also lose. Her practical ideal will become impoverished, and she will be unable to build up her believers into that catholicity of manhood without which no life can be truly what it should be.

Nor is this the only mischief done by an insistence upon an altogether too narrow definition of things spiritual. It has enabled men to propose a mere 'Sunday Religion.' Conceiving Religion to be confined to a narrow range of human interests and human work, they have in all else felt free to follow the promptings and seek the nearest gains of the moment,

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—to be acute in business beyond the measure of honesty, and to be rigorous in mastery without thought of charity.

These evils, wherever they exist, all arise directly, although not exclusively, from that mistaken thought which regards only one small part of human nature, and one narrow range of human life, as spiritual, and which, in every other range of life, permits the nature that it deems non-spiritual to legislate for itself. Whenever and wherever Religion insists upon a definition of the spiritual so narrow as to bring a great part of human nature and life under non-spiritual categories, then and there those evils will be actual or imminent. They can be avoided only by a full recognition of the primary truth that the nature of man is essentially unitary, and that all its activities have their term in completeness of manhood and fulness of life. But those activities can be thus determined only if the nature which possesses them be essentially monistic. Only by the inherence of separate powers and faculties in an unitary nature—only because they are activities of a nature which is essentially one,—can the gain of life that comes through any one of them become contributory to the completeness of the whole in its several parts. The unity of human nature is not that of an aggregate, whereof any one part can suffer gain or loss without gain or loss to the other parts, its unity is organic, and all its parts “are severally members one of another.” The life of man is essentially one, and a gain in its effectual powers, though it come through only one of the many channels of life's activity, is a gain for the whole life. It is the *whole* nature of man, although not necessarily—not usually—the whole of his powers,

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that is the true agent in all work, and it is to the whole nature that the gain of life wrought out by work belongs. It belongs to the *whole* nature,—and not only to the faculty immediately engaged in the work that wins the gain for life,—because faculty is not an accident that pertains only adventitiously to the individual spirit which claims it as its own, but *is* that spirit, in its very self, acting in this particular way and not in that.

This monistic doctrine must be the basis of our thought concerning the ethical duty of the nation. That duty is simply this,—to build up all who have part in the nation into true character and helpful manhood. It arises from the extension to the nation of the moral ideal that is sovereign over the individual. Nor is this extension in the least degree arbitrary, for, just as the nation has no reality apart from the individuals constituting it, so it has no end other than theirs. It is distinctively an instrument, and its end is individual good. Therefore, just as man, besides a practical vocation to make the natural resources of the world tributary to his need, has also an ethical vocation,—a vocation to be what he ought to be, to make actual all the varied possibilities of manhood latent within him,—so, also, the nation, besides the practical vocation we have already considered, has also a vocation distinctively ethical,—a vocation to help its members fulfil the ethical vocation that comes to them severally as individuals.

Thus, alike in things ethical as in things "practical," the nation exists that it may serve ends that are individual,—in other words, it is the primary duty of the nation to be not only serviceable, but *generally*

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serviceable,—helpful, not only to this class or to that, but to all who have part in its organic life, and helpful to them in all the common interests and sympathies that make them sharers in that life,—helpful to them, also, for that sovereign and consummating purpose to which those interests and sympathies are or should be ancillary.

INDIRECT CHARACTER-BUILDING |

The nation, therefore,—in this, as in all essential matters, reproducing the primary facts of individual life,—has for its practical vocation, not only the maintenance of bodily life, but also the formation of character, and for the nation, as also for the individual, this ethical vocation is, to no small degree, fulfilled indirectly and unconsciously, without intending foresight and design.

The history of man, whether we think of the individual or the race, is a history of spiritual development,—of the passing of spiritual possibility into actuality. Therefore, we rightly speak of it as a process of self-realisation, and of complete self-realisation—the complete development of character and capacity—as its ethical term. Individual life always commences in immaturity. In earliest infancy character and capacity are alike undeveloped. Then, manhood is not actual, but only potential, and it will only become actual through the experience and work of later years. The various disciplines of life—the home, the school, the university, the business or professional career,—these *add* nothing to the spirit that by them is built up into effectual manhood, they do but *develop* possibilities that were

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latent in it at the earliest beginning. Quite strictly speaking, the spiritual history of the individual is not a history of *acquisition*, for the harvest of the years is not reaped in foreign fields and brought into the soul from without,—it is a history of *evolution*, or unfolding,—for the harvest of life springs up and ripens in the soul itself, and is but the fruitage of the soul's own essential powers. And the history of the race does but illustrate on a larger scale the same essential truth. Human life is ever a transition of the potential into the actual, and progress ever comes, not by addition from without, but by unfolding from within.

We know nothing, and can surmise but little, concerning the spiritual character and capacity of our earliest forefathers,—of the men who shaped the Eolithic flints, or of the yet earlier and more primitive wanderers who have not left even such poor records of their presence. Essentially like ourselves they must have been, or they had not been men, but, yet, how widely different! Without civic life or civic virtue; capable only of the simplest thought; incapable of art; knowing only the barest rudiments of religion and of family life, and, as yet, scarcely at all disciplined by either; without industry or polity; snatching a chance subsistence from a world on which they had but precarious foothold;—they were, indeed, truly men, and yet how unlike any of the men we now know! Even our lowest savages are higher than they, for those savages are all inheritors of a nobler past. Yet, in that unmanlike humanity, lay hidden the possibilities of all that man has since achieved and become, and the development of those possibilities has given us the content of History,—has created our politics, our institutions, our industries, has given us alike our

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Philosophy, our Science, and our Art, and has, at least, helped significantly to shape all the world's religions. It is as true for the race as for the individual that larger manhood comes "not by addition from without, but by unfolding from within."

But this word "unfolding" is only in small degree appropriate to the process by which individual character is formed, and by which the present manhood of the race has been built up. It has been here used only because it serves to so clearly set forth the essential fact that spiritual progress always takes place by *development*,—by the coming into actuality of capacities and powers which, although at first but potential, were, as potential, genuinely present in the original constitution of the developing nature. This, however, is the limit of its relevance. If used with wider reference it can be only misleading. For instance, the mere process of unfolding makes no difference in the structure or character of that which unfolds. What it was before unfolding, it is afterwards.

But in the process by which human potentialities, whether in the individual or in the race, become actual, change is not only present but essential. For example, the civic virtues at one time did not exist. They are the outcome of civic life, and that life had no place in the first beginnings of human history. We must, of course, suppose that they were potential in the nature of primitive man,—that in him were certain aptitudes of character, and certain possibilities of nature out of which, by the opportunity and discipline of later circumstance, those virtues grew, but between that primitive endowment of capacity and the noble instances of civic patriotism which adorn and dignify the later history of the race, how great a difference!

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—in the development of one into the other how great a change has taken place! Similarly, we are, I think, compelled to believe that primitive man was not wholly without Religion,—or that he had, at least, the first rudiments of that consciousness which afterwards became fundamental in the religions of the world, but, once more, between that crude beginning and the religious consciousness as we have learnt to know it in the history of earth's holiest, or even as we know it in our own poorer experience, how great the difference! —in the development of the one into the other how great a change has taken place!

It is the fact of change that gives to modern theories of evolution their distinctive character. We no longer think of the Present as existing fully preformed in the Past, and awaiting only the invitation of events to unfold itself. The Present was in the Past only as the Future is in the Present,—not as a hidden actuality that waits only the fulness of the times or the fitness of opportunity to spring forth into completeness of active being,—not as a hidden actuality, but as a possibility, a potentiality, and the process by which this latent capacity of nature passes into actuality is genuinely and essentially a process, not of mere unfolding, but of change.

Nor is this transition—at least, as we know it in human history,—passionless or painless. Here again the word “unfolding,” were we to take it as generally descriptive of the process of development, would seriously mislead us, for unfolding—the opening of a flower in the sunlight—is the gentlest process in organic Nature, and it suggests neither strain nor effort: it simply comes to pass,—always silently, always gently, often graciously. Far different is it with the changes

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that develop character and fashion manhood. Silent, indeed, in themselves,—for they are changes in a spirit which never obtrudes itself upon the theatre of sense,—they are often wrought out in bitterest pain and through stormiest conflict. Not only by the gladness and success of life, but, also, by its tragedy, its failure, and its grief,—not only by healthful effort in peaceful industry, and by leisurely work in the by-ways of Art and Thought, but through the death-storm of war, through “plague, pestilence, and famine,” by strenuous endeavour and ceaseless labour,—it is by and through these and such as these that man has come thus far along his road,—it is by and through these and such as these that he is now advancing. It is true that his path is not always so beset by peril and suffering, but in greater or less degree it is always laborious,—his advance is always by effort and discipline.¹

Now, if we speak of man's growth towards completeness of character and of life as an unfolding, it is precisely this distinctive characteristic of his history that we fail to set forth. Nor, indeed, is the word “growth” much more appropriate, for growth also is silent and gentle,—never catastrophic,—and although growth involves change, the change it most directly suggests is one in magnitude. But this is not the characteristic change in human progress. Conscience,

¹ This is not a peculiar disability of spirit. In this world no human good is quite gratuitous. In some form or other Nature always exacts payment. There is, indeed, in the world abundant provision for our need, but that provision becomes helpful to us only through work. The air is seemingly most completely free, but breathing is no small tax upon the physiological resources of the body. It is not otherwise in things of the spirit. There is abundant provision made for Progress in the possibilities of human nature and the opportunities of experience, but Progress comes only through the use of that provision, and use necessarily involves effort.

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for instance, has not become *bigger* since Pre-Glacial days. It has become more sensitive and more enlightened, and the range of its judgments has become wider. If, indeed, we take the process by which the acorn becomes the oak as typical of growth, then, indeed, the analogy becomes closer, but here, again, we have no suggestion of endeavour and suffering.

It seems, therefore, better to use the general words "development" and "evolution" to designate the advance in human history, for these are neutral terms, and suggest nothing as to the felt character in experience of the incidents that make the process they name.

We have seen that in human history the incidents of progress are always, in greater or less degree, strenuous. But, in most cases, the effort they imply is not primarily and intentionally directed to the ethical end. Although always of some ethical value, and sometimes obviously fruitful in ethical results, human effort usually has for its immediate end—often for its only apparent end—some outward "objective" gain which, in itself, as a purely external advantage, is non-ethical. For instance, the immediate ends of man's daily industry are not, in themselves, ethical. That daily industry, by the discipline that it brings to character, by the training of capacity it involves, by the interests that gather round it, and by the affections that cheer and inspire it, is itself a moral agent of primary value, but the ends that it directly and intentionally seeks are not ethical. War, too, ruthlessly though it disciplines character, rarely has a directly ethical end. For individual character, the incidents of war may be sternly salutary, and, for the larger destinies of nations, war may have results

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of great ethical significance, but, in most cases, if not in all, these results are incidental, not intended.

Only exceptionally, in individual life as we ordinarily see it and know it, and yet more exceptionally in national life, are the ends of conduct directly and intentionally ethical. Indeed, deliberate moral self-culture is but doubtfully commendable, and doubtfully beneficial. In the spiritual life the healthiest growth is, doubtless, the unconscious and unintended growth that comes from work faithfully done, simply because it is in the path of daily service, and from ideals loyally followed simply because they are rightfully sovereign.

A well-known ethical school frankly accepts the paradox that, although, according to the distinctive teaching of that school, pleasure is the true *summum bonum*—the true end of life,—yet to seek pleasure is not the highest or the wisest practical rule, because pleasure comes most healthfully, most helpfully, most certainly, not by intentional quest, but by incidental gain. *Non dux sed comes voluptas*. But we do not necessarily escape paradox by turning from Hedonism. Even if we say that goodness, not pleasure, is the end of life, we have to recognise that goodness is not best won by those who seek it most directly,—who make, or try to make, longing for goodness the immediate motive of every action,—because goodness, like pleasure, comes “most healthily, most helpfully, most certainly, not by intentional quest, but by incidental gain,” as we labour, without introspective thought or selfish purpose, in the broad fields of daily duty and service. If this were not so, Charity,—which ever seeketh not her own,—could not be the highest and most fruitful discipline of life.

Both in early and adult years it is, ordinarily, thus

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indirectly that manhood is developed and character built up. Most of us are formed and informed far more by life's practical activity than by its moral aspirations and purposes, and herein we do but illustrate the general education of the race,—the general process by which man has come thus far out of the darkness of his remotest past. If we take man's predominant and most general purpose as that which gives unity to history, and marks the goal of progress, we shall find in civilisation, in knowledge, in culture, his characteristic gain, and shall be compelled to see in goodness and in serviceable manhood only by-products of his industry,—so true is it that spiritual gains usually come to us, not directly, as the reward of endeavour that purposefully seeks them, but indirectly as the benediction of work rightly done and service well performed. Because, however, these latter gains, although seemingly incidental, are, by their very nature, directly contributory towards that moral end which (whether clearly intended, or only silently dynamic in the inner activities of the spirit) is sovereign and consummating in human life, it is *these* gains, and not those others,—civilisation, knowledge, culture,—that are truly characteristic of History, in so far as it is genuinely *human* history. It is spirit, and not outward achievement, that gives to History unity, meaning, and purpose, and to spirit all else is but ancillary. Human life, then, in its inmost nature and characteristic progress, is essentially spiritual, but, because the facts that make up its outward history are genuinely and indispensably ministrant to that nature and ancillary to that progress, that outward history itself is also spiritual.

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Let us now use these thoughts as our guide in our further endeavour to interpret national work and national vocation. But, indeed, for our present purpose, little remains to be done except to repeat, with new illustrations, what has already been said with wider reference. We speak, we rightly speak, of national work—of the outward activities which subserve a nation's life—as ethical, not because we suppose it usually to spring directly from what would ordinarily be called an ethical motive, or to be usually guided by an ethical purpose, but because it is an instrument, and an indispensable instrument, to ethical ends. Just as individual character is trained and formed by the discipline of outward effort and by the varied experience that outward effort brings,—just as the manhood of the race has developed in and through action,—so national character is built up by national work. And, once again, this character-building is indirect and seemingly incidental. The bond of the nation's unity is truly spiritual, but the ends immediately served by that unity are not what we ordinarily call spiritual, nor are the processes by which nations have been founded and built up in themselves what we ordinarily call spiritual. Yet those “non-ethical” processes have given us strictly ethical results: they have given us the nation as a distinctively ethical organism, and they have largely and indispensably helped in that ethical development which has given us manhood as we now know it. And these results have been reached incidentally,—simply by men doing the work that came to them in the organic unity of national life. In this way civic life has created the civic virtues; in this way even industry—which, at first sight, seems characteristically

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non-altruistic,—is being led out of its self-interest, towards the recognition of a national vocation and a national responsibility; in this way local particularism has lost itself in higher aims and larger work.

Thus, every endeavour and every achievement that has contributed to a nation's industrial and political life has contributed, also, to the nation's manhood,—has helped to form the characters and enrich the lives of the individual men and women who have part in the nation. And, once more, all this has been done indirectly and incidentally.

DIRECT CHARACTER BUILDING

We have seen that the ethical progress observable in History has been ordinarily the indirect result of processes which, in themselves, have been non-ethical. But, besides this indirect character-building, there is another character-building which we may not improperly call direct, for it is the result of action intentionally determined to it, and herein we find a nation's true ethical duty,—its ethical vocation as distinguished from its ethical work.

I have said that goodness, like pleasure, is not to be immediately sought, for we may say of it, as of pleasure, *non dux sed comes*, and this, I think, is unreservedly true; but, nevertheless, thoughts of goodness and of right, and the self-discipline to which they give rise, powerfully influence both conduct and character.

The first steps in the ethical progress of the individual are always taken without reflection and without intention. While he is yet a small child, unaware of the ethical contrasts which are so sadly significant to his elders, the foundations of character

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are being laid, and the beginnings of actual capacity developed. As it is now with each individual, so it has been with the race. Before we can suppose ethical ends to have become in the least degree clear in the obscure consciousness of primitive man, no small spiritual work had already been accomplished in him: in him, also, the foundations of character were laid, the beginnings of actual capacity developed, long before he intentionally sought ethical ends. But, just as the child at length awakes to moral self-consciousness, so, also, has the race awakened, and, with this awakening, character becomes an immediate end of conduct. Even, then, however there is, or should be, no divorce between the ethical and the practical vocation. Character and manhood are developed only in and through the practical activities of life. They cannot rightfully or fruitfully be made the objects of a separate quest. Even love, as a permanent habit of life, comes to us only through life's practical service and endeavour. "He that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen?" "Love for the brethren," inevitably issues in loving service, and, indeed, only in that service can it live. Separate from that, it becomes a mere "pious opinion" or empty aspiration. Even the self-discipline which the thoughts of goodness and of right impose upon those who recognise their lawful sovereignty is a discipline exercised and operative only in life's practical activities, not in separateness from them, and only as so exercised does it truly accomplish its end, and become healthily and completely fruitful in character. Quite similarly, too, is it with Religion, which, in divorce from those activities, tends, all too dangerously,

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to become a barren sentiment, or an impoverishing asceticism.

The direct ethical calling of a nation must, therefore, be fulfilled through the practical activities that carry on its life and constitute its work. The law of ethical progress is the same for nations as for individuals. In both, when once the ethical consciousness has truly awakened, ethical motives become active for immediately ethical ends,—both have to make the discipline and formation of character and manhood an immediate and primary end of conduct, but neither can effectually achieve those ends, nor hopefully nor helpfully attempt to achieve them, along paths separate from those of life's daily industry.

How then is a nation practically to fulfil its direct ethical vocation? We have seen what that vocation is,—to build up manhood towards completeness of character and of life. Remembering the inevitable independence of character upon activity,—of manhood upon circumstance and the opportunities and demands of circumstance,—we see at once wherein part, at least, of a nation's directly ethical work must consist. It has to make its life truly healthful, and completely organic to human nature, so that it—the nation—shall become a completely serviceable instrument for individual self-realisation.

The nation, as we have already seen, is essentially a moral organism, and, as such, it has, and can have, no other ultimate end than that which is consummatingly sovereign over individual life. Of that life it is at once the organ and the instrument;—the organ, because through it individual character and capacity receive expression; the instrument, because it exists to help that character and that capacity to attain completeness.

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Clearly, therefore, its first duty, after it has awakened to ethical self-consciousness, must be to adapt itself to this work,—to make itself a completely serviceable instrument for the purpose which is sovereign over it. This duty involves two immediate practical obligations. A nation must see that its industrial life is helpfully “humane.” It is not sufficient that the conditions of daily work be kindly, and not oppressive. They ought to be genuinely helpful to manly character and true citizenship, so that a man may become the better for his work,—better as a man, more serviceable as a citizen. The nation’s industry should not be carried on, as now it too largely is, at the expense of the nation’s manhood. At present, the conditions of work are largely degrading,¹—felt to be so in many cases, more fatally mischievous when not felt to be so. Not only are numbers of our people, men and women alike,—sharers with ourselves in the same great citizenship—condemned to unhelpful and hopeless drudgery, unrelieved by the “humanities” that do so much to make life valuable and manhood serviceable, but we are frankly told that this serfdom of theirs is necessary to the nation’s commercial welfare, and if any attempt be made by themselves or others to improve their lot, it is met by strenuous assertion that, if successful, it will imperil the nation’s trade by increasing the cost of production. If this were true we should have no choice but to accept the situation, and to be content with such improvement as we could effect by changes other than those directly industrial in their results. But is it true? When we think of the greater

¹ Even in the Civil Service, where manhood is frittered away in hopeless routine, and capacity is made the unwilling and blunted tool of privileged incapacity.

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productive value of "humane" labour that is humanely free, and of the extent to which industry is taxed by professional auxiliaries and intermediaries, and by those who are content to use it simply that they themselves may live in idleness, or may extract from it a "living wage" extravagantly calculated,—when we think of these things we are compelled to ask whether, even if the financial obstacle alleged be actual, its very existence is not due to the false conditions under which industry is at present carried on. Of course, if industry be used primarily and disproportionately for the benefit of those who are called the masters of it,—if commercial middlemen and professional assistants be allowed to tax it as they will,—then, of course, those who by their labour carry it on must inevitably be depressed. But these causes of depression are, in themselves, by no means inevitable. They are, indeed, only temporary accidents of industrial life,—due to the conditions under which our industries have grown up and are still carried on,—and when industry truly comes to its own, and when no one has more than his own, they will cease to exist.

The answer, therefore, to industrial Toryism is twofold. In the first place, we may say that work, if genuinely "humane,"¹ would be so much more efficient that reform, although immediately costly, would, nevertheless, be profitable. If this prove unconvincing or unacceptable, it will be incumbent upon us to press our final answer:—"The conditions of industry must be radically changed, and the unjust taxation of industry for ends other than

¹ I use "humane," rather than "intelligent," because of its wider meaning. It denotes, not merely mental, but also moral qualities, and these are of first importance in all industry.

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those properly its own must cease." If this answer were made the basis of effective action, it would probably result—ultimately, if not immediately—in a form of co-operative organisation which the uninstructed or the biassed would be likely to call "socialism," but which, at once more radical and more conservative than any socialistic polity, would in reality illustrate "collectivism."

It is sometimes said—and probably thought more often than said,—that, even if the humanities of life were brought home to the class narrowly called industrial they would be only wasted, for—so it is contended,—the great majority of "working" men and women are incapable of profiting by them and have no desire for them. It is further said that, whatever humane opportunities were opened up to that class by reform, those opportunities would, in most cases, only be abused. Well, we all abuse our opportunities, or, at least, misuse or neglect them,—masters of industry and other lords over God's heritage not less heedlessly, not less mischievously, not less openly than most. If it were not so, our present need for reform would not be so great. Unfortunately, it is probably true that if new opportunities were given they would, at first, be largely abused. But by many, by very many, they would not be abused, but helpfully and healthily used. Nor should we forget that there would be a certain humanness even in the abuse, for that abuse would be due to the going-out of ignorant natures, too long held in bondage, after such poor and unhelpful forms of good as they knew, and sooner or later, one would hope, through the new opportunities would come better knowledge, and from better knowledge more helpful practice.

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In social and industrial affairs we must be prepared to act boldly and hopefully upon the maxim that has been so thoroughly vindicated in our political life,—upon the maxim that reform is primarily a response to need,—not a reward of fitness already existing, but an instrument to create fitness where as yet it is not. It is said that the “working classes” could not make rightful use of humane opportunity, because they have no present desire for life’s humanities. If they have not, they ought to have. The men and women who are thus lightly condemned to servile poverty of life are of a nature essentially like our own,—of a nature with great possibilities for evil, it is true, but also with great possibilities for good, and with greater possibilities for good than for evil, because the nature of man is formed for good and not for evil,—because good, not evil, is ultimately sovereign over his life. They have no present desire for anything better than they have! Then they should have opportunity and invitation to develop that desire.¹ In England to-day we cannot afford to allow so great a part of the nation’s moral resources to remain undeveloped and unused. Days of severe difficulty—of difficulty both industrial and political—may be ahead of us: let us then redeem the time as good patriots, as men whose patriotism is a living and catholic faith, not a narrow and barren formula, and—despite the clamour of ignorance, and the opposition of powerful selfishness,—let us do what we can to bring into

¹ It is entirely a mistake to think that reform is only or primarily a remedy for discontent. The very absence of discontent may well be, to those with heads and hearts, the most effectual argument for reform. Reform is necessary whenever and wherever institutions or usages impoverish life and cripple manhood, for a nation lives by the manhood of its people, and cannot, without loss, suffer any of it to be wasted.

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full activity the latent manhood of our people, to make this land of ours a true Fatherland to all who bear the English name, so that, when danger threatens, the full manhood of the nation may rally to the nation's help. But we must not be impatient of results,—the wheels of History often seem to move slowly, but they move surely,—nor may we be niggardly in means. We must scatter profusely, if we would reap abundantly. After all, he that goes forth weeping bearing precious seed shall return again with gladness bringing his sheaves with him, and we who have given ourselves to this work of reform are not weeping, but glad, seriously glad, because of the greatness of the opportunity that has come to us. It may be that the harvest will be delayed, so that we shall not see it, but it will assuredly come, and our sons or our son's sons will behold it, and we shall see at least the first-fruits.

But not only in things industrial have modern nations a directly ethical work to do. A precisely similar work awaits them in things political, for political life, no less than industrial life, has to be made a full expression and completely serviceable instrument of national manhood.

Here, in England, we have not much immediately to do in the way of what is ordinarily called political reform. The Upper House should, of course, be made more truly representative than it is now of the permanent interests, the highest tradition, and the best manhood of the nation, but the way to this reform is not yet generally thought to be obvious, nor has the practical need for it yet been recognised as urgent. There is, however, an immediate need for reform in the House of Commons. We do not return the right

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men to carry on the nation's business. Young men of reputedly good family, of whom the best pass for brilliant among those who do not know what real work is nor how it should be done,—lawyers, professionally apt to speak according to their briefs and superstitiously reverent of parchment,—landlords and great employers, whose personal interests bind them to defend the existing order, even in its harmfulness,—of these we have enough and more than enough in the House that is sometimes miscalled the People's; but how many have we who represent the higher mind or more effectual manhood of the nation, or who genuinely know—know for themselves, and not merely from Blue-books,—how the masses of the English people live and work, or what manhood they are of, or are capable of, or what they need, or what thoughts and hopes and feelings are at work among them? How many are there who represent or truly know the educated and industrious middle class,—the salt of the nation's life,—and how many who, in their own persons, represent that yet larger and but half-awakened class whose labour is the very foundation of our imperial polity?

"The Empire has need of men." Yes!—truly it has, for the interval of opportunity is rapidly passing, and our best endeavours will hardly suffice for the work that ought to be done.

"The Empire has need of men!" Yes, truly it has! It needs them in St. Stephen's,—men of trained judgment and proved capacity for work, men whose primary thought is not advancement, but service, and who will be content to find their reward in the consciousness of helpful work well done. At present Parliamentary life is too often used primarily as a

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means to some narrowly personal end. Many a man enters it, or attempts to enter it, whose immediate aim is, not to serve the commonwealth, but to make a career. There would be no harm in this, but possibly much good, if the *ethos* of Parliament were such that only by proven helpfulness in counsel—helpfulness to the Fatherland, not to a party; helpfulness in the national *work*, not in the child's-play of Parliamentary dialectic;—could a career be made. Knowledge, sound judgment, and trained ability for practical work, these are, or should be, the essential qualifications for Parliamentary life. Certainly, most certainly, the Great Council of the Nation does not exist to provide advancement for a few lawyers, or to open up to well-connected inexperience short and easy ways to high office, and the commonweal suffers when Parliamentary life is degraded to these ends.

Nor would our gain from the ethical reform of the House of Commons be only and wholly "practical." "Practical" gain—great "practical" gain,—there would indeed be. Even the War Office might then become reasonably efficient! But, besides this "practical" gain there would be a moral gain,—a moral gain of incalculable value to the nation's life. It is not well, but ill, exceedingly ill, that the House of Commons should fail in counsel, and should reflect the feebler manhood and less helpful judgment of the nation. The country has recently passed through a season of severe trial. During all that time of difficulty, how much of helpful counsel or manly inspiration did it receive from the House of Commons? We all remember the dark days of General Buller's reverses. It is not too much to say that the country was heartily ashamed of the administrative incompetence

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of the Government, and when Parliament met for the Autumn Session of that year, the defeat of the Ministry would have been certain had the House of Commons been at all effectively what it ought to be. Before Parliament met, "What do you think of the Government?" was the universal question, and there was only one response. After the first few days men ceased to think of the Government. Everywhere one heard, "What do you think of the House of Commons?" and, once more, there was only one response. We had been ashamed of the incompetence of the Government, although perhaps we had not been greatly surprised by it: we took greater shame from the helpless degradation of those miserable opening debates. Nor is it sufficient to point, in apology, to the feebleness and disorganisation of the Opposition. That may explain why the Government escaped defeat: it does not explain the contemptible failure of the men who, although elected by us, misrepresented us. Certain forms of political feebleness in the present Parliament may, undoubtedly, be immediately explained by the helpless condition of the Liberal Party, but moral degradation—and it was *that* that we then found in the proceedings of the House of Commons,—moral degradation can have its roots only in personal character. Once more, it is not well, but ill, exceedingly ill, that these things should be. We looked to Parliament for helpful counsel and saving action. We received only the most paltry rhetoric of party recrimination. No wonder that we were ashamed!

How different had it been were our legislators of nobler fashion! In a country like our own, where the opportunities for national self-government which free institutions afford are not neglected, political life has

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inevitably a great influence upon national character and manhood. That influence may, of course, be for evil or for good, and ultimately the character of that influence is determined by the character of the House of Commons and of the men who seek to enter it. No seat in Parliament can rightly be sought—no seat in Parliament should be sought—primarily for self-advertisement and self-advancement. If political discussions never rise above vulgar personalities and partisan adroitness, if they contribute to the political education of the people nothing better than cheap rhetoric, uninformed by knowledge and unilluminated by thought, the direct influence of political life is almost wholly bad. We believe that here, in England, the influence of our free political life is predominatingly for good, but were it generally recognised that political life is distinctively a moral vocation, and that the qualifications primarily required for it are essentially moral qualifications,—fairness in judgment, earnestness in work, and a complete sincerity of purpose that spares no trouble to become informed, no labour to become effectual,—how vastly would that predominance be increased? It is not enough for Parliament to be truly the centre of the nation's political life. It should also be an example, most conspicuous because so truly central, of the most helpful Patriotism,—of Patriotism unsullied by selfishness, unweakened by favour or by fear, mindful of our highest traditions from the past, vigilant and unwearied in present duty, inspired by unconquerable faith in its own vocation, and guided by full knowledge and sound judgment. If Parliament were at all serviceably like *this*—or if only it were, in serious loyalty, to accept *this* as its governing idea, how much more helpful to English manhood our English freedom would be!

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But this reform of Parliament must come primarily from without, and, Pride's Purge not being now available, it must come from the electors, through the ordinary machinery of representative government. Before a better ideal can become sovereign in Parliament, it must become sovereign in the constituencies. But this it will hardly do unless a new enthusiasm for practically effective righteousness take possession of our people.

Unfortunately, this is not a time of enthusiasm in things political. The old party programmes are obsolete. Middle-class Liberalism has done its work, and Conservatism is scarcely conscious that it has any domestic work to do, unless, indeed, it be to protect established interests.¹ In its more reasonable moods it is perfectly willing that men of ordinary clay should come by their own, provided that they pay handsomely for the privilege. But at other times it seems unwilling, upon any terms, to part with opportunities for living upon national industry, and resents the narrowing of those opportunities as injustice.

Some may, perhaps, point to the widely-spread excitement about the recent Education Acts as evidence that Liberalism, although impotent in Parliament, is still powerful in the country, but that excitement—surely?—has but few of the marks of genuine Liberalism,—unless, indeed, Liberalism be ethically a much poorer thing than many of us have thought it to be. Certainly, the Liberal Leaders have made themselves parliamentary instruments of that agitation, but the agitation itself did arise from their initiative, nor

¹ It is eloquent about "rights of property," but significantly such silent about the rights of those who by their industry make property valuable and "rights of property" worth contending for.

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does the passion that inflames it spring from devotion to any recognisably liberal principle, but, rather, from a narrow sectarianism, from prejudice and intolerance which have come down to us as a *hereditas damnosa* from Cromwellian days,

When pulpit, drum ecclesiastic
Was beat with fist instead of stick,

to the temporary destruction of English liberty, and to the no small peril of English religion.

It is, of course, true that principles remain although policies pass, but principles that are not creative of practical policy are but platitudes or academic opinions. They cannot do more than preserve the shadow of an ideal. Apart from this they can do little more than serve as shibboleths of party, or save politicians the labour of thought. At one time the Liberal party was distinctively idealist. It included the most helpful and most hopeful elements in English political life, and, under the leadership of Mr. Gladstone, it gave to political life a moral dignity and enthusiasm which have not ceased to be valuable, even now that they have become a memory. Possibly if we had a leader of Mr. Gladstone's commanding personality, of his inspiring faith in human nature and in righteousness, able, as he was, to speak directly to the nation's heart, able, as he was not, to speak as directly to its highest mind, the day of small things would be over. But leadership seems to be a lost art. Only a man who had ideals and who believes in them—a man with something of a prophet's outlook, with something of an apostle's faith,—only such a man can helpfully lead a great people, and among the men foremost in parliamentary life to-day who is there so gifted?

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But, if such a leader be not forthcoming, we dare not wait for him. We would gladly welcome him,—a man able and willing to do a man's service to the commonwealth, a man who, without regard to the corroding privilege of birth or claims of party-service, would give us *men* to do the nation's work, and who himself would not shrink from labour, nor fear to face and tell the truth,—we would gladly welcome him, but once more, we dare not wait for him.

Nor need we wait for him. Happily, we to whom these thoughts of a nobler and more home-like Fatherland have come are not dependent upon a leader. Our inspiration is in our cause. The manhood of England is waiting for us,—that manhood which we ourselves share,—waiting in half-articulate appeal for the words and deeds that shall open to it the pathway to a new and better life, to a worthier and more helpful work. At present it is largely unused or wasted,—squandered to support the unserviceable, impoverished by Gibeonitish servitude in dark and narrow ways wherein there is no helpful light of thought or faith, and no room for a man truly to live a man's life, and, all the while, our competitors are closing in upon us, and, while we still suffer the privilege of birth and of possessions to paralyse us, are taking possession of fields which, were we but ready for our opportunities, would bear their first-fruits for ourselves, and their coming harvest for our Commonwealth's later good.

To fit our English manhood for its work while yet there is opportunity for work,—it is to this that we are called, and in this that we find our inspiration. A great leader could help us, but, if he be not ready, we cannot wait and need not wait. Our work is ready to our hand. A leader might gain us fellow-labourers,

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and we would welcome them, for the work is exceeding great, but we do not need a leader's voice to make that work ideal, for we already know the constraining power of its sacredness.

Here, then, in the redemption of English manhood, is a work that, with or without a leader, will of itself, if we but earnestly undertake it, restore to our political life the enthusiasm and the dignity it has lost, and make it once more, by the spirit that informs it, no less than by the ends it directly achieves, rich in generous helpfulness. We deplore, and rightly deplore, the present impoverishment and feebleness of our public life, but at our very doors a work is waiting for us as arduous as ever challenged English manhood, as sacred as ever quickened missionary zeal, and, if we but give ourselves to it whole-heartedly, even the dead bones of party politics will clothe themselves with the helpfulness of human grace.

It were, however, a mistake to suppose that the higher inspiration can come to political life only through a cause exceptionally and obviously great. If so, that inspiration would perforce be only occasional, and would alternate with seasons of dull impoverishment. But not alone in times of conspicuous reformation are we serving the nation's need and helping to build up its life, for *all* political work, if rightly done, is thus ancillary. Now and again, in times of national awakening, the political duty of the present hour, whether against foreign menace or domestic hindrances, is the manifest inspiration of the nation's life, but, whatever claim of Patriotism, whatever claim of manhood and of right, makes this occasional duty obviously sacred, that claim inheres equally in the everyday duties of public

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life. The details of local administration, and the daily routine of Parliament may seem trivial and uninspiring, but in them and through them, if we do our work properly, we are serving our country's manhood no less truly and no less directly than when the spirit of some new enthusiasm makes us active in a cause which is obviously great. Our work may fill but a small page in History, or may pass unrecorded into the memory of God, but we are at least keeping our country's air pure and fresh, so that those who breathe it shall be strengthened by it,—we are at least making the Fatherland more helpfully habitable, and keeping the fields of the nation's husbandry free from weeds. Do these seem small things? Only the very greatest are greater, and they are different only in degree and not in kind. They are more serviceable to the nation's life or serviceable in higher ways, but the smaller things, each in its smaller way and measure, are not less truly serviceable, and the service, be it great or small, is ever service to that generous Fatherland which rightfully claims our best endeavour because of the priceless good we have received from it,—is ever service to a kindred manhood which, by every right of brotherhood, potently claims our sympathy and our help.

We need not, then, wait for a great occasion to give us inspiration or to bring us ideals. That occasion, if it came, could but draw upon springs that are never dry,—upon those living waters of Charity and Hope which are perennial in each one of us, and, were our Patriotism thorough, would even now provide the daily refreshment and sweetness of our lives,—it could but emphasise claims that are ever present, and bring into clearer light ideals that are ever close at hand.

Our ideals are given to us by our English citizenship,

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—not only by the greatness of its occasional opportunities, but by the informing spirit of its daily service, and in the humane charity of civic duty Patriotism can ever find an ennobling strength.¹

IV

NATIONAL VOCATION AND PATRIOTISM

Let us now return to the main line of our argument. We have seen that our political life, as a genuinely national activity, is characteristically concerned with spiritual interests. It is concerned, of course,—although this point has not been emphasised,—with the practical business of the nation, with the maintenance and building up of the outward fabric of the national polity: it is concerned, also, and yet more characteristically, with the building up of the national manhood.

The result is of direct significance for our conception of Patriotism and of the duty of patriotic citizenship. Defining Patriotism as love of country, we reached the conclusion that one direct aim of Patriotism is to make the Fatherland truly paternal to all who, by nurture or adoption, are sons of it. Later discussion disclosed the complementary aim of building up the children of the Fatherland into the fulness of their sonship. We have not only to make the Fatherland generously helpful to all its sons; we have, also, to make its sons worthy of their inheritance. And yet we have not here two duties but one duty,—

¹ Education is, of course, an important means of direct character-building, but I have intentionally refrained from dealing with it here because what I have to say concerning it will, if Fortune prove favourable, be said separately.

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the filial duty of service to the Fatherland, of building up the spiritual body wherein we have sonship.

Our Fatherland *is* our Fatherland, not because it is the country wherein we were born or wherein we live, but because it is the home of the national community to which we belong. The living tradition of manhood that makes our sonship in the Fatherland vitally valuable—veritably a “means of grace”—springs, not from our country’s soil, but from the men and women who have lived thereon. These have left us the memory and example of their lives to be to us a benedictory strength, and by their courage and patience, by their endeavour and sacrifice, have been built up and shaped those institutions and settled ways of life which have trained us into the broad and helpful manhood of a free citizenship. Our country has been made our Fatherland by the lives that have been lived in it, and have therein built up the helpful polity of this our island state, and therein formed the tradition that to-day shapes and inspires our noblest citizenship. We are sons, not of a geographical expansion,—that were an impossibility,—but of a living organism which strengthens and ennoblees our lives by the harvest of manhood which it has treasured from the Past, and which it is yet reaping for us in the broad fields of contemporary history; and it is to this living community, and not to the land in which it lives, that the allegiance and service of Patriotism are due.

“To this living community!” It is by the life of a people—a life rich in strength-giving memories and inspiring tradition,—it is by *this* that Patriotism lives, it is to *this* that Patriotism renders its “bounden duty and service.” And of what does the service of Patriotism consist? It returns what it first receives,

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—Life and the means of Life, not the Life that is nurtured by the "bread which perisheth," but that nobler Life of thought and aspiration, of endeavour and of humane helpfulness, which lives only in and by the reciprocal and sacramental fellowships of Charity.

To this service, then, Patriotism is called by its very nature. It is essentially a love wherewith the heart that has received, through its environment of history, a quickening and healthful ministry of Life, responds to that gift by a like ministry. It is not merely a sense of indebtedness,—a consciousness of grace received: it consists essentially in responsive service. And the form of its response is determined by the nature of the gift it has received. That gift, as we have seen, is a gift of Life. Therefore, the response to that gift is a reciprocal gift of Life. But how can that response be effectually made? Only in one way,—by building up the life of that historical society—the nation—through which the creative gifts of Life have been received.

Patriotism is not merely the vehicle and transmitter of a tradition. It is truly that, but it is not *merely* that. A tradition of helpful manhood cannot be handed on except by helpfulness. Even were bare transmission possible, in that there would be no responsive service. Only through similar helpfulness can response be made to a ministry of helpfulness. Patriotism, therefore, must of necessity pass out into active endeavour for the national good. It may, of course, rightly concern itself with outward policy and polity, but it deals with these only in so far as they are ancillary to Life. Its immediate duty is to the nation as a living organism, and its characteristic service is a ministry of Life.

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helpfulness of our national polity, the greatness of our national life, directly depend.

Even so, it may be said, it yet remains true that there are numbers who have no part in this complex tradition. Are there? There may be, but to that conclusion Charity will be indisposed to hasten. Many who seem alien are the wrecks of our present social order, and before their fall have, it may be, done better than we think, and even in their fall may be worthier than we think. Among those homeless in our streets three winters ago were men who, in South Africa, had faced death for what they deemed their country's right. These men were no aliens to our English tradition, yet they came home to be numbered among the outcasts. But let us admit the worst that can be said. Can we not then imagine the Spirit of our Fatherland—the Spirit that lives by the life of its children and strengthens as they grow strong—adapting, without irreverence, sacred words, and saying to us, as she looks out on the waste of broken and impoverished English lives, "Inasmuch as ye do it unto one of the least of these your brethren ye do it unto me."¹

¹ Only one more word need be said before we pass on to the final section of this chapter. Patriotism, in its ministry of Life must necessarily be reformatory, and that, not only of character, but of laws and institutions. But it should not wait until the cry for reform becomes minatory. Reform should be made wherever sympathy detects the need for it, or if, in any case, in a country like ours where policy is directed by the popular voice, this should not be immediately practicable, at least the education of the electorate in the direction of reform should then immediately begin. This means, of course, that leaders should be genuinely leaders of the *nation*, and not merely of political parties anxious for office. One of the worst lessons that can be taught to a democracy is the one that we have so effectually taught the Irish,—the lesson, that is, that reform can be won only by violence and disorder, or, at least, by coercive agitation.

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THE "PRACTICAL" AND THE SPIRITUAL

The vocation of Patriotism is thus in part "practical," and in part spiritual. As "practical" it is a vocation to build up the outward fabric of national life; as spiritual it is a vocation to build up the national character; and, as we have seen, of these seemingly contrasted forms of service, the spiritual is the more truly characteristic. Indeed, we may say that the "practical" vocation of Patriotism is incidental to its spiritual vocation,—that "practical" concerns rightfully claim the care of patriotic citizenship only in so far as they are ancillary to things spiritual. Patriotism, as a sentiment, is a love responsive to a gift of Life: as an activity—and only as love becomes active does it become complete—as an activity, it is a responsive ministry of life. It lives essentially in the realm of the spiritual. The life that sacramentally awakens it is a spiritual gift,—the nature to which that gift is imparted is a spiritual nature,—the active love wherewith that nature responds to the grace it has received is itself distinctively spiritual, and its helpfulness is, as distinctively, for spiritual ends. Patriotism deals with "practical" things only in so far as they are relevant to spiritual life.

Now, because the vocation of Patriotism is only the national vocation interpreted as the duty of the individual citizen to whom citizenship has become an inspiring reality, it does, in all this, but reproduce the essential characteristics of the national vocation. This, also, is twofold,—in part "practical," and in part spiritual: in this, also, things spiritual are essentially

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primary. And in all this the national vocation, in its turn, does but reproduce the characteristics of that larger and sovereign individual vocation of which civic vocation is but a part or an aspect. The end of individual life is also twofold,—in part “practical,” and in part spiritual, but the “practical” enters into that end only as contributory to the spiritual. The sovereign and consummating end—completeness of manhood,—is always entirely spiritual. Just as things are valuable to the individual, and rightfully have place in the plan of individual life, only because and in so far as they are vitally helpful, so the outward fabric of society is of national value, and rightfully becomes an end of national policy, only because and in so far as it is serviceable to national life.

Because of all this, the ends of political action are always, directly or indirectly, spiritual ends. We sometimes, it is true, find it convenient to speak of the immediate end of some present endeavour as practical, rather than spiritual, but by this permissible convenience of speech we characterise, not the political endeavour itself, nor the aim of that endeavour, but our own immediate interest in that endeavour, our own unanalysed attitude towards that aim. No political end is ever *merely* practical. If not itself obviously spiritual, it must at least be relevant to the spiritual,—either as helpful or unhelpful. Political life is essentially a spiritual activity,—a function of a spiritual organism,—and, however various its immediate ends, these are always contributory to one sovereign end in which they are consummated,—are contributory to that development of manhood, to that building up of character, for the sake of which the body politic

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exists. Nor is this consummating end one that is to be attained by only a few,—by some specially favoured members of the national organism. It is the appointed end of each individual life,—an end which, it is true, can be attained only in and through national life, but which can be achieved by the nation only in and through the achievement of it by each individual member of the nation. Within the limits of the national organism it is genuinely a catholic end,—an end for all, and an end for each, and an end for all by being primarily an end for each.

Political work, therefore, is always spiritual work. Characteristically and normally it is always a form of spiritual service, although, unhappily, ignorance and selfishness—personal ambitions and class predominance—too often make it an instrument of social disservice. Except when thus depraved, its immediate aim can never be the individual advantage of those who take part in it. Whatever private gain they reap, can, unless it be dishonouring and dishonourable, only be incidental, because political ends, unless political life be corrupted, must always be national, and not merely individual. The individual citizen normally has part in political life, not as an individual, but only as a *citizen*,—as a member of a whole which, in a very real although not ultimate sense, is greater than himself. Therefore, political life is always normally altruistic. Its end—the good estate of the body politic—is not a merely individual but a general end. Therefore, “Service” and not “Gain” is the watchword of that life,—at once its governing ideal and its regulative end.

In so far, then, as not debased by that selfishness which is always contradictory of its essential meaning,

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political life, because essentially altruistic, is characteristically an expression of Charity,—a form of that helpfully active sympathy which becomes complete in Love, and is fundamental in human character and in human life.

It is, of course, easy to find an apparent refutation of this in the facts around us. Neither altruism nor helpful charity are conspicuous in parliamentary life as we daily know it, but rather the protean forms of self-interest. Men seek election to Parliament for the sake of personal advancement,—for social prestige, or for professional gain,—and, when returned, they seem content to act as instruments of a party policy, or as representatives of merely sectional interests. But they never confess to be merely this or that. Whatever their actual aims and motives, they are always careful to use the speech and wear the guise of Patriotism,—and *this* is always national, never merely sectional or partisan. It may be that many are insincere. Be it so,—their very insincerity is a witness to the practical sovereignty of the true ideal. When the worst has been said of parliamentary life that can be said, it yet remains true that the professed aim of parliamentary life is altruistic, and that altruism—genuine national feeling—is so far sovereign therein that even those who in practice are unmindful of it are constrained to yield it outward allegiance.

Political life, then, is one form of the consummating life of Love,—one form of that perfect life in which all human activities find their true completeness, alike as determinate expressions of character and as practical energies purposeful of work.

We have already seen that the nation, as an ethical

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construct, is built up by sympathies that become complete in Love, and only therein. We now see that political life reaches out towards the same completeness. Nor is this only a coincidence, for the sympathies that make political life truly national—that make Parliament something more than a battle-ground for rival advocates of protean selfishness,—are precisely those that bind men together in the inchoate but developing brotherhood of national unity. The nation, therefore, alike in its organic structure and in the regulative activities that constitute the life we call distinctively political, is informed and sustained by a sympathy which, if we may not always call it Love, is at least preliminary and ancillary to Love.

“An academic conclusion!” you say. Perhaps, and yet not without somewhat of practical value. It is something—surely?—of more than academic interest and importance to have reached a distinctively spiritual conception of political life,—a conception in which there is no place for merely partisan disputes or class selfishness. But this exclusion of Life’s baser policies is not our only gain, for the new emphasis upon things spiritual in which these thoughts result awakens a clearer perception of the primacy of *character* as an instrument of political life. Truly, it is not an undivided primacy, for knowledge holds an equal place; but, as contrasted with “Pure Reason,”—with the cold intellect which sometimes, in moments of revolt from the mischievousness of ill-formed goodness, we are tempted to think a sufficing equipment for leadership,—the pre-eminence of character is clear and indisputable. The clear intelligence may sometimes suffice to disclose the elements in a given political situation, but only sympathy can discern their value,

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or measure the momentum they derive from the strength of human purpose and desire, and, it may be, of human passion that they embody. Few things are more noteworthy than the mistaken historical judgments of men whose intellectual capacity cannot be questioned, and when these mistakes concern contemporary events, and when they are made by men entrusted with political leadership, few mistakes have had more widely mischievous results, for these mistaken judgments issue in mistaken policy, and a mistaken policy in national affairs always works wide-spread harm, and may even disastrously alter the course of history. In a very real sense our *first* men should be our *best* men, for character alone can truly interpret Life and the movements of Life.

CHAPTER IV

NATIONAL AUTONOMY

BECAUSE the nation is not an aggregate, but an organism,—an ethical organism,—it follows, as a matter of course, that it is ethically autonomous. This, indeed, is only another way of saying, with new emphasis of interest, that the nation is genuinely an organism, for, as we have already seen, “self-determination” is the distinctive note of everything that can properly be called an organism, and, in the domain of conduct, “self-determination” involves, among other things, moral autonomy,—“Home Rule.”

I say “among other things,” for the conception of autonomy does not exhaust the meaning of self-determination. When we say that a nation is autonomous, we mean that it possesses full power of legislating in its own affairs,—that it alone gives the law to its own life. But the definition says nothing concerning the character of the policy and laws that result from this self-government. For anything the definition tells us the legislation may be quite capricious, or may deliberately be for the benefit of interests essentially foreign to those of the legislating State. If, however, we limit our thought, as we properly may, by taking autonomy to be an expression and instrument of self-determination, we shall immediately see that autonomous legislation must be directly relevant to the nature,—to the constitution,

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the character, and the practical purposes,—of the self-governing community from which it issues.

We are familiar with both conceptions,—with that of autonomy, and with that of self-determination,—in our ethical thinking concerning individual life. Conscience, we say, is autonomous, and the individual self-determined. By the former we mean that Conscience rules in its own right, and gives the law to individual life by its own authority. By the latter we mean that the conduct of the individual is determined by his own nature,—ultimately by the movement of his own nature towards its own completeness, towards its own ideal. If we combine these two conceptions we get this result,—that in the legislation of conscience a given spiritual nature expresses itself in laws of its own making, framed and put forth to guide its own life to the attainment of its own ideal.

If we transfer this result from the individual to the nation we find that, whereas the autonomy which belongs to a nation by virtue of its character as a moral organism, *does* imply freedom, it does *not* imply independence.¹ If a nation be not free, it cannot live as it will,—it cannot fashion its own policy, or follow its own ideals. If it be not free it must, if not tributary, be at least subject,—it must live according to another's will, must subserve another's purposes, and conform to another's policy. It may, indeed, possess certain domestic liberties, and may, therefore, in a limited sense, be spoken of as autonomous, but this restricted autonomy does not extend beyond the limits

¹ I understand by "freedom," not "the power of arbitrary choice" or of "unmotivated willing," but "the power of a subject to act according to its own nature."

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of the nation's freedom. In so far as it is subject, it is not free, and in so far as it is not free, the integrity of its national life is impaired. Indeed, if subject, it is not completely a moral organism, for an organism must always live for ends determined by its own nature, whereas a subject nation, in so far as it is subject, must live for ends prescribed by the power that is sovereign over it. Clearly, then, freedom is a necessary condition of autonomy.

The conception of freedom, however, is wider than that of independence. Every independent nation is free, but it does not follow that every free nation must, of necessity, be independent. Take, for example, our own Empire, if not as it now is in fact, at least as it one day will be,—as it already is in idea. According to that ideal polity, our great self-governing Commonwealths are not politically independent, but they are nevertheless entirely free, and are therefore rightly spoken of as autonomous nations. They are not politically independent, because they are parts of the British Empire. They are not, it is true, dependent—except in the sense in which co-ordinate factors are dependent upon each other and upon the whole that they constitute,—but they are coefficients in a larger imperial life, and, therefore, are not independent. Nevertheless they are free, for the Empire is not something set over them to which they are subject or tributary; it is constituted by their organic association with one another, and with the other factors in the same great political unity, and this association is not compelled, but free. Therefore, the Empire's life is, quite strictly, a *common* life. The Empire is constituted by the free association of the several factors that are coefficient in it. It arises, one may say, from

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the growing together of several streams of life, from the true harmony and consent of several wills. It cannot properly be called either English, or Canadian, or Australian, because, from the imperial point of view, each of these nations is only provincial. It is, at one and the same time, English, and Canadian, and Australian, and much else. We may agree in calling it British, but, if we do, this name must be understood purely and simply in a historical sense,—as expressing the fact that Empire has been built up primarily by the prowess and industry of the British peoples, and that it is governed and informed by ideals born and nurtured in British lands. It must *not* be understood to imply British lordship,—to imply, for instance, that the imperial polity should be controlled, or imperial policy dictated, by British electors.

According, then, to the ideal constitution of the Empire,—to which, as the years go by, its actual constitution will more and more closely approximate,—the great Commonwealths of the Empire, although not politically independent, are yet genuinely and completely free, and genuinely and completely autonomous. Therefore, although autonomy implies freedom, it does not imply independence.¹

Let us return from the nation to the individual. We have seen that the moral autonomy of the

¹ As a matter of constitutional theory, I suppose, every part of the Empire is subject to the legislative power of the Parliament at Westminster. This might seem to involve British lordship and Colonial dependence. But one can hardly imagine that Parliament exercising its supreme power except as the interpreter of imperial opinion. When the Empire has grown into the true form of its constitution, to which it is already hopefully approximating, this legislative supremacy will exist only for genuinely imperial purposes. Indeed, that supremacy, which now, to some, seems only an anachronism, may then, upon fitting occasion, be found no small convenience.

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individual is an expression and consequence of his freedom,—of his power and his right to live according to his own nature. This power is essential in the human spirit, and the right of exercising it is man's primary right,—a right which is the precise measure of his ethical primacy, of his moral claim upon the surrounding world of men and things.

Because of this right, man, not unnaturally and not presumptuously, takes the manifest needs and postulates of his own life as the most serviceable tests of truth. In virtue of this right he transforms the doctrine of the Divine Sovereignty until the power of God is seen to be ancillary to His fatherhood, and he changes the doctrine of the last things until it gives the comfort of a certain hope to the yearnings of human love. In virtue of this right, too, he protests, and successfully protests, against all attempts to discipline the heart into obedience to the frigid abstractions of theories that ignore its wants, whether these theories arise from underestimating the world,—as the disciples of "Naturalism" underestimate it,—or from overestimating the "Pure Reason." By the same prerogative he claims to re-fashion institutions and to reform usages, whenever these become oppressive or obstructive. In short, because of this essential right, he conducts himself in history as its immediate lord, with lawful power over all that history creates—whether in Practice or in Thought—to make it serviceable for his use.

Therefore, it is not enough to say that the essential freedom of man is freedom to do right, unless we clearly understand that "right" means more than the narrow round of moral proprieties which are commonly spoken of as duties. The Moral Imperative—that

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absolute command which we are unconditionally bound to obey,—is wider in its denotation, and higher in authority, than the social conscience,—wider and higher than even the individual conscience, which, however sacred its claims, borrows all its sanctity from the consummating right to which that supreme imperative calls us, and which no public or private code of practical right-doing can ever more than partially and imperfectly set forth.

The history of Revelation, as we in Christendom have received it, has done much to confirm our natural inclination to think of Right as legislatively determined. In the very beginning of the economy of grace we are told that God spake to His people the Ten Words of formal prohibition and command which are yet accepted as the foundation of our practical duty. Those words, it is true, no longer exhaust our duty, but whatever the world has since learned that it should do or not do, that new knowledge has inevitably fallen into preceptual form. Therefore, to the ordinary thought of the world, righteousness is obedience to law, and Right is the content of law. Even conscience, which claims to be above law, is itself but another law, and in its most characteristic utterances it echoes the "Thou shalt" and "Thou shalt not" of the primitive legislation.

But no legislation is final. In longer or shorter time amending or supplementary change inevitably becomes necessary. Now, what is it which thus, from time to time, corrects or extends the accepted law of conduct? What is it but the thought of Right,—of the ideal of Right,—which, itself limited and exhausted by no code of positive law, is yet the basis of all moral legislation, and the source of its authority?

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What account can we give of this sovereign conception? How ought we to define it, or how describe it?

The law of Right is not a foreign legislation, imposed upon the soul from without. It is enacted by the soul itself,—herein thinking God's thoughts after Him,—and does but bring under one august sanction all the several forms of human good that are constituent in man's ideal. But this legislation is not arbitrary, nor is it constitutive. Rather is it declaratory, for the "rightness" it predicates is already inherent. The several forms of human good which it declares to be good are not possessions, but forms and modes of life, and the ideal that they constitute is an ideal, not of opulence, but of life's completeness. As such it is the term of self-realisation, and, therefore, intrinsically good. The legislation of conscience does not give a *new* character: it declares an existent character.

Now, the moral ideal is characteristically and immediately an individual ideal. It is an ideal of the completeness of individual manhood and of individual life, and its most articulate vocation is in that Supreme Imperative which bids each one of us make the best of himself,—of his character and of his life.¹ *This*,

¹ To make the most of one's life! Most of us have, I suppose, at some time, resolved to do this,—first, it may be, in some great moment of unexpected discovery, when the first stirrings of unsuspected powers make the future bright with the promise of vile achievement, and later on, with greater fulness of meaning, in the Eucharistic presentation of body and soul to be "a reasonable, holy, and lively sacrifice." We have resolved to do this, but between purpose and accomplishment stand the barriers of Circumstance, and sometimes these appear to the faint-hearted insuperable. The world has a bitterly unkindly side for the poor and the unfriended.

If effort seem fruitless, should our resolve fail? Assuredly not. The achievements of Charity are always open to us, and it may be that

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then, is the sovereign law of Right, and the essential freedom of man is nothing less than freedom to live according to this law,—freedom to live out his life to the full, to develop, truly and completely, all the possibilities of manhood that are latent in him. In modern phrase, the essential freedom of man is freedom for full self-realisation.

This truth is the fundamental principle of the higher Humanism. Even those forms of Humanism that do not clearly recognise it, reach out towards it.

Because Humanism thus recognises, with greater or less clearness, the essential worth of the *whole* of human nature, it has been a powerful influence for good against the spiritual narrowness so often and so unfortunately associated with Religion, and against the equal narrowness of a merely intellectual *Aufklärung*, which (to use figurative, but well-understood language), neither recognised the rights of the human heart, nor attempted to satisfy its needs. Humanists have, it is true, given many a dark page to history, but their frequent sins of excess have arisen, not from Humanism itself, but from their misunderstanding of Humanism, and more particularly from their abstract and non-ethical conception of Freedom. True Freedom is not mere emancipation. It does not bring with it the right to exercise, freely and without measure, any and every capacity, or to indulge any and every propensity. It is simply freedom to make actual the latent

in *these* we are to make the best of ourselves. After all, above the earth are the eternal Heavens—

“The high that proved too high, the heroic for earth too hard,
The passion that left the ground to lose itself in the sky,
Are music sent up to God by the lover and the bard;
Enough that He heard it once: we shall hear it by and by.”

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possibilities of life,—to make them actual in a completed character and manhood, and in that consummating completeness there can be no license, for life can become complete only through ordered activity and proportioned growth,—only in and through the conditions of “the perfect law of liberty” which make all capacities and powers harmoniously co-operant.

Because this freedom is essential in human nature, man—the individual man—is truly autonomous,¹ and the autonomy that belongs to nations, as their characteristic attribute and essential prerogative, rests upon precisely the same foundation,—upon freedom of each individual to live out his life to its completeness.² But neither for the individual nor the nation does this ultimate freedom mean moral isolation or spiritual atomism.

¹ It is because of this autonomy that conscience, which utters the law of Right as it apprehends it in the particular circumstances of each passing of alternative opportunities, rightfully claims the ultimate sovereignty over conduct.

² It follows from this primacy of the individual that national autonomy cannot become complete unless liberty be the pervading spirit of the nation's life,—unless each individual citizen be personally free, and each intra-national community self-governing. A nation, we say, is a free society,—a society that gives the law to its own life,—but, if a nation's freedom be not more than freedom from foreign rule,—if it be not also obvious in personal rights and in local liberties,—that nation is only imperfectly autonomous,—is, indeed, only imperfectly a nation.

According to the true ideal of national life, a nation is, or should be, not only a free society, but a free society of free men,—a society, not only fenced by freedom against alien might, but, also, informed in all its parts by freedom, for all the purposes of its complex life. Only in this completeness of freedom can a nation completely realise its essential and constitutive nature as an ethical organism.

It follows from all this that the personal and local liberties which make the English peoples uniquely free are not superficial and passing accidents of history, for their foundation is on ultimate and imperishable Right.

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By common sympathies and interests men are formed together into communities which, by the moulding hands of history, are built up into permanent polities that, at first sight, seem to absorb the individual into the life of a larger whole. But the absorption is only seeming, for in social life, in so far as it conforms to the ideal proper to it as human, the individual does not lose his freedom, but most truly finds it, because his nature is such that only in social life can it find true and complete realisation. The "seat of authority" is always within himself,—there is no law higher than the true law of his own individual life, but that law makes him, of necessity, social, and, in lifting him out of his isolation,—out of mere individualism,—makes him genuinely free. So also is it with the nation. That, also, is a spiritual unit,—an independent centre of moral authority, but, although unitary and autonomous, it is not therefore bound to separateness of life, for in federation and alliance, or in the organic synthesis of some higher political unity, like that of our own Empire, it may find a means of fuller "self-realisation" strictly comparable with that which social life gives to the individual. So, once more, therefore, although freedom is essential to national autonomy, political independence is not necessary.

At this point, however, a doubt may be suggested. The doctrine of self-realisation, as a rule for individual life, implies, it may be said,—and, as I think, rightly said,—not only that the individual is endowed with possibilities which may be wrought out either in time or in eternity, but, also, that he is a permanent spiritual existence which, because permanent, and only because permanent, is capable of gathering up the fruits of experience into final

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completeness of character. A nation, however, has no such abiding soul, and it may seem rash to take conceptions of freedom and vocation, which presuppose the existence of a permanent self, and to carry them over from the individual, who is truly such a self, to the nation which is not such a self.

Now, it is of course true that a nation has no existence apart from the individuals who compose it. The soul of the individual is a substantial existent, but "the soul of a nation" is only a figure of speech. And yet "national character" and "national temperament" are not figments but realities. They have no separate existence of their own, as substantial particulars in the world of spiritual reality, but in individual character and temperament—in individual souls—they have an existence, which, although not separate, is, nevertheless, most genuinely real. Common interests and common traditions, a common language and a common religion, common institutions and a common political and industrial life give to those who share them a certain spiritual likeness which we quite properly accept as the distinctive mark of their nationality. Hence, although each individual has points of character and temperament peculiar to himself, he has, also, points which he possesses in common with others, and which represent in him what, upon a general view embracing all the individuals who severally possess them, we not only conveniently, but, also rightly, call the national character and the national temperament. By these names, therefore, we designate those common spiritual features which make the individuals of a nation truly a spiritual brotherhood, and when we attribute to a nation the right and the duty of self-realisation we

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mean simply this,—that the individuals constituting that nation have the right and the duty to reach out after the true completeness of that distinctive life which they owe to their particular position in the present, and to their particular heritage from the past. That life is always an individual life,—in no two individuals does it possess quite the same characteristics, and yet, in every individual constituent in the nation, there are certain common traits which fully warrant us in speaking of national character, and, indeed, also of national ideals,—traits which, in their precise number, proportion, and grouping are not duplicated elsewhere, and which mark off those who possess them in common as being, in things spiritual, a distinct national group,—a group which has a life and an ideal distinctly its own, and which, therefore, we rightly call autonomous.

The nation as an abstract entity is not autonomous, but, then, neither is it existent. The individuals who, by their spiritual kinship, constitute a national group, are, however, severally essentially autonomous, and from their autonomy as individuals follows their autonomy as a society,—as a nation.

THE PRINCIPLE OF NATIONALITIES

It is this essential autonomy of the nation that gives the "principle of Nationalities" its great constructive value in international politics. An oppressed nation claims freedom as a right, but the claim of right, as such, has small reason to expect a favourable hearing when the Concert of the Powers meets to rearrange the map of Europe. Fortunately it can urge its claim persuasively,—persuasively, that is, to all save those

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who thrive by "fishing in troubled waters,"—because freedom is the handmaid of Peace. If the national claims of a subject people be fully recognised, yet another corner of the world is won from chaos to order. So long as a nation is oppressed, and knows itself oppressed, precisely for so long will its land lie under the shadow of revolt,—precisely for so long will it be an element of unrest in the polity of the world. When the freedom which it rightly claims is granted, that element of change passes away, and instead of the throbbing passion of a spirit "rightly struggling to be free,"—a passion which is ever on the verge of war, and which seeks but opportunity to rebel,—we have the settled peace of new moral order. When freedom is granted to a land, that land is handed over, not to chaos, but to law, for the gift of freedom means simply this,—that a certain organised spiritual life which has hitherto been kept down by force is henceforth to make its own way in the world without let or hindrance. Therefore, when freedom is given to a nation, or won by it, lands aforetime ruled by force become the abode of law, for they become the unshared home of a free people, who have claimed their freedom as a right because of the common life that makes them truly one people, and who have received their freedom, or have won it, in order that they may live out that life to its completeness,—and this can never be done through chaos, but only by living obedience to the sovereign laws of Right, immanent in character, and manifestly embodied in Life's guiding ideal. An emancipated nation brings its own law with it into freedom,—not, it may be, formulated in statutes, but, at least,

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implicit in the very life that makes it a nation. Therefore, when a land is given over to Freedom, it is rescued from chaos—to which Tyranny is always vassal,—and given over to law,—to the new law of the liberated moral life that thenceforth will entirely possess it.

It is this that makes the principle of nationalities so valuable a guide wherever statesmen are seeking some relatively permanent rearrangement of political boundaries and areas. If these are made coincident with those of the natural communities into which history has grouped men, all has been done that diplomacy can initially do to ensure peace, and that "all" is something of no small value.

It must not be forgotten, however, that this principle is only what it professes to be,—genuinely a principle of nationalities. Its political serviceableness lies in the fact that it deals with men in natural groups. It recognises that men are not like sheep, who can be divided into larger or smaller flocks at the shepherd's will,—according to his convenience or caprice,—but that history has gathered them together into societies which are at once organised and organic,—into societies of which each has its own distinctive life and character, its own practical vocation in the world's policy and industry, its own limiting and unifying interests and sympathies. It is in this recognition that the practical usefulness of the principle consists, for by this recognition it becomes a potent instrument for the achievement of that abiding peace to which we look forward as the appointed goal of history, and which will become possible only when the polity of the world is securely based upon the natural grouping of the world's inhabitants.

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This grouping of men together into separate social units, each of which has its own distinctive character and life, is a process that goes back to the very beginning of history, and, even after unnumbered centuries, it is yet far from complete. It were incorrect to say that the history of the past is the record of this process, for it is also the record of much else, and, moreover, the birth and growth of a nation has not infrequently seemed to be merely incidental in the story of the times that witnessed it. But this at least we may safely say,—the natural organisation of mankind, according to interest and sympathy, according to character and practical vocation, is the proximate end to which history is working, and an end in which are gathered up the results of all the various processes that constitute history.

I have said that this process of spiritual synthesis is one that goes back to the first beginnings of human affairs, but at no time has it been the sole occupant of the theatre of history. So largely, indeed, have events at times been shaped by other processes that, in many records of the past, we can only with difficulty detect any trace of that organic growth,—fundamental though it has always been in the developing order of the world. Indeed, it is only within times that are yet comparatively recent that men have begun to look for it. For instance, it is even now a comparatively new idea that English history is, in reality, the history of the forming and up-building of the English nation, and that, in that history, wars and the vicissitudes of sovereigns have been but incidents, and, nearly always, secondary incidents. Secondary though these incidents be, however, it is these that figure most largely in the

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records of times past. These records are often disappointingly silent about the processes of growth that have built up the organic structure of the world as we now know it, but they bear abundant witnesses to another process which, although not without abiding results upon the organic development of human society,—for no considerable series of events in history can be without such result,—has not entered into that development as, in itself, primarily and immediately formative and constructive. That other process which, thus, in our historical retrospect, so often seems the most conspicuous occupant of the theatre of events, even as in contemporary opinion it must often have seemed the most important, may, perhaps, be best designated, with rough but sufficient accuracy, as the process of self-aggrandisement. We may call it, if we will, the chaotic element¹ in history, for it has had, and, in so far as it persists to-day, it still has, no concern for man's primary and essential rights,—for his practical interests, and his formative, guiding sympathies,—but has essayed only the building up of some particular supremacy, either personal or national. It has aimed, not at bringing men together into living and abiding fellowship, but at subjecting them to the rule of a conquering race,—not for their own good, but only that they might become tributary to the seeming greatness of their lords.

We have, then, in history, these two primary secular processes,—one that brings men together into national groups, each organised and unified by a distinctive common life, and one that uses the militant forces

¹ The only possible foundation of liberal—that is, rational,—order in history—and no other kind of order deserves to be called order,—is, of course, ethical.

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of the world for narrowly egoistic purposes,—for purposes which, if finally triumphant, would be an emphatic disproof of the assumed rationality of the world, and would make history a moral chaos.

Most of the turbulence in history has been directly incidental to the second process, for it has arisen from base endeavour for base dominion, and from the ignoble rivalries which this has occasioned, but not a little of that turbulence has been due to the conflict of the two processes,—to the effort of incipient and growing nations to maintain themselves against the incursions of alien tyranny. For long the issue of this conflict must have seemed uncertain, but now victory has finally inclined to the side of order. To-day, even the disorder in history illustrates its fundamental orderliness. International disputes are no longer merely disputes for inglorious self-aggrandisement. We have been told, and with no small measure of truth, that international politics are rapidly becoming economic, and this surely means that the constructive processes of history are at last becoming sovereign, and that the policies of the world are passing under the effective control of the world's natural communities, to which, of course, economic questions are of primary importance. The forces of merely selfish aggression are retiring, and will, we hope, soon pass from the scene. All the causes of unrest among the peoples will not, it is true, pass with them, but many will, and those that remain, because incident to the orderly development of the world, will also in their turn pass, as that development advances.

Meanwhile, although, from the residuary sources of trouble, difficulties will continue to arise, men will tend more and more, as the ethical forces in history

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become stronger and more clearly self-conscious, to find for those difficulties solutions which will be more explicitly ethical than is the rough and uncertain arbitrament of the sword.

It may, perhaps, be said that the recent experience of Europe does not confirm this optimism, and for illustration of this comment we may be pointed to the Balkan Peninsula, where a handful of small states, based, as we may be told, upon this very principle of nationalities, are not only themselves very far from peaceful, but are sufficiently unpeaceful to, now and again, bring the greater Powers of Europe within measurable distance of war.

Now, in the first place, it must be noticed that not a little of Balkan unrest arises from an incomplete application of the principle of nationalities. Macedonia is yet "unredeemed," and naturally seeks deliverance. But Macedonia is to-day little more than a geographical appellation. We may, indeed, conveniently and rightly speak of the Macedonian people, if by that expression we mean simply the people dwelling in Macedonia, but certainly we cannot speak of a Macedonian nation. Greece, Servia, Bulgaria, all these have racial and religious interests in Macedonia, and to their conflicting aspirations and ambitions not a little of the Balkan trouble is due. The fact seems to be, that in the Balkan states and provinces we have not nationalities, but only nationalities—or is it a nationality?—in the making. The liberation of the Balkan peoples from Turkish rule, in so far as it was accomplished at Berlin, was most certainly not premature; but perhaps the liberation of them along lines that were taken to be those of nationality was, if not a political mistake, at least an uncertain

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anticipation. At the close of the Russo-Turkish War the Balkan peoples—if we leave out of account the Greeks—were not nations, but, at the best, only the beginnings of nations. Servians and Bulgarians were, indeed, distinct racial and linguistic groups, and community of race and language has often been accepted, by greater authorities than diplomatists, as the distinctive mark of nationality. But this implies an altogether inadequate conception of nationality. A nation is not primarily, or even necessarily, a racial or a linguistic group. It is primarily and necessarily a spiritual unity,—that and nothing more, but certainly and necessarily that. Now, community of race and language, when it is present, may be a powerful factor in national unity, but it is not indispensable, nor is it, by itself, sufficient to constitute that unity. A nation is constituted by the common life that builds up its members into an organic whole,—by a common inheritance from the past, by common industry and policy in the present, by common hopes for the future,—and it is *this*, and not mere identity of race or language, that is the distinguishing mark of a nation. But among the northern Balkan peoples at the time of their emancipation this organic unity was only commencing. It was not absent, but it was certainly inchoate. Even so, it might have developed peacefully and helpfully had fair opportunity been given to it. But the policy of the liberating Powers, in part feeble and in part Mephistophelian, suffered the emancipated peoples to commence their independence as merely parochial states, strong enough to have ambitions and rivalries,—strong enough, too, to be useful pawns in the hands of the greater Powers in the subtle game of European diplomacy,—but feeble

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enough not to interpose any effectual obstacles to the ulterior designs of their nearer liberators. Had such designs not been cherished, the Powers had found it an easy task to lay the foundations of a strong Servo-Bulgarian state which, under capable leadership, might have become the home of a new nationality—neither Servian, nor Bulgarian, but Balkan, in which the “unredeemed” peoples south of the Balkans might, in due time, have been quite naturally incorporated. This would have been an achievement worthy of statesmen, but the Powers preferred the feebleness and less excellent way, which left the newly liberated peoples exposed to mutual discord and foreign intrigue.

Balkan unrest, therefore, is due, not to the adoption by the Powers of the principle of nationalities, but to the halting and imperfect way in which they applied that principle, and the responsibility for that unrest attaches to the diplomacy which prepared the way for it, and fostered it because of selfish ambitions, rather than with the Balkan peoples themselves.

But not only around the Balkans are questions of nationality prominent in present-day politics. They are conspicuous, also, in Finland and in Prussian Poland.

The Finlanders who, under the protection of their local liberties, have enjoyed an intellectual freedom denied to all other subjects of the Tzar, rightly claim these liberties as morally inviolable. They are a distinct nationality,—separated from Russia, not only by their inheritance of freedom, by religion, by language, and by race, but also by the genuine individuality of their provincial life, which derives nothing from either St. Petersburg or Moscow. They, therefore, naturally

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and rightly resent the present aggression of the imperial authorities, and, indeed, were their might equal to their right, they might justly do much more, for, as possessing a developed national life of their own, they might justly claim that complete autonomy—I do not say independence—which is not only the highest, but also the essential and inalienable prerogative of every true nation.

The Russian Government, claiming that military affairs are matters of imperial and not of merely provincial concern, insists upon the Finland regiments serving, in times of peace, in other parts of the Empire, and upon their place at home being taken by Russian troops. But the Finlanders—Scandinavian rather than Russian, alike in sympathy and in culture—naturally suspect that a Russian garrison would be an effectual instrument for the "Russification" of their Fatherland, and to them "Russification" means degradation. Moreover, the distant service required of the Finland regiments would, in time, weaken their local attachments, and make them regard themselves as primarily soldiers of Russia, rather than of Finland,—as servants of the Tzar, rather than defenders of their native province.

It may, however, perhaps be urged that we have here nothing but a conflict between a narrower and a higher Patriotism—that Finland, whatever its local privileges, is an integral part of the Russian Empire, and must accept the duties and responsibilities of that position. But, until Russia be changed, the larger Patriotism of Finlanders can never be Russian, for Russia is in no sense their Fatherland, and Russian rule is in no sense paternal. Their life is distinctively their own,—the inspiration of their culture comes from

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the West, not from the East—their history, their religion, their literature link them to Sweden, not to Russia. Their relations with Russia are extrinsic and accidental,—in no sense and in no case vital and organic. They are members of the Russian Empire! True, in a certain sense, and to a certain extent, they are, because the ill-fortune of Sweden made the Tzar Grand Duke of Finland, but the imperial connection—always unhelpful, and now mischievous—can arouse no Patriotism and claim no loyalty.

We have learned from many a darkened page of history that Russia has no place within her borders for freedom,—that the only liberty she does not grudge, in things political as in things religious, is liberty to be orthodox. We may regret this intolerance, but it does not disappoint us, nor may we call it incongruous, for Russia,—despite the polished mendacity of her diplomatists,—is the most backward of the Powers. In her Church and State alike the shadows of the Dark Ages still linger, and whatever barbarism be reported of her, whether it pertain to the intimate life of her people, or to the policy or conduct of her rulers, we are not surprised. But, happily, Russia is the only Power thus privileged to disgust without astonishing. West of the Vistula the modern conscience is, not merely a spectator of history, but is hopefully effective in shaping it. But even there the traditions of darker ages still linger,—although sometimes disguised by plausible magniloquence,—and obsolescent ideals are still powerful. Germany, for instance, has many just claims to our respect and even to our admiration. In Thought, in Science, and in Industry she takes a foremost place, and yet her Anti-Polish policy, so narrow in its intolerance, so

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harsh in its incidents, is but a militant anachronism,—a survival of that old world we would gladly be rid of.

The Poles, although, by the sins of their fathers and the equal sins of their neighbours, they have lost their political independence, and are now divided between three alien Empires, are still a genuine nationality. As such, their right to an autonomous life—to a life distinctively their own—is morally above all challenge. Yet, so far is the Kaiser from recognising this right, that, helped by the menace of the legions that prepared the way for him when he entered Posen, not as *Pater Patriæ*—the father of the Fatherland—but as War-lord, he is resolute to destroy the very spirit of nationality out of which that right arises. And why? Because, in the Kaiser's opinion, the Poles are not good Prussians. Probably they are not. That they may be something better than good Prussians is a possibility that does not seem to have occurred to their imperial critic, and were it suggested to him he would probably regard the suggestion as an impertinence.

The German Emperor, alone, perhaps, among the sovereigns of Europe, is a strenuous idealist. He is possessed by a clear ideal of the kingly office,—an ideal in which he evidently finds personal inspiration—and it is an ideal which, in certain epochs of history would have been called worthy, and which even now, when our allegiance is given elsewhere, compels our respect for the man strong enough and earnest enough to make it his own. He has, too, a precisely correlative ideal of citizenship, and both ideas received illustration and persuasive power from heroic passages in Prussian history,—from the days of the great Frederick, and from those more recent days when

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Prussian genius built up the imperial polity of Germany with blood and iron. But both ideals are impracticably narrow. They belong to the past, and not to the present: all the forces that make the history of Western Europe progressive are working against them.

It is the established practice for a monarch to speak of the people committed to his charge as though he owned them. "My people," "my army," "my navy," are accepted commonplaces of Royal diction. They are not impertinent only when they are purely formal, and, even then, they suggest impertinence, but the German Emperor uses them with deliberate and sincere emphasis on the personal lordship they indicate. Judged by his apparent ideals, the present Emperor is the most pronounced and convinced autocrat in Europe. He is not even a Hetman of Cossacks, for the Cossack has rights and privileges which were and still are independent of his Hetman's will, even though his Hetman, because now also Tzar, can forcibly override them. Men speak of him as feudal, but one cannot think of him as willingly consenting to the restrictions imposed upon kingly power by the feudal law,—by the rights and privileges of an armed baronage almost as powerful as the Crown.

Were it not for the ambition—assuredly neither selfish nor ignoble,—which seeks to found a world-Empire and to share or dispute with us the sovereignty of the seas, he would be happy in ruling according to his will (without the intervention of representative institutions or of Ministers who were more than instruments) the people of a small, hereditary principality,—a people trained for generations in unquestioning loyalty to his house, and accustomed to act in all

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things according to their ruler's will. Upon such a stage he might achieve relatively great things; in the Europe of to-day he is the representative of a cause which, happily for the future of the world, is already lost, and whatever the success his personal abilities enable him to achieve, his ideals are foredoomed to death, his policy to ultimate and final failure.

Such is the ruler who would now Prussianise the Poles,—who would discipline a freedom-loving people into an obedience like that of the army which, a hundred and fifty years ago, laid the foundation of Prussian power. He would compel them to learn an alien language, he seeks to plant their land with German colonies,—hopeful apparently that these will corrode the national spirit he finds inconvenient. But the days are past—at least in Western Europe—when a people can be treated as the pawns of an alien policy, and shaped in this way or that as alien convenience dictates, or alien conceptions of propriety prescribe. Not, indeed, that it has ever been an easy thing forcibly to denationalise a considerable people. You may crush them by overwhelming strength, destroy their institutions, supersede their laws, proscribe their language and their religion,—you may deny them education, save that which you think will best serve your own purpose, exclude them from all the liberal professions, and ruin their native industries,—you may plant their Fatherland with aliens, or even drive them forth from it impoverished and homeless,—you may do all this, and more than this, and, when all has been done, what will you have achieved? You will not have denationalised a people; you will have destroyed one.

The slow progress of the world has made such

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extermination morally impossible,—at least west of the Vistula,—and yet, short of these conscienceless extremes, what measures are likely to prevail against a people resolute to maintain what is most truly their own,—against a people who count no sacrifice too great, provided that, by it, they may preserve, for themselves and their children's children, that common life which makes their scattered groups and broken multitudes truly one nation? For centuries, the Irish have passed through vicissitudes of which the like cannot again darken the page of English history,—what are they now? More nearly a nation than ever, they will soon become completely a nation,—themselves giving the law to their own life.

The spirit of nationality is no creation of a poet's fancy, or "fond thing vainly invented" by a philosophy over-inclined to abstractions: it is the breath of a people's life. Wherever found, it springs out of the deepest and most potent facts in men's common life, and gives to the individual a brotherliness that ennobles life, and an inspiration that makes effectually for life's satisfying completeness. Deprived of it, life loses much that makes it sacredly dear,—much that makes it more truly worth the living: even the sanctities of home and church are pervaded by it, and while *these* link *it* to life's holiest faith, they take from it, and from the facts that give rise to it, all that makes them distinctively a people's own,—all that makes them an organic part of a country's history,—all that gives to them the form and impress of a distinctive devotion. It is fostered by the memory of a country's past, by the present industry and policy that give to a common life a distinctive practical vocation, and by the present sympathy that arises out of common and distinctive

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interests, and common and distinctive work. While these live, it lives also—the characteristic mark of a people's individuality, the living summary of their past, the promise of their future, and the informing strength of their present. Against this living and creative spirit,—so vitally a part of a people's everyday life of memory, of hope, of work,—against this, as it is found in Prussian Poland to-day, what can the Kaiser's petty annoyance avail? His German "plantations" may, if he plant judiciously, turn the scale at one or two elections to the Prussian Landtag: they will hardly win the Poles to Prussian sympathies and to Prussian obedience. His compulsory German will only make the German name and all pertaining to it more heartily disliked. His schoolmasters may teach the children German: their fathers and mothers will teach them Polish, and the proscribed language will gain a new sanctity, and gather round it a new devotion. The Kaiser is the master of many legions, but not all his legions can annul Polish history, or banish the memory of it from Polish minds, or the aspirations that have made it heroic from Polish hearts.¹

But, it may be said, whatever the theoretical rights involved either in Poland or in Finland, the primary concern of statesmanship is, necessarily, with a practical situation, and (as those who object to a present

¹ It is urged, by the Kaiser himself, that the new policy in Prussian Poland will not infringe the individual rights of the Poles. But of those individual rights the most distinctive is surely this—the right to live in Polish fashion and according to Polish ideals. The national spirit lives, as I have already said, only in individual temperament and character, to which it gives a distinctive tone and tendency, and to deny to the individual opportunity for his characteristic national self-expression, is, to that extent, to infringe fatally upon his primary and essential right.

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policy may fairly be called upon to suggest another) the problem of the situation may be presented to us in some such way as this,—what, after all, is a ruler to do who finds, somewhere within his dominions, a people of recalcitrant nationality? The best thing to do, were it possible, would be to make them so completely at home under his rule that the imperial Fatherland would be but an extension of their national Fatherland, and the imperial citizenship but another expression of their distinctive national life. This cannot be done without a full recognition of their right to live according to their national will,—in other words, without a full recognition of their right to autonomy.

But, were this measure of freedom permitted, it might well happen that, so far from helping towards reconciliation, it would only make the differences between the liberated people and the ruling power more serious and conspicuous,—would increase the provincial divergence from the imperial polity and policy. It is quite possible, for instance, that a completely autonomous Finland would become more Scandinavian than at present, and not more Russian, and that, if the Prussian Poles had the same measure of freedom, they would diverge even more widely than now from the policy and ideals of Berlin.

Well, such things are the Nemesis of history upon past wrong-doing, and statesmanship must be content to make the best it can of a morally untenable position until one of two things happens,—until either the predominant Power becomes more generously humane, or until disruption puts an end to a non-natural union. Neither the policies nor the politics of the Continent are final. The Kaiser is not immortal, nor is the

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present orthodox Tsardom permanent, and, probably, in the course of time more than one European frontier will be altered. Meanwhile, trouble is inevitable.

THE LIMITS OF AUTONOMY

It may not, however, be supposed that the rights of nationalities are unlimited. Indeed, they cannot be, for they are only an expression of individual rights, and these, as we have seen, are never unlimited. They are always limited—given a definite concrete character—by the moral ideal. Neither for nations nor for individuals is freedom indefinite.

Let us take an extreme illustration. Suppose that England or Russia found herself sovereign over a people, possessed of genuine nationality, among whom cannibalism was, not only an established and widely prevalent practice, but one closely bound up with their national life. In that case, however sincerely the sovereign power might recognise the right to autonomy, it would clearly be its bounden duty to suppress that practice,—if necessary by force. Strictly speaking, however, this suppression, even though forcible, would not involve any infringement of the liberty proper to man and essential in human nature. Neither in the individual nor in the community is the right to freedom ever unconditioned. The right to individual freedom is, we know, from its very nature, essentially dependent upon conformity to the moral ideal. The freedom which a man may validly claim as his essential and inalienable right is not freedom to do whatever he likes, to become whatever he chooses. If it were, there would be no ethical foundation for our criminal codes. Now, those codes, do, in fact, express, however imperfectly, the

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supremacy of practical righteousness,—the rightful sovereignty of the moral ideal. But, if man's primary right were to unconditioned freedom, they would express nothing but the practical convenience of the classes dominant in the state, or the proprieties of conduct which those classes happened to profess. In neither case, as applied to the criminal, would they rest upon anything but force. But the moral freedom of man is not of this nature. It is simply freedom to do and to become *whatever is consistent with the ideal completeness of his nature*, or with his growth into that completeness. Nor is this thought of ideal completeness a mere abstraction of philosophic dreaming,—an abstraction set up by philosophers as a standard for life only in the interests of some favourite theory. It rests upon the thought—itself no mere imagination, but an inference from well-attested and fundamental facts of human nature and of human life,—that there is in very truth “a spirit in man,”—a spirit possessing a character which, although definite from the beginning, becomes completely developed only through experience, and upon the further thought that this complete development of nature and character is not merely the theoretical, but the actual and consummating end of all human endeavour,—the actual end, although it is often only implicit. Now, the freedom which is man's essential right is freedom to grow into this completeness,—*that*, and nothing more. Therefore, we rightly speak of it as freedom for true self-realisation. Therefore, because national rights are but a particular expression of individual rights, the national right to autonomy is subject to the same conditions as those that are regulative of individual freedom. Therefore, in the case supposed, cannibalism, because inconsistent

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with growth into this ideal completeness of life, may and ought to be suppressed,—if necessary by armed force.

This, however, is not the only other limitation to the right of autonomy. Even if a nation be independent, it may not do simply what it likes. For instance, no state has a right to follow the example of the Deys of Algiers, and to subsist by piracy. If a state chose to be thus Ishmaelite, armed intervention would quickly follow. As a matter of practical politics, that intervention would take place to protect peaceful merchantmen from pillage, and peaceful seafarers from assault and captivity, but it would have its ethical ground in the universally recognised maxim that no individual and no community has a right to make use of liberty to the injury of others. This carries with it the implication that the fundamental order of the world is not atomistic, but social,—that men everywhere, both as individuals and as societies, form part of a moral order—of a moral organisation—which is none the less real because, actually, it is only incipient. The true subject of rights is always the individual. Whatever rights, therefore, a man may lawfully claim as primary and essential for himself, belong equally to every one of his fellows. But equality of rights can be secured only in and through a society essentially ethical. In other words, freedom for all can be attained only through order,—not through the chaos of mere individualism, which would inevitably end in oppression and unjust servitude; but in and through *society*, which (whatever its temporary imperfections) will ultimately issue in a truly catholic fraternity.¹

Once more, this conception of a general moral order

¹ This, of course, implies that freedom becomes complete in love.

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is not a mere invention of the schools. Human nature is essentially social. "It is not good for a man to be alone," because he can reach the completeness of his life only in and through society,—only in and through the common interests and sympathies which build up the fabric of society, and through the helpfulness of the complementary lives which, in society, surround and are vitally connected with his own. The moral ideal, therefore, presupposes society, and the society thus presupposed is genuinely catholic—one embracing the whole of mankind. In other words, the moral ideal presupposes the social organisation of mankind, and, for the ideal to be entirely practicable, that organisation must become complete. Of this ultimate organisation, existing societies are the commencing actuality, but these societies are themselves, even now, not merely individual. They are bound together, in various ways and in various degrees, by community of interest and sympathy, and by the general sovereignty, whether it be recognised or not, of the moral ideal. They are historical stepping-stones to the catholic organisation of the race, in which organisation, when it comes, the associated life of man will become completely helpful to the completeness of each individual life. Meanwhile, they are themselves, each in its own way and measure, genuinely helpful to this consummating end, and so also is that inchoate international community which they now constitute and which, here and now, they are slowly building up. Even now the common life which makes the nations co-operative in work or fraternal in sympathy gives to them a unity more inclusive than any that the world's political organisation has yet been able formally to express.

Acts like national piracy are offences against this

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developing community of nations,—violations of that general order through which alone the good life can become perfectly possible to all, through which alone the individual can enter into the full possession of that freedom—freedom to be what he ought to be,—which is his essential right.

Here, then, we have another limitation to national autonomy, but, once again, it is a limitation to which the autonomy of the individual is also subject, and it is so far from involving any infringement of man's essential freedom that it is the very condition through which alone true freedom can be fully won.

National autonomy, therefore, in so far as it implies separateness of polity and life, is but a transient phase of that spiritual evolution which has given us the content of earthly history. This, however, does not mean that we, who are now labouring to build up the outward fabric of the Fatherland and to strengthen its life, are wasting our strength for the impermanent. "There shall never be one lost good." Whatever gain of manhood is here and now wrought out in and through the complex activities of national life, will, in the fulness of time, pass over—not into nothingness, or into some discrepant and irrelevant perfection, but into its own completeness, and for that completeness we, whose present architecture of polity and life may, in its present form, be but transient, are, in effect, here and now, working.

To the final brotherhood of that consummating Future, each nation will bring the completed strength and grace of its own distinctive life,—will bring the completeness of its own distinctive manhood, and in the perfect freedom of that free brotherhood, will find its own freedom made perfect. In what relation its present polity and its present life stand to that final order of

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historical Reality,—*this* is determined by the ideal which here and now informs that polity and inspires that life.

Our discussion of national autonomy concludes, therefore, with these questions:—

- (1) What is meant by a national ideal? and
- (2) What is the true ideal of national life?

CHAPTER V

INTERNATIONAL LAW

IF the nation be essentially autonomous, the question naturally arises—"What is the relation between the polity which is thus self determining—which acknowledges no external secular authority,—and that body of developing practice which we call international law?" The answer, of course, is obvious,—the relation is essentially the same as that which ideally subsists between the autonomous individual and the municipal law to which he owes obedience. And yet, in fact, there is one conspicuous difference. Municipal law is armed with powers that compel obedience and punish disobedience,—in the last resort, it is supported by the sword. International law, however, has no such auxiliary: it rests only upon mutual consent. Nations, indeed, may and do concert together for the defence or execution of a common policy, and it may well be that in a given case this common policy involves particulars of agreement which are ordinarily said to belong to international law, but those particulars are defended or enforced by the concert of the interested powers, not as parts of *law*, but as integral in *policy*.

Municipal courts exercise a jurisdiction which is ultimately coercive and penal, but international law is only consensual. It binds as *law* only so long and

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in so far as a nation consents to be bound by it. It may be that deliberate and continued violation of its primary articles would entail consequences of such a character that the offending nation would lose more than it would gain by its self-imposed outlawry, and the thought of this may constrain an obedience which otherwise would not be rendered, but the obedience thus constrained would be based upon calculations of prudence, not upon respect for law, and international law would be recognised in the councils and policy of that nation, not because of its moral authority as law, but simply because of the harm or inconvenience likely to attend upon the violation of it. This, it may be said, is only what happens when those who would be criminal if they dared give a reluctant obedience to municipal law. True, but municipal law has a moral authority which is independent of the penalties that it can enforce. Even though a man, through obscurity or privilege, be able to break it with impunity, he ought not to break it, and usually he knows that he ought not to break it. Has international law any similar authority, and, if so, whence is it derived, and in what relation does it stand to national autonomy?

Up to the present, international law has been most conspicuously illustrated in international arbitration. Arbitration, however, is not, strictly speaking, a legal process, although legal persons may be engaged in it, and legal forms used. Questions of international law may arise in the course of it, principles and facts of international law may more or less guide it, but its ultimate decision has not essentially the character of a legal verdict. However arrived at, and however it may afterwards be used by international jurists, it is a practical, not a legal decision. It may be that,

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sooner or later, through the recognition of jurists and statesmen, the decision becomes part of the practical code of international law, but, as so incorporated, it has an authority quite distinct from that derived from the tribunal which first pronounced it,—an authority in part subsequent and extrinsic, due to the recognition that made it an effective part of international law, and in part original and intrinsic, due to the principles illustrated by it. In a particular case, of course, the decision of a court of international arbitration may be, in substance, entirely legal,—drawn, by recognised principles of interpretation, from the recognised code of international law, but, although it then has whatever moral authority attaches to law, this authority is only incidental, and is due to the fact that, in that particular case, the arbitration tribunal chose to act as though it were a court of law. The decision itself remains a practical one: it is derived from law only because of the practical decision of the arbitrators to be guided by law.

Here, then, we reach an important distinction between courts of arbitration and courts of law. The latter are bound by the law they administer, or, at least, by the principles of that law: their only duty is to interpret and apply the law. The former are not of necessity so bound. They are appointed and constituted to find a practical way out of dangerous or inconvenient disputes, and if, in a particular case, a court of arbitration decide to act as though it were a court of law, and to allow its decision to be determined by law, it so decides, not because it is bound to do so by its very nature, but because, in that particular case, the way of law seems practically the most useful,—the most likely to lead to a satisfactory result. In

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other cases the decision of a court of arbitration may represent nothing more than a practicable compromise which the disputing parties are prepared to accept as a way of escape from a difficult position. Sometimes it may even be largely determined by considerations of policy. The possibility that this may at any time be the case, seriously limits the utility of arbitration, for a nation which would be willing to invite a properly constituted and independent judicial tribunal to pronounce a legal verdict upon its claims, might naturally and rightly refuse to allow those claims to be judged according to foreign views of policy. An arbitration court that allows its decisions to be thus determined does grave injury to the cause of international peace, and, yet, the very fact that courts of arbitration can, without violating their essential constitution, permit their decisions to be thus determined, shows that they are not essentially courts of law.

In a particular case, an arbitration court may, as I have said, decide to act as though it were truly a court of law, but this decision would be a practical decision, based upon practical considerations immediately pertinent only to the particular case before the Court. The decision as to procedure might have been quite different without being in any way inconsistent with the character of the court as a court of arbitration. But a court of law, as such, does not possess this choice. Its only duty is to interpret and apply the law.

What, then, is that international law which courts of arbitration may administer, but are not bound to administer, for which sometimes they may provide materials, but which they can at no time authoritatively declare? The simplest answer is, perhaps,

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this:—international law consists of recognised international usages and of the principles involved in those usages. International usage is gathered from history. International agreements, international practice, and the utterances of statesmen and jurists, who may be presumed to speak with more or less authority, are accepted as declaratory of it. But the acceptance is not unquestioning; the gathering not mechanical. If the codifiers of international law had been thus indiscriminating, their labours would have given us only an unreasoned collection of, perchance, unreasonable precedents. But the process by which they have built up the code now generally received by civilised peoples has been always, and essentially, selective and critical. Not every practice, not every particular of agreement, not every relevant statement of persons presumably speaking with the authority of knowledge, has been accepted as declaratory of international law. Some practices are held to be legally invalid, others valid, some agreements are held to be purely practical,—factors in international politics, but not materials for international law,—some statements are held to have been mistaken or inexact. Jurists have never held that a fact in international history is necessarily constitutive or declaratory of international law. What, then, has been their test? They have been greatly influenced by the Roman conception of the *jus gentium*,—a law intended to embody the several relevant particulars of law and custom upon which the municipal codes and usages of different nations were in agreement. That law might thus be said to involve an appeal to the *consensus hominum*, and to have whatever ethical value this general consent possesses, but probably the thought behind it was originally only

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one of practical convenience. As, however, it was a code, not for regulating international relations—(for *these*, in so far as they were under the control of law, were, in the early days of Rome, governed by the entirely independent *jus fetiale*),—but for dealing with the affairs of strangers who came to Rome, and for settling disputes between them and Roman citizens, it is obviously not *directly* applicable to international questions.

The thought of general consent, in matters of law and usage, leads, by an easy transition, to the conception of a law of Nature that transcends all the differences between municipal codes and local customs, all the differences of nationality, faith, and religion,—a law recognised in various degrees by all men, and ultimately sovereign over all. From the days of the Stoics until the close of the eighteenth century this conception exercised a wide influence over the thoughts of jurists, and it has left a broad and deep impress upon the literature of international law. It belongs, however, to the past rather than to the present, and the name of it survives in our vocabulary to-day, rather as a convenience of every-day speech, than as the expression of a formally articulated faith.

The method of modern international jurisprudence is partly historical, and partly ethical. It is historical, in order to establish the facts of international practice, and ethical, to test their ultimate propriety. Not every usage is accepted as law, however strongly preceded. More than one practice of earlier days has been rendered obsolete by the developing moral consciousness of the civilised world, and, although not expressly condemned, nor renounced in any formal international instrument, can no longer be reckoned part of the

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living body of international law. Others, again, which were formerly thought ordinary, are now held to require the warrant of an exceptional situation. Thus, the place at one time held in international jurisprudence by the Law of Nature has been taken by the Moral Law,—and by this, not as a completely known code imposed upon man from without, but as a gradual discovery,—a discovery made known in the developing thought and sensibility of the world's progressive peoples.

It is in ethics, too, that our modern international jurisprudence finds its first and formative principles. It essays to introduce order into the chaos of precedent, in part, no doubt, by simple generalisation, but chiefly by means of the selective principles arrived at by an enquiry as to the rights and duties that belong to an independent state in virtue of its very nature as an independent state, and this enquiry is entirely ethical. These principles are, however, more than selective,—they are formative, for they may be made the bases of deductions which, if completely worked out and properly systematised, would constitute a finished code of abstract international Right.

Criticism, and that criticism ethical, is thus a conspicuous part of the method of international jurisprudence. Moreover, it is an essential part, for only by ethical criticism can a precedent be translated into a rule of law.

International law, then, is derived from two sources,—from historical usage, and from ethical principles, but we cannot say that these two sources are equal in dignity and importance. Usage and principles alike furnish materials for law, but the material furnished by usage is, at first, crude and

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unselected. Selection—the process that rejects *this* precedent and adopts *that*,—is always the work of principles, and to these, also, we owe whatever of organic unity, of reasoned order, and of ultimate reasonableness, exists at any given time in the corpus of international law. Apart from principles, and the inferences to which they lead, and apart from the selecting and organising work of principles, there would not be anything that could properly be called law, but only a collection of ethically undiscriminated precedents, which would differ among themselves only in the length of usage and weight of political power behind them. But these precedents, *as such*, would not and could not constitute law. They would, at most, be materials for prudential guidance, but, once more, counsels of prudence are wholly distinct from the authoritative precepts of law.

To ethical principles, then, as contributory, discriminating, and co-ordinating, international law owes its distinctive character as law, and, yet, it was almost inevitable that it should commence with usage. When the conception of law first extended itself to international relations, it was natural that men, in their earliest endeavours to discover the content of the law current or sovereign in this new field, should first turn to the actual practice that had arisen out of the intercourse of nations. But the conception of international law is a comparatively late development of human thought, and the first retrospect of history sufficed to show that international practice is variable. This first conclusion of historical science in the field of international jurisprudence has been amply confirmed and abundantly illustrated by the wider and more complete retrospect possible to us to-day. We know that

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international usage has varied not only from place to place, but also, and more significantly, from time to time. If, however, men had been unable to discover any content for their new law other than usage, they would have been unable logically to attribute to it any of that moral authority which always inheres in everything that can properly be called law, and which always enters into the conception of law as pertaining to its essence. Usage, as such, can exercise only a prudential, not a moral, constraint, and no blame can attach to the violation of it, beyond that incurred by imprudence. Indeed, if, in a particular case, violation be profitable, then, *ex hypothesi*, no blame whatever can attach to it.

Moreover, had men accepted this view of law, and the antinomial conclusion to which it leads, they would have been able to point to more than one incident in history, and to more than one weighty declaration of opinion or policy, in confirmation of their view. It is a recognised principle of politics that the sovereign power in a state cannot be finally bound, even by its own acts, and that which is true in the domestic history of nations is equally and more obviously true in the international history that arises out of the intercourse of independent and sovereign powers. Whatever agreements such powers enter into one with another, whatever usages tacitly arise out of their mutual relations, are all, strictly speaking, only provisional. Each particular agreement and each particular usage holds only until one or the other of the interested powers desires, and feels itself strong enough, to depart from it. Hence, a cynical interpreter of history might say that even the most solemn international agreement derives its binding force only from the self-interest of

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the high contracting powers who are parties to it, and that, at any time, any one of those powers might, for its own profit, blamelessly break it, if the risk of an unprofitable war or of damaging retaliation were not so great as to make the breaking of it imprudent, and he might ingeniously appeal for support to a doctrine which holds a very prominent place in these pages,—the doctrine of national autonomy. If, he might argue, a nation be genuinely autonomous, it necessarily follows that it cannot rightfully be controlled by any other nation or group of nations, nor bound by any agreement into which it enters, longer than that agreement is profitable,—conducive, that is, to its own interests as interpreted by itself. And we might freely concede the truth of this without thereby pledging ourselves to any non-moral interpretation of history, or to any inference nugatory of the supremacy of law in international affairs.

A nation is, indeed, genuinely autonomous because man is autonomous, and, just as in national history the progressive self-determined spirit of man is solvent, transforming, and creative, so, in international history, the progressive self-determined nation is similarly solvent, transforming, and creative. In all history, laws, usages, and institutions are morally subordinate to life, although at times they may, in fact, wrongfully oppress it, and in all history—or, at least, in all history that is not stationary,—the living spirit that is in man destroys, renews, and creates according to the changing needs of his own changing life. To this rule, international history is no exception. A treaty is no more eternal or sacred than an Act of Parliament: a usage between nations no more exempt from the dialectic movement of life than a usage within a nation.

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This may seem to lead direct to an essentially unmoral nihilism or anarchy, and from a conclusion so undesired and undesirable we may, perhaps, seek a way of escape in the thought of the "polity of nations." We may urge that sovereign states are not absolutely independent of each other,—that they belong to an international polity or community, and that out of this fact of association springs a genuine authority for law. True, but what do we mean by a "community of nations," and how do we conceive such a community to be constituted? Whatever political theory may suggest, the greater nations of the world have always regarded themselves as completely sovereign and independent, and this separateness, at once political and moral, would seem to be inconsistent with any and every possible idea of a true community. And, yet, in various ways, we find them variously associated, for specific common or coincident purposes, by specific agreements. By these agreements their separateness has been, in part, overcome, and something like an international community has been established. But, strictly speaking, a community constituted only by common agreement for common practical purposes is not an ethical construct, for, as we have already seen, agreements that are *only* practical have, as such, no distinctively moral authority. Life always transcends conventions, even the most formal and the most solemn, and a purely practical agreement, as *purely practical*, binds no nation that is party to it longer than interest and prudence dictate. Therefore, it is not in a community so constituted that we can find a basis for the genuine authority of law.

Specific agreements, however, are not the only means by which the separateness of nations is overcome.

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Intra-national communities—those that exist within the limits of a single nation—rarely owe their existence to a written instrument,—perhaps never owe their existence entirely to a written instrument. If, in any case, instrument there be, it is usually regulative rather than constitutive,—settling the government and constitution of a community that already exists in fact, rather than creating a community. The charter of a town, for instance, gives to the town a corporate character, but the town existed prior to the grant of the charter. Nor is this all: not only did the town exist prior to the grant of the charter which made it a corporate body, but it existed then as a true community, and this manner of being was the condition precedent of the grant of the incorporating charter. Had its inhabitants been merely a horde, they would not have been incorporated. Now, what is it that, independently of all formal instruments, thus overcomes the separateness of individual men, and makes them a community? We are accustomed to say that common residence, common interests, and common sympathies—the very conditions of local Patriotism and, indeed, of all Patriotism,—are the chief factors in social integration, and when we speak of a community of nations we naturally think of it as the result of these same dynamic and unifying elements, or, at least, of some of them. I say “of some of them,” because community of residence scarcely seems operative as an agent in the wider international movements of social integration. Some of the most closely allied nations—for instance, England and the United States—are geographically so far apart that we cannot speak of them as having a common residence, except in that more general sense which arises from the fact that all

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nations dwell together upon the face of one world. It is true that this fact gives to all peoples a common practical vocation,—they are severally and collectively called to make the world helpfully habitable by man, and, in the few minds that are influenced by the highest results of reflective thought, this idea of a common vocation for all the scattered families of mankind may undoubtedly operate as a strong inspiration and creative rule. A local form of the same idea—implicit in feeling, rather than apprehended by thought,—is sometimes a powerful and valuable element in the progressive life of the more vigorous intra-national communities, but, even there, it is not found until unity has become an obvious and controlling fact. It is not one of the initial causes of unity: rather does it mark the later stages of its growth. And, in international affairs, this idea of a common vocation is not yet practically operative. Nations have not yet risen to the thought of an abiding vocation common to them all: when they adopt even a common policy it is only for some temporary and limited purpose, and, not infrequently, even this co-operation is disturbed and hindered by mutual jealousy and mistrust. Yet the idea of a vocation covering the whole world floats intermittently before the thought of men, but usually each nation that perceives it translates it into the conception of a national mission to subdue the earth unto itself, as though the whole earth and the fulness thereof were its appointed inheritance,—its inheritance, not for helpful service, but for unhelpful mastery. Probably, only among us English folk is a more generous thought to be found, and even among us it is implicit in the idea of our imperial polity rather than explicit in our policy.

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The idea of a common vocation is the highest form in which the fact of common residence can become operative as a factor in social integration, and, up to the present, it is a factor that has scarcely made itself felt in international intercourse, and, indeed, it is not yet easy to find international parallels for those integrating effects of common residence which we can undoubtedly trace, or probably surmise, in the early history of intra-national communities. So far is common residence from being a conspicuous agent in the overcoming of national differences, that neighbouring nations are often the most hostile. Not infrequently, indeed, geographical proximity does but accentuate and increase the separateness of nations, by making the conflict of national interests sharper and more constant. But no nation remains entirely separate from the rest of the world, nor are international relations always hostile or inimically competitive. Each considerable nation recognises that it has a very real community of practical interests with, at least, certain other nations, and these common interests, whether they receive expression in formal international instruments or not, are in fact powerfully active in the wider integrating movements of history.

But, as we have already seen, practical interests, merely as such, although they may lay the foundations of a community, do not, in and by themselves, furnish a basis for that moral authority which is one of the characteristic marks of law. That basis we cannot find until we pass from the practical to the ethical.

Happily the way has been made plain for us. Nations have common sympathies, as well as common interests, and they are at least beginning to recognise a common rule of Right. International relations are

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already tintured and ennobled by somewhat of ethical feeling, and this present achievement, small, regretably small though it be, is rich in promise for the future. It has given us the first beginnings of a true international community, and those beginnings will grow until war, and the enmities that make for war, become things of the buried past,—until the separateness of the nations be overcome in unity, and the federation of the world, with or without a "parliament of man," becomes an accomplished fact.

It is upon this common ethical character that the existing polity of nations is based. When we think "of the polity of nations," we must not seek too carefully or too anxiously to mark the limits of that polity, or even to define its nature. Speaking roughly, however, we may say that the polity of nations is a polity of *civilised* nations, or of those that recognise the authority of international law. The former description is the better, at least for our present purpose, because it gives prominence to character, and it is only character—only national character—that can make a national recognition of international law trustworthy. When a state desires to enter the polity of nations, it must do more than profess its acceptance of international law: it must give some sufficient guarantee of its genuine and abiding loyalty to that law.¹ Now this guarantee can be given only by character. Unless character be stably law-abiding, obedience to law may be either a passing whim, or merely

¹ This has immediate application to the case of a country like China. The enlightenment and good intentions of a few prominent Chinese are more than counter-balanced by the quite contrary characteristics of others, and by the general character of the Chinese people, who, although not uncivilised, are, from the point of view of international ethics, distinctively unsocial, in some ways barbarously so.

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a device to further some temporary practical interest, and neither whim nor interest can be any guarantee of that permanent allegiance to law without which neither individuals nor nations can claim to be recognised as "law-worthy."

The polity of nations, then, is an ethical brotherhood. It is this ethical community between nations—a community based upon character,—that alone makes international law possible as a practical code. Apart from it, that law would represent nothing but the thoughts and hopes of a few speculative thinkers.

National law, it is true, because of the coercive agencies that enforce it, seems to have a practical authority which does not arise from the ethical acceptance of it by those who are subject to it, but this authority, expressed in punishment and constraint, is not independent of character. It exists, along with the coercive machinery by which it is enforced on the unwilling, only because and in so far as a national law embodies the practical rules recognised as ethically binding by those who are effectively predominant in the State. In thinking of national law, then, we must distinguish between the authority that arises from acceptance, and the authority that arises from its ethical foundation. In so far as these two grounds of authority are not coterminous, the authority derived from origin expresses itself coercively. Did law derive no genuinely moral authority from its origin, its coercion would be *mere* coercion,—appealing only to fear or prudence. Indeed, it could not then properly be called law, for moral authority is an essential part of the conception of law. It would be only a mere police regulation,—enforced only by power, and sustained only by the selfish interests of those who make it and enforce it.

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When we turn to international law, we find the legal machinery of coercion conspicuously absent. There is no international police, and not only have those who deliver the judgments of international law no power in their hands wherewith to enforce them, but the nations that accept international law for themselves cannot by any legal process compel obedience to it from those that do not, nor punish by law a nation that is outside the law for its breaches of the law.

The practical system of international law is, then, entirely consensual: its immediate authority arises only from acceptance. And, yet, acceptance, in and by itself, cannot impart moral authority. It is at most a means through which authority becomes effectual. The true basis of moral authority is always to be sought amid origins. The consent of the nations makes international law current between them as a practical code, but the authority which thus becomes operative in the field of international relations arises, not from the mutual consent of the associated nations, but from that free ethical activity in each which calls into being the formative and regulative principles afterwards made effectively international by the later act of mutual consent.

Law, then, whether national or international, is always the expression of ethical life. If we accept the old contention that all law implies a legislator, we may say that wherever we find law, whether customary or statute, the true legislator is always the free spirit of man—a spirit always and distinctively ethical,—which, in its age-long travail towards its own completeness, builds up practices and discovers principles which are become regulative of its life, and express its achievement, its aspiration and its hope.

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It is because of this spiritual origin that customs are more than mere customs. They are modes of man's self-realisation, and as such they have an ethical character which, when we meet with them in international life, permits us to use them as materials for a code possessing the true authority of law. They are, it is true, immediately shaped by man's convenience and interests, but that convenience and those interests are expressions of a distinctively spiritual life, and subserve its ends. But our acceptance of custom should never be indiscriminating. Had the human spirit an unchanging nature, like that which we attribute to inorganic things, human customs would be as permanent and unalterable as the formulæ which express the behaviour of a chemical substance. The human spirit, however, is not unchanging, but changeful, and not only changeful, but progressive. It outgrows customs that have long suited it, and fashions for itself new ones. It makes discovery of principles which express, or seem to express, the sovereign truths of its own life, and these lift it above custom, even while it continues to conform to custom. Once discovered, they become critical and constructive. They test old practices and create new ones, and the testing and the creating are, alike, always ethical,—for present practice is judged by life's present needs and present possibilities, and present needs and present possibilities determine the new ways of practice that supplement or supersede the old.

It is thus that ethical principles are operative in the broad field of international practice. They are the judges of precedents, selecting this to become part of the living body of the law, and rejecting that as without present authority or value. They are also

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sources of new practice,—not the only sources, it is true, but the most important, because the most clearly significant, and now the most productive.

International law is thus an ethical construct, for it is built up and created by principles which are distinctively ethical, because they express a distinctively ethical life. It is from this ethical origin that international law derives its characteristic authority as law. It is more than a rule of custom or of prudence. It is a rule of Right. The mutual consent of the nations makes it current, but its authority is the authority of conscience.¹

The sovereignty of international law, then, is in no way inconsistent with national autonomy. Indeed, as practically effective, that authority is the outcome of national autonomy, for the law recognised in international affairs arises out of that progressive development of ethical life in which the autonomy of the nation, as of the individual, has characteristic expression. International law is affirmed, in the first place, by the individual conscience, which is the natural instrument of man's moral self-government: it is made a practically operative code by the consentient consciences of the several nations that recognise its authority. Like all law, international law is one of the forms of human self-realisation; it springs out of the better possibilities of human nature, possibilities which prevent man from being always a wolf to man, and through it, as it develops and becomes more effectual, those possibilities will become more and more completely realised.

There is, then, no contradiction between the

¹ This makes it yet more clear why the "polity of nations" is, or should be, based upon character.

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sovereignty of international law and the moral autonomy of individual nations. The dialectic of life, in the hands of which all customs and all institutions are plastic, is not a lawless criticism, destructive of law: it is the very movement by which usage and precedent become law, and, as interpreted by those having authority, it stands in the same relation to international law as legislation does to national law, for it is the means by which established practice is brought into harmony with new life, and with new needs and new conditions of life.

The authority of international law, then, depends upon its ethical character. Of the two sources of that law, usage and principle, we now see that principle is primary, for usage becomes law only as and when it is affirmed and sanctioned by principle. No rule of national policy, unless it embody an ethical principle that can be generally applied to the intercourse of civilised peoples, can be regarded as law, and no recognition of it by other powers can make it law.

This principle can be well illustrated by an examination of the Monroe Doctrine, for which the predominant opinion in the United States claims legal authority.

In its original form that doctrine affirmed that no part of the American continent, not already possessed by European powers, could be regarded as a field for European colonisation. It was a protest, and more than a protest, against the extension of European sovereignty in the New World. To-day, vague ambitions, and the resistless march of events, have given it, in some minds, a wider meaning. We have,

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for instance, heard it invoked to cover intervention in Canada against British misrule. We may smile at this, and think it only the extravagance of a visionary enthusiast or of a politician more than ordinarily magniloquent, — even when judged by American standards. But, in so far as it expresses a sense of moral vocation, it points to a feeling which is probably more widely spread than we on this side of the Atlantic think. The United States are only tardily and, apparently, reluctantly entering the arena of world-politics, but in many serious minds there is a deep persuasion that the American people has an exceptional moral mission to the world. The United States is, they think, appointed to be the premier representative and guardian of republican ideas, and those ideas they think valuable. In their thought the Monroe Doctrine marks off the American hemisphere as sacred to the American tradition and to American influence.

Now, it may be entirely true that the United States have this missionary vocation; entirely true, also, that republican ideals are valuable, and that the New World ought, as far as possible, to be protected from non-republican influences. But this would not make the Monroe Doctrine part of international law, although it might well make it an entirely admirable rule for American policy. A more excellent vocation does not give to a people an exceptional privilege, nor can it, by itself, make the policy that is ancillary to it part of international law.

As a matter of history, however, the Monroe Doctrine has not usually been based upon an evangelical vocation, but upon a domestic duty. The early statesmen of the Transatlantic commonwealth were primarily

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concerned, not to preserve a republican tradition and example for the benefit of the world, but to protect republican institutions and republican life in the United States. They had good reason for believing the continental powers of Europe to be actively hostile to the political faith in and for which they and their compatriots lived, and they not unnaturally felt that the strengthening or extension upon American territory of monarchical institutions dependent upon those of continental Europe, would seriously menace the future of their own republic. Hence the Monroe Doctrine.

The policy that framed that doctrine was, however, distinctively a policy of self-interest,—of ethical self-interest, possibly, but, still, of self-interest, and we have already seen that self-interest, as such, cannot be a foundation of international law. I do not know whether that early feeling of insecurity in the near presence of monarchical rule has passed away. Probably it has, for the United States are to-day too strong to be lightly interfered with, even were the Holy Alliance still a living and militant factor in the world's politics. But if it have, what is the present ground of the Monroe Doctrine? We, in England, who are not concerned to challenge it, are content, for practical purposes, to accept it as a practical determinant of United States policy, but when we are asked to recognise it as part of international law we are compelled to ask—"Upon what principle is it based?"

It may perhaps be said that primacy in the New World plainly belongs to the United States, and that this Western primacy carries with it a supremacy upon the Western continent, and a right of intervention in Western affairs comparable with the supremacy

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possessed and the right exercised by the Greater Powers of Europe in European affairs.¹

But the Concert of Europe—although, when operative, it has exceptional power,—has no exceptional rights. It is constituted by the common action of independently interested Powers to safeguard their several independent interests, and its rights of intervention and control are not original but derived. They arise out of the universally recognised and primary right of each independent nation to protect itself,—out of the right of self-maintenance,—and they are strictly limited by that right.

Now, undoubtedly, the United States—simply because they constitute an independent nation, and not because of an attributed primacy,—has precisely similar rights, and those rights are world-wide in range, and not limited to the Western hemisphere. Outside their own territory, our cousins have no rights there that are not shared by other Powers, nor have they any rights there different in kind from those that they possess in other parts of the world.

The practical interests of the United States in other parts of the American continent are so extensive and so considerable that the authorities at Washington

¹ Such a claim, if seriously advanced, could not be dismissed off-hand, although England and Canada, because of the imperial interest which they represent, might well refuse any place lower than the first in the polity of the Western hemisphere. This does not mean that the United States should be second in the New World, but only that Great Britain might well claim to be even there her equal. Probably if this equality were frankly recognised by our kinsmen, it would place the Monroe Doctrine as a matter of practical politics entirely beyond the reach of effective challenge. We, at least, have no desire for a South American dominion, and we have a strong desire for the closest possible friendship with those whom our own misfortunes and mistakes have separated from us.

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may justly claim at least to hold a "watching brief" whenever a dispute arises between some other part of the continent and a European Power or group of Powers. Circumstances, too, can easily be conceived in which those authorities, although not parties to the original dispute, could rightly claim to take part in the final settlement. Always, of course, they would have the right to proffer mediation.

All these rights are, however, independent of the Monroe Doctrine. No inference is possible from them to it, nor does the recognition of them necessarily imply any acceptance of it.

That doctrine, as a factor in present-day politics, asserts the practical principle that no extension of European sovereignty is to be permitted in the New World, and it sets forth the United States as the guardian of that principle. It goes beyond any and every rule of international right current among the Powers of the Old World. Upon what, then, does it rest?

Originally, as we have seen, it was put forth to defend interests which the political leaders of the United States rightly conceived to be of first and immediate importance to their commonwealth. Historical changes in the balance of power have, however, effectually safeguarded those interests in other ways, and to-day the Monroe Doctrine is based upon—what?

We are not told. The swelling words seem quite isolated, — without historical ground or justifying reason,—and they appear to embody a purpose rather than a principle.

We conclude, therefore, that the Monroe Doctrine is only a maxim of American policy. It is not a part

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of international law, because it does not rest upon any ethical principle generally applicable to the intercourse of nations.¹

We are thus brought back to the conception of international law as an ethical construct. It represents the moral code of international intercourse, and nothing can properly be said to belong to it which cannot be derived from some principle of that code. It is, therefore, characteristically a system of equity,—a system continually refreshed and invigorated by the developing morality of the world. Its authority is that of the enlightened conscience, and, like the enlightened conscience, it cannot be bound either by usage or by precedent,—even though the precedent be of its own making. We may say, if we will, that international law is largely case-law, but if we do so it must be upon the understanding that its cases are of binding authority only in so far as they illustrate some accepted ethical principle, or one that ought to be accepted.

International law, then, is a branch of ethics, and upon this fact we build our hopes for its future. The nations will never consent to be bound by precedent,—by the history that they themselves have made,—and in this they are entirely right, for man is always greater than usage, and, as a moral agent, cannot be finally bound even by his own practice. Only in the reasonable conscience can he find an authority which he may lawfully recognise as supremely regulative of his

¹ A German metaphysician—did he wish to be uncomplimentary,—would perhaps describe the Monroe Doctrine as unmediated by Thought, but, if Pan-Germanic dreams ever invite German ambitions to South America, German diplomatists will probably find its crude Americanism sufficiently effective.

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conduct,—an authority, which, indeed, he knows that he ought so to recognise, unless he will to do despite to his own life,—and this reasonable conscience is the true basis of international law, and is, or should be, the sole guide of its judgments. In proportion, therefore, as the moral development of the world proceeds,—in proportion as international society becomes “moralised,”—international law will become stronger and more effectual, more competent to deal with the differences that now, by open war or by the veiled hostilities of diplomacy, so often disturb the world’s peace.

But if it is to do this, it must frankly recognise its own character and vocation as a branch of ethics. It must hold itself aloof from policies and the conflict of policies,—accepting no rulings from *them* and taking no part in *it*. It must become the interpreter of the world’s most serviceable conscience, and must apply that conscience, without fear or favour, and without time-serving, to the settlement of the world’s disputes. It must free itself from the fetters of history, even from bondage to its own past, and must make its judgments the utterance of a living authority that speaks to what is best in man. In short, it must become for its own purposes the articulate conscience of the civilised world.

It will hardly become this, however, until it has, not only its own permanent tribunal, but its own permanent and independent judges. There should be an international bench of judges with full authority to try and finally determine all causes brought before it, and the members of this bench should hold office, as do our own judges, “during good behaviour.” This permanent international court might be constituted, in

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the first instance, by each party to the Hague Convention appointing to the Bench some jurist of generally acknowledged reputation. Vacancies, however, should be filled by co-optation, because the Court should be so constituted as, by its very constitution, to give the strongest possible assurance of its judicial independence.

Our hopes for the final peace of the world rest upon our hopes for the future of international law. Arbitration is but a provisional device,—acceptable only because of the present inadequacy of international law, and satisfactory only in so far as it reaches the sovereign equity of law. Even so, it does good service to the cause of peace, but its procedure is so indeterminate, its results so dependent upon accidents of personality, time, and place, so liable to be influenced by policy, that we cannot think of it as the final instrument of international right. Only in a permanent Court, lifted above personal interests and national policies, and administering a settled code of recognised authority, can we find a tribunal which we may reasonably hope that the progressing conscience of the world will one day recognise as sufficient and final.

It may perhaps be said that there are many questions which cannot be settled by law, and others that no power would consent to refer to any tribunal, however distinguished or independent,—that there are practical questions, which can be settled only by the practical give and take of diplomacy or war, and questions of honour, which no nation will submit to any judgment but its own. At first sight, this seems obvious, but our second thoughts suggest large reservations. Probably no international disputes occur in the commonwealth of civilised peoples which do not arise

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out of questions of right, or out of practical interests that can be translated into rights, and, wherever there is a conflict of rights, *there* the decision of law is possible. It may be that the conflicting rights are ill-defined and difficult to compare, but *as rights* they cannot be wholly refractory to the analysis of ethical thought, or beyond the judgment of conscience. Then as to questions of honour:—usually these are only incidental in international controversy, frequently, indeed, they are accidental, and there is, one knows, a general agreement that no nation can be asked to submit its honour to arbitration. Possibly not, for arbitration is arbitrary. But why should it not invoke the protection of law? Questions of honour are purely ethical, and international law also, is, or ought to be, characteristically ethical, and, as such, the pledged guardian of honour.

But, once more, if international law is thus to become the general instrument of international right, the effectual safeguard of international peace, it must come to such clear knowledge of itself that each member of the polity of nations shall find in that law the living and articulate authority of its own best conscience.

CHAPTER VI

THE NATIONAL IDEAL

THE ideal of any given nature is determined by the character and constitution of that nature. Thus, the ideal of manhood is determined by human nature,—by human character and capacity, and by the essential constitution of the nature which these express. Not every nature, however, has an ideal. For instance, we cannot speak of the ideal of a stone or of a tree,—perhaps, even, we cannot speak of the ideal of a dog, or a horse,—and, if human nature were exhaustively disclosed in the character empirically revealed, that nature, also, would be without a regulative ideal. Strictly speaking, only a nature in which the potential has not completely passed into the actual can properly be said to have an ideal. A given fact, when taken merely in its present actuality, has no ideal. It cannot be said to possess one until we regard it a partial expression of a nature greater than its present self,—greater, at least, in this sense that it contains possibilities which are not expressed, or not fully expressed, in the given fact. Therefore, a perfectly simple nature cannot possess an ideal, for in such a nature there cannot be any possibility which is not perfectly expressed in the present actuality of that nature. Only a complex nature can partly disclose itself. Therefore, only a complex nature can have an ideal.

The ideal of any nature, then, is always an ideal of that nature's completeness: it is, indeed, the

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completeness of that nature conceived of as a normative and regulative end. Now, in this thought of the completeness of a complex nature, there is involved, not only the thought of full development, but also the thought of proportion and balance,—of organic equilibrium. The several parts of that nature—the several elements integral in its complex unity—cannot be regarded as so many separate facts, independent in character, in life, and in destiny. They are, essentially, *parts of a whole*, and by this dominant fact they are essentially conditioned. Each is what it is by virtue of its position in the organic construct to which it belongs, and the construct which embraces them all in the unity of its complex character can attain completeness only by the several factors which are integral in it becoming harmoniously developed. Disproportionate development—that is, inharmonious development,—would be destructive of unity. Thus, human nature is not only intellectual, but also emotional, and no adequate conception of human nature can be formed in which intellectual and emotional elements are not both present, and present in due and harmonious proportion,—so present that Life is not robbed of any valuable content of feeling by the usurpations of “Reason,” nor deprived of rational strength and insight by the anarchic predominance of momentary emotions. The perfectly developed man would be a perfectly balanced man.

Let us now apply these thoughts to the interpretation of the national ideal. A nation, we have seen, is, characteristically, an organic construct. It is also, and equally characteristically, an ethical construct. We have seen, too, that, as an ethical construct, it is governed by the ideal which is sovereign in individual life,—by

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the ideal of the completeness of human nature and of human character,—but, strictly speaking, this ideal belongs primarily and characteristically to the individual, and, although ultimately supreme over the nation, it is not the immediate ideal of national life. The moral ideal is, in its essential character, primarily an ideal of and for individual life. We speak of it as the consummating ideal of human life,—as embodying our thought of the completeness of human nature. Human nature, however, is not a concrete universal that informs and constitutes the several individuals who, in their severalty, give it protean illustration. It is a universal of Thought, and does but set forth the fact that, in the essential constitution of their several natures, all men are generically alike. And yet it were wrong to suppose that this universal is but a convenience of speech whereby we indicate the aggregate of individual ideals. There is, indeed, no concrete universal called human nature, but God has “made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth,” and has fashioned their hearts alike, and the common plan thus made manifest in generic identity of character and constitution makes possible a common ideal. When we speak of the ideal of human nature, we mean, therefore, the consummating ideal that expresses each and every individual ideal,—that points to a completeness of nature and character which is the true completeness of each individual life.

The moral ideal, then, is distinctively an ideal of and for individual life,—it is an immediate end only for individuals, if not in their separateness, at least in their severalty. Because it is genuinely a consummating ideal, it is rightfully supreme over all forms of human conduct, and every form of human life,—over

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every human purpose, and over every means subsidiary to purpose. It is sovereign, not only in the inner realm of character, but, also, over outward action, for action is at once the expression and the mould of character. It is sovereign, too, over every human institution, and over every form of corporate and co-operative life. But its supremacy over these is not immediate, for it results from the fact that these are severally instruments of human purpose and endeavour,—instruments for the attainment of human ends.

The sovereignty of the moral ideal over the various instrumental forms of life is, then, a mediated sovereignty,—it results from the general supremacy of that ideal over every human life and over the purposes, endeavours, and ends of every human life. Now, to each instrumental form of life there pertains an ideal of its own completeness,—of its own completeness as an instrument,—and the character of this ideal is determined by the character of the instrumental form of life to which the ideal belongs. Because that form of life is essentially instrumental, its ideal is essentially an ideal of instrumental service,—of service which finds its immediate end in the human purpose to which the given instrumental form of life is ancillary. The ideal of any given instrumental form, as such, is an ideal of the completeness—of the perfection—of that form as an instrument. Because the moral ideal is necessarily sovereign over the human purpose to which a given form of life is instrumental, that ideal is also sovereign over that instrumental form, but not immediately so,—for that instrumental form, as instrumental, has its own specific and particular ideal of instrumental usefulness, and that specific and particular ideal, although ancillary to the moral ideal, is yet clearly distinct from it, because

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expressive of merely instrumental completeness. That ancillary ideal sets forth the completeness of a nature which exists only as an instrument. The moral ideal, which, were it attained, would be the consummation of life, sets forth the completeness of a nature which is an end in and for itself.

"What, then, is the distinctive ideal of the nation—of the nation considered as a human instrument? That it is characteristically an instrument follows immediately from the account already given of it as an ethical organism. It exists, not only as a form of human life, but, distinctively, as a means of human progress,—as an instrument of human purpose, and a help to human development. In other words, it is a form of life ancillary to human endeavour and advance towards the moral ideal, and in practical helpfulness to that endeavour and to that advance it finds its characteristic work. All this, as we have seen, is involved in the thought that the nation is distinctively and essentially an ethical organism. But it follows from this same thought that the helpfulness of national life should be catholic, because all the individuals who constitute a nation are, as spiritual natures, ethically of equal value.

A nation is an organism composed of individuals, over each of whom the moral ideal of "self-realisation"—of completeness of life,—is rightly supreme, and in whatever forms of associated life these individuals become participant, those forms have ethical value,—are more than mere facts,—only in so far as they are catholicly serviceable. The helpfulness of national life should be no respecter of persons.

We may say at once, then, that the national ideal is an ideal of "indifferent" serviceableness. The helpfulness of the national organism—the helpfulness for

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the sake of which the nation exists,—should include in its beneficence all who take part in national life, and every one participant in that life has an equal claim upon that helpfulness.

Unfortunately, this essential truth is not always nor by all discerned. Indeed, men often seem unaware that the nation is characteristically an instrument. They speak of it simply as an existent fact, definite in constitution and character,—although, doubtless, alterable within certain narrow limits,—and for that present constitution and present character, as given facts of history, they claim the loyalty which is rightly due only to serviceableness. For instance, the accidents of history have wrought out for us in England a social life and organisation which men are proud to think distinctive of our island home. We have, it is true, left feudalism far behind us,—unregretted, except by the uselessly romantic,—but we have translated the class-predominance of feudalism into modern forms, and translated it so effectually that England to-day is still largely the heritage and, unfortunately, the pleasure-ground of a few,—of a few who appear genuinely to believe that they are as rightfully the lords of the nation as they are unmistakably its beneficiaries. Now, were those thus privileged satisfied to enjoy the sun while it yet shines upon them, one might be content to commend their worldly wisdom and to work silently—"ohne Hast und ohne Rast"—for their overthrow, but when they claim their privilege as final, and the existing order which gives that privilege as in all essentials permanent, it is time to point out plainly that their privilege, in so far as it is for enjoyment and not for service,—and unfortunately, to-day, it is very largely for enjoyment, and only for enjoyment,—

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is radically inconsistent with the true ideal of national life, and that the social order out of which that privilege issues is, because of that inconsistency, radically unsound. Our loyalty and our patriotic service are due, not to the present constitution of our State and our society, but to that generous English life which is our common inheritance, and in which, unfortunately, many of those who think themselves first in the body politic have but small part. No discussion of Patriotism can be adequate which does not make clear this essential point,—the point that national usages and institutions are of national value, and can rightfully claim patriotic allegiance, only in so far as they are genuinely serviceable to national life,—helpful to the manhood of all who form part of the nation.

The human spirit, although essentially constructive, is yet profoundly anarchist. It is essentially constructive, because by sympathy and interest it characteristically draws men together into various forms of co-operative life, and thus gives rise to politics and civilisations: it is profoundly anarchist, because it recognises no first principles of conduct other than those given by its own nature, and because, over all the institutions and customs that it has created, it claims sovereign authority to end or to mend according to its will.¹ From this criticism of spirit no usage and no institution, however long-established—however exalted by fashion, or bulwarked by privilege,—can validly claim to be exempt. Human life is greater than its instruments, and can always change or alter them according to its need. Only by helpfulness to national life can any usage or institution vindicate for

¹ If that will be rational, and in so far as it is rational, that claim is valid, that authority righteous.

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itself a place in national polity, or make good a claim to the allegiance of patriotic citizenship. Unless it be thus helpful, its very existence is a violation of Right, and the privilege that supports it is pernicious. Of course, no form of associated life can be entirely barren of helpful result. Every usage and every institution must be, either directly or indirectly, in some way serviceable—serviceable to pleasure, if not to industry. But *cui bono*?—to whom serviceable? If *only* to the few, it is not of national value, and cannot claim support. I say “if *only* to the few,” and this emphasis is essential. Class-privilege is not wrong in itself. It is, indeed, quite easy to conceive of circumstances in which class-privilege of a certain sort,—or what the Democracy of the streets would assuredly call class-privilege,—would be entirely righteous and helpful. Let us, for the sake of example, suppose a nation in which, by the accidents of history, a great part of the population is servile,—if not in status, at least in character. Now, if, in that nation, there was a strong minority of an altogether different mould of manhood,—expert in war and capable of rule,—would it not be well if, by the industry of the servile who could neither fight nor rule, that helpful minority were set free for the work of government and defence? Take another case. Suppose an old community in which some class, already privileged, uses its leisure in such a way as to make the higher helpfulness of Thought and Art widely benedictory among those who, but for that ministry of the privileged, would be left in boorish darkness or to the phantasies of vulgarity. Would not that class, also, justify its privilege? It may perhaps be said that neither of these supposed communities would be perfectly healthy,—that Patriotism cannot rest

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content in the thought of a class-dependence due to impoverished or undeveloped manhood,—that the social order which makes the majority of the nation in these ways dependent upon a privileged few is radically unsound. True, I do not suggest that the supposed communities would be ideal, or the supposed privileges final. I only ask—"would not those privileges be morally valid?" Of course, they could be accepted by Thought only as temporary expedients, and, equally of course, if the privileged did their work with practical effectiveness and well-informed Patriotism, they would gradually take away from their privilege the reason that, while unimpaired, sufficed to justify it, for they would use it to build up the classes subject to them into a serviceable manhood that would, in the fulness of time, become independent of their ministry. The fact, however, remains that, for a time at least, in our supposed communities, the supposed privileges would be of national helpfulness. Although distinctly class-privileges, would not their helpfulness be their justification? I think it would.

This argument is sometimes used to defend our English land-system. That system has, it is contended, given as a class which, although undeniably privileged, is, as undeniably, helpful to the commonwealth. Now, even if this contention were entirely true, and true without qualification, it would not prove our land-system to be in itself righteous. Adverse criticism of our English practice involves a negative answer to the following question:—Should the value that accrues to land through the development of national life and industry pass immediately into private ownership? Defence, on the other hand, must of necessity involve proof of an affirmative answer.

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Now, the argument in the text is based upon the national serviceableness of a given privilege. It does not prove an economic right, for it does not deal with economic factors. It can at most prove a conditional political right. But a right of this character will not content those who are the most vigorous defenders of our present land-system. The "sacredness" of property in land can be vindicated only by showing it to rest upon a clear economic right, and this is precisely what the argument from useful privilege cannot do and does not profess to do.

The validity of this latter argument, moreover, depends essentially upon the national utility of the privilege defended. Now, in the present state of English life and of English society, can it fairly be claimed that the landed classes make any return in public service, or any adequate return, for the privilege they enjoy? Somewhat of independent manhood, somewhat of humanising influence, they do indeed contribute to our national life, but is the service commensurate with the privilege? He would be bold who answered in the affirmative. It were easy to paint an attractive picture of a landed aristocracy resident upon its estates, and wisely sedulous, not only for good farming, but also for the highest and most complete well-being of those among whom it lived and by whose industry it was supported,—an aristocracy disciplined by service, as other classes are by labour, enriched with genuine and unselfish culture, able to bring to the service of the State experienced judgment and a trained manhood, informed and shaped by the best traditions of the Fatherland,—it were easy to paint such a picture as this, but, when painted, it would be only an idyllic romance founded upon

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transfigured memories, and composed by dreaming fancy. The aristocracy of land is now little more than part of the nondescript and unhelpful aristocracy of fashion, and whatever little helpfulness comes from the few who are not unmindful of duty or regardless of opportunity is altogether outweighed, like "the small dust of the balance," by the mischief wrought by the multitude of the frivolous, who find in well-endowed idleness only an opportunity for unprofitable and wasteful pleasure. Whatever our land-system has been in the past, whatever possibilities romantic fancy may invent for it, it is not now an exceptional school of serviceable manhood, and, if the argument from serviceable utility be invoked to defend it, that argument will inevitably fail, not because itself invalid, but because the privilege to be defended is not adequately serviceable to the commonwealth.

Privilege, then, is inconsistent with the true ideal of national order only when unserviceable to the nation, or not commensurately serviceable. If adequately thus helpful, it is valid.¹

This, then, is one of the characteristic notes of the ideal of national order,—national helpfulness.² But,

¹ This is a point which is often overlooked by the militant spokesmen of Democracy. Too often they directly attack privilege *as such*, and become contributory to selfish animosities in which there is little to help and much to degrade.

² This, of course, is not to be interpreted in such a sense as to exclude class-helpfulness. Indeed, we cannot exclude it, unless we are prepared to seriously narrow and impoverish our conception of national helpfulness. Much that is of praiseworthy intent in our modern legislation is primarily for class-benefit,—for the assistance of farmers, the protection of workmen, the housing of the poor,—but surely no one, except an unscrupulous rhetorician, or an unpractical doctrinaire, or a partisan blinded by party tradition, and, perhaps, by party prejudice, would, *upon that ground alone*, venture to condemn it. "Class-legislation" is, it is true, a name of evil repute, not, however, because it is

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helpfulness for what ? The answer, surely, is obvious. The helpfulness of the nation should be as wide as the national work,—as wide as the national vocation,—as wide as human nature. The nation exists to produce men,—to form character and develop manhood,—and its ministry of helpfulness must be as wide as the possibilities of the spiritual life it serves. Men often speak as though the narrowest commercial or military virtues, or the barest elements of learning were, for the majority of people, an adequate equipment for the station in life to which they are called. "The station in life to which they are called !" And to what are they called ?—to what are they called here in England ? To full partnership in "the lordliest life on earth,"—in the greatest citizenship that the world has seen,—in the noblest heritage of manhood that the world has known. To this, all are called who claim sonship to our English Fatherland,—the lowest as truly as the highest. Can the "three R's," or mere aptitude for half-servile work, and more than half-servile obedience,—can *these* be thought an adequate equipment for *this* ? A thousand times, No ! It is a vocation that demands their fullest and most effectual manhood. Few political mistakes are greater, or more likely to be widely mischievous than this of thinking that a national or imperial polity can be best or sufficiently established upon ignorance and narrow manhood. A nation lives by the manhood of its individual members: the best man—he who brings

primarily for class-benefit, but because it is thought, and sometimes with reason, to be *only* or disproportionately for class-benefit. In so far as a given act of "class-legislation" increases the patriotic helpfulness of the class it benefits, that particular legislation is so far justified. There is no harm in class-legislation, but, on the contrary, much good, if it widens or improves the national serviceableness of the benefited class.

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to the service of the commonwealth the best character, the ripest and most effectual manhood, the best-informed judgment,—he it is, who is the best and most serviceable citizen, and to make such citizens as he (ultimately, not for its own sake, but for theirs), the nation exists.

"Ultimately, not for its own sake," for the nation, even when making the highest claim upon individual service, or laying the heaviest burden upon individual resources, is, in so far as it conforms to its own ideal, only and always instrumental. It has no independent interest or aim of its own separate or separable from the dominant individual interest and aim set forth in the moral ideal which is sovereign in the lives of the individuals who constitute it. The larger interests of the collective life in which those individuals, in virtue of their citizenship, have part sometimes, it is true, involves genuine individual self-sacrifice, but this self-sacrifice, if we regard it (as of course we should) as an incident in the life of a spiritual whole, receives ethical sanction, not from a primacy of right inherent in the whole as opposed to the individual, but from the essentially social nature of the human spirit. That nature, simply because it is genuinely social,—in the very beginning it was seen that "it is not good for man to live alone,"—does not permit narrowly self-regarding interests to be ultimately sovereign in life, and, in self-sacrifice—which subordinates those interests to others which, as terms of conduct, are ethically superior to them,—that essentially social nature receives characteristic expression. We dare not analyse self-sacrifice into transfigured egoism, or explain it away as though it were simply a deferring of gain. As expressing

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motive it is genuinely altruistic; in its effect upon the immediate purposes and hopes of life it involves genuine loss, and, through this, often no little of equally genuine suffering; but, all this notwithstanding, we are compelled to see in it a true expression of the higher possibilities of human nature,—an inevitable and necessary discipline for the perfecting of individual character. Paradoxical though it may so seem, self-sacrifice is a valuable form of “self-realisation,” and it is upon *this*, and not upon a primacy of right inherent in that for which the “self” is sacrificed,—it is upon *this* that the ethical sanction of self-sacrifice is based.

We come back once more then to the thought that the nation, as an ethical organism, is—even when it seems to claim the individual most completely,—essentially an instrument of individual life. National life is a means to the completeness of individual life, and has ethical value only as such. Now, in what ways can and should national life further individual life? The answer is obvious and simple:—in all possible ways. National environment touches individual life so closely and so completely, and affects it so widely and so strongly, that we cannot say that any part of human nature is uninfluenced by it, and the activities of national life become, with the progress of society, so various and so complex, that we cannot regard any part of individual manhood as wholly outside of them. Once more then, the ministry of national helpfulness should be as wide as the possibilities of human nature.

Even if we change our point of view, and think first, not of individual life, but of the society in and through which that life has, of necessity, to advance towards its completeness, we shall come to the same conclusion.

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If it be true that the perfect life can become actual in the individual only in a perfect society, it is equally true that a perfect society can be actual only in and through the perfectness of each of its several members. So, therefore, if for a moment, and by a convenient symbolism, we speak of society as an end in and for itself, we must inevitably conclude that its primary duty and interest is to build up each of the individuals constituent of it into completeness of individual life.

The helpfulness of national life should, therefore, be broadly and generously humane. In a given time and place circumstances may impose limitations, and may assign a practical primacy to this or that interest, but the limitations and the primacy are alike temporary, and, as the ideal always transcends them, so also should our hope, our deeper purpose, and the informing spirit of our policy.¹ The nation, therefore,

¹ It follows from this that Commercialism and Militarism, as sovereign policies, are radically inconsistent with the true conception of national life, for, in so far as they are helpful to human nature,—and, certainly, they are most conspicuous as *un*helpful,—they are helpful to it only in its lower and poorer categories, and, when sovereign, they exclude higher and more serviceable helpfulness. An academic disputant might, perhaps, suggest that they mark inevitable stages in human progress, and are a necessary preparation for higher forms of the national ministry of life. But, wherever we find either the one or the other as considerable factors in national life, there also,—for instance, in England and Germany,—we find the people hungering for a higher helpfulness in their Fatherland, and there also we find the Fatherland capable of effectual response. Commercialism does not exhaust the moral possibilities of English life, or the moral resources of the English State, nor does Militarism exhaust the moral possibilities of German life or the moral possibilities of the German State. Putting aside academic refinements, which are here irrelevant, we may say that neither Militarism nor Commercialism can become dominant in a modern civilised State except by an actual depraving of the national ideal, an actual depraving of national character, an actual impoverishing of national life.

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should not only be generally helpful, it should also be humanely helpful,—catholic alike in the range and in the character of its helpfulness. But helpfulness, thus catholic, is not the only predicate whereby we can characterise the ideal of national life. That ideal is also an ideal of liberty.

Now, in the first place, what do we mean by "liberty"? We need not involve ourselves with the philosophical problem of free-will, which is here irrelevant. By "liberty," I here mean "self-determination" as opposed to external constraint,—determination from within, as opposed to determination from without.

Let us revert for a moment to a thought which is fundamental for this essay. The human spirit is not abstract spirituality. It is, in each one of us, concretely individual, with a positive character distinctively and essentially its own. That character is never fully disclosed in any earthly experience or achievement. Besides the phases of character at any given time empirically manifested, there are other phases which do but wait the opportunity of some other moment to become in their turn manifest, and besides the capacities at any given time actual, there are others which are as yet potential,—which exist as yet only as possibilities. In the harmonious development of these possibilities human progress consists, and, to develop them, until manhood becomes complete alike in capacity and in character, is the distinguishing vocation of man,—the sovereign vocation of each individual.

It is as instrumental to this development of individual manhood, and only thus, that the nation has ethical meaning. It exists that men may become

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what they ought to be,—what they have it in them to be. This is what we mean when we speak of the nation as an ethical organism. Now, it is characteristic of the nation as such an organism that all the members of it are ethically peers,—equal in vocation and equal in right, equal too, in their ultimate claim upon the helpfulness of national life. The Fatherland should have no favourites, and if it assign to some of its children a more honourable place, this should be only because of pre-eminent serviceableness,—it cannot be because of primacy of right, for, in essential right, all the children are equal.

This leads immediately to the conclusion that in the polity of the Fatherland, no individual life can properly be treated as only, or even chiefly, tributary to another. The activities of national life are, it is true, very largely collective or co-operative, and in that co-operation there may rightly be distinctions of service,—some may be appointed to direct, others to execute,—but the fruits of co-operation should not be for the benefit of only a favoured few. Co-operation should mean brotherhood.

And yet, it may be said, constraint, and even external constraint, plays an important part in life. Individual character is largely formed by it, especially in the earlier years of life, and there are many in whom the corporate spirit is so weak that, without external constraint, they would remain unserviceable. True, but in no case should such constraint be thought of as a final discipline, for it is, at the best, only preparatory to the stronger compulsion of sympathy. Sometimes, and in some things, we train children by constraint, and many a lad, when first he goes out "into the world," owes much to the constraint

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of office or workshop; but, in such cases, those who exercise authority hope that constraint will be only a temporary necessity. It is useful as formative of habit: it is disastrous if it supplant sympathy. It may do something to mould character into a serviceable shape, but it fails hopelessly and lamentably unless it awakens interests which shall themselves become inner determinants of conduct so strong as to render constraint from without unnecessary. It is precisely the same in national life. Just as constraint is necessary in the industrial order, until the industrial virtues become strong enough to render it unnecessary, so it is also necessary in national life, until the distinctive virtues of that life become similarly strong. Whenever present circumstances make constraint necessary, our hope, our purpose, and our thought should always point us beyond that temporary and instrumental discipline to the trained and developed character which will be able to act as a law unto itself. But this means that constraint should not be a brute force,—arbitrary in origin and regardless of life's deeper purpose,—but intelligent, sympathetic, genuinely humane. It should not be used to make a man merely the instrument of another's will,—a tool for another's use,—but to make him more completely a man, that, in his complete manhood, he may become more completely serviceable. If it does not make for this end, it is pernicious and invites revolution.

Constraint, then, however important its place in national life, should always be part of the national ministry of helpfulness,—a discipline preparatory and conducive to that genuine freedom wherein a man does willingly, out of the awakened sympathies and

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interests of a rightly developed manhood, what he aforetime did unwillingly, because he was compelled.¹

Ethically interpreted, then, constraint points towards liberty, in which, to make use of a scriptural thought, it finds its fulfilment. And it should be noticed, too, that constraint—humane constraint, which alone the moral judgment can commend,—never, even when most strict and compelling, makes the life which it disciplines tributary to another. It disciplines, that it may render discipline unnecessary.

There are, perhaps, some who will say that I have overrated the importance of liberty,—that the concrete character of helpfulness, however produced, is alone truly valuable, and that, even in our most advanced communities, there are large numbers who are obviously unfit for liberty.

It is one of the unfortunate consequences of our present unequally helpful civilisation that hitherto most of our essays in political theory and in the criticism of political theory have been the work of men who have been exempt from the burdens and restrictions of the commonalty and from the soul-destroying ills thereupon consequent, and who have not in their own lives known the bitterness and degradation of heartless bondage. But I hold myself fortunate that this experience has not been wholly withheld from me. Born of the people, and sharing their lot during all the most formative season of life, I have paid to adverse Fate an unwilling tribute of

¹ It may sound Quixotic, but one cannot help wishing that our prison system were more largely influenced by these thoughts. Punishment that is *only* punishment—merely vindictive—is either a survival from barbarism, or a confession of the impotence of society as a humanising agent.

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years wasted in Egyptian servitude, and if I have not made many bricks, I have at least trifled with clay, and learned my lesson, where certainly I had not expected to learn it,—in one of the public offices in Whitehall.

You laugh, and your laugh has in it somewhat of derision, for the Civil Service is not generally reputed to be a school of drudgery. But there are worse and more poignant evils in life than a compelled service of overtaxing labour. It is worse to spend the years of opening manhood, when new capacities and new ideals are urgent within one, tied down to a trivial and perfunctory routine prescribed and governed by crude and clumsy precedents that leave no room for individual initiative,—tied down to a routine that dooms half one's days to an idleness that must perforce disguise itself as industry,—to a routine that awakens no interest, that entails no responsibility worthy to be mentioned by a man, that makes no demand upon a man's powers of judgment and of work, and is serviceable only to the incapacity of those who, by supervising it, set themselves above "the ordinary of nature's workmanship" in pretentious and paltry dignity,—serviceable only to small men in small places, whose ignorance is a daily provocation, whose thriving incompetence is a bitter mockery of Life's more earnest hopes. In this hopeless bondage of the spirit I have spent more years than I care to count, and yet I do not deem those years wholly wasted. They have cleared my mind of much superstition, and have taught me, among other things, the invaluable lesson of the pricelessness of reasonable liberty,—of that liberty through which work becomes an interest genuinely humanising, an activity genuinely worthy of manhood.

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Complete manhood must, of necessity, be free manhood,—serviceable, indeed, to others, but in no wise tributary to them, and unto this completeness we are all severally called. Freedom is not an exceptional vocation for a favoured few: it is the birthright of the race. In a given time and place it may seem the privilege of a fortunate or pre-eminent minority, but, even in the lives that then and there are tributary, there is an inborn capacity for a larger manhood,—a capacity that even then and there is acquiring the preliminaries of freedom, and building up a character which, slowly achieving strength and conscious purpose, will in the process of time, by evolution or revolution, so far transform the fashion of Life's usage and circumstance as to make Liberty a general benediction. The national ideal, therefore, is an ideal, not only of catholic and humane helpfulness, but also of Liberty. It is also, and consequently, an ideal of Democracy, for Liberty, when perfect, necessarily involves true and complete Democracy.

Men often think of Liberty as though it were primarily or chiefly political,—something to be achieved by Reform Bills,—and, here in England, the political history of the last hundred years has probably done not a little to establish and confirm them in this narrowness. Our rulers, chosen always from classes that constitute a privileged minority, have been so regardless of their duty as guardians of the national welfare, have shown such little understanding of the nation's vital needs, such indifference or hostility to claims not directly and menacingly articulate in Parliament, that, in the days of a restricted electorate, the unenfranchised effectually learned the lesson that, in this English world of ours, considerable reforms can be brought about only by

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electoral compulsion. They learned that political freedom must precede social and industrial freedom, and so important has this preliminary seemed that, although in itself little more than instrumental, men have sometimes spoken as though it were final,—in itself the one thing needful.

But this has been an accidental and transitory manner of speech. The freedom which is our English heritage is not only, or even characteristically, political: it is personal, and is embodied in individual rights which no process of law can infringe, or act of State invade. It is these rights, more than our political rights, that make us genuinely free, for, in so far as they are operative, they make the individual personality inviolable, and secure to each man some at least of the essentials of independent manhood. And we are to-day learning more completely what independent manhood means,—what the ideal of it involves. It involves more than the right to give an occasional vote, more than those elementary individual rights which make one man as completely "law-worthy" as another: it involves freedom from all those inequities of usage which, now, through class-privilege and industrial organisation, make one life tributary to another,—the many tributary to the few,—it involves, in short, for each member of the body politic, full opportunity to work out his life to its full completeness. A freedom that gives nothing but a vote is of little value. The only genuine freedom is that which makes a man worthily the master of his own life.¹

¹ I say "worthily," because outward emancipation is but the beginning of freedom. Men have to be set free, not only from unrighteous bondage to their fellows,—to those whom law and usage have made powerful enough to bind others to tributary service,—but, also, from

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Freedom, in the fulness of its reality is, then, primarily personal and social: it is only incidentally political. According to "the perfect law of liberty," every individual in the body politic should be completely autonomous,—a law unto himself,—completely the master of his own life, for the ends that are sovereign over his life.

Liberty is thus the necessary expression of man's moral autonomy,—of the ethical primacy of the individual. Now, because it makes a man always and only a peer among his fellows, and, in the complex play of human activities that constitutes national life, allows each individual to count as one, and only one, it necessarily involves democracy, for democracy, rightly understood, means nothing more than this,—the determination of national life by the whole of the national organism, for the equitably proportionate benefit of each of the several members of the organism, and not exclusively or disproportionately by any one part of the organism, or for the exclusive or disproportionate benefit of any one part.¹

their own lower selves,—from ignorance and selfishness, and from all that inwardly constrains their lives to incompleteness. Unless freedom thus become complete, political freedom will but make men ready tools of charlatans and mistaken enthusiasts, or victims of ill-advising friends and mis-advising false friends, who may even persuade them for a time to remain in bondage, that those who now unrighteously profit by them may continue so to profit.

¹ Therefore, Liberty can never mean Chaos. It can become perfect only through perfect allegiance to the moral ideal, and through a complete development of character in subordination to that ideal. It does not mean exemption from law, nor even from service. By it man is, indeed, set free from the laws devised to his undoing by human selfishness and power, but only that he may the more completely come under the sovereign law of God written in his heart, and embodied in the very constitution of his nature. By it he is set free from Life's lower service to unrighteous lordships and to his own lower self, but he is thus set

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Here, again, we have to do with a conception that is only incidentally political. Democracy, in the completeness of its meaning, is primarily a doctrine of society. Logically, it is a doctrine of government only because it is primarily a doctrine of society, and if, in any country, it appear first as a doctrine or form of government, this is only an accident of political history, and is, moreover, only transitional, for political democracy—if, in any given case, historically primary,—must (unless in that case the process of human development be interrupted or diverted), inevitably pass on to its completeness in social democracy. Just as a liberty which gave nothing more than a vote would be of comparatively little worth, so a democracy which gave nothing more than a formal electoral equality would be of comparatively small value. What would a people gain by universal franchise and electoral equality if its land were still a private benefice, and its industry still taxed for those “who toil not neither do they spin”? Do you say “It would gain the power of destroying this unrighteousness”? Precisely,—political democracy must complete itself in social democracy. Indeed, only as democracy thus becomes complete can electoral equality become real, for privilege has many ways of suborning men and of constraining their obedience, and even of winning a mistaken allegiance, and, while privilege continues powerful, electoral equality can only be formal.

Let us revert, yet once again, to the thought of the nation as an ethical organism. As such an organism the nation exists for the equal benefit of free only that in new completeness of manhood he may enter the more effectually into Life's higher service to the things that are lovely and of good report.

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each individual belonging to it. As parts of an ethical whole, all the individuals constituting the nation are ethically peers: they are equals in moral vocation,—equals also in the nature of their "bounden duty and service" to the body politic, and in their ultimate claims upon the helpfulness of national life. Does not all this involve pure social democracy?

It does not, however, follow that in any given community governing classes are immediately to be set aside. Democracy—like Liberty, or, indeed, like the ethical State itself,—is a governing ideal towards which we are slowly working, and we must not, either in our policy or our polity, attempt to anticipate the gradual achievements of history. Not only are governing classes the natural result of widely spread historical conditions: they have also been valuable—I had almost said indispensable,—agents in national progress, and probably no considerable nation in Europe to-day could, without loss, dispense with them. Nor is the reason for this in the least degree occult. Among the members of any considerable community we are certain to find great differences in civic helpfulness. Many who could be helpful, will not: many who have the will to be, cannot be—either from press of business or because of personal deficiencies,—and, unfortunately, many have neither the power nor the will to help. In these circumstances it is at once inevitable and beneficial that those who both can be and will be helpful should take the lead in the conduct of public affairs. Civic helpfulness—although in a very real and significant sense natural to man,—is, like every other virtue, an acquired capacity, and the course of history has been such that in most of our greater communities it has been acquired by certain

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classes earlier and in more useful measure than by others. Gurth the swineherd "born thrall of Cedric of Rotherwood" was an estimable swineherd, but it is no disparagement of him to say that, probably,—precisely because he was a swineherd and a thrall, with a swineherd's education and a thrall's outlook upon life,—he was less fitted to rule than his master. Now, at one time, most European communities were, through the accidents of history, made up of Gurths and Cedrics, and even to-day, after centuries of progress, the old line of demarcation, although it has shifted and changed its name, has not been wholly obliterated. While it remains it is natural and beneficial that the Cedrics should rule. It may be said that governing classes are themselves but accidents of history. True, but history cannot work without suitable material, and they became governing because of qualities that marked or inferred—denoted or connoted—a superior capacity for rule. It may be that at first, their manifest capacity was only for war, but in that far-off chaos of the *Völker Wanderungen*, when the first foundations of modern Europe were laid, military capacity and the military virtues were of primary importance, as, indeed, they still are. Moreover, in that strong manhood which proved itself so capable in war, there was a large aptitude which war did not exhaust, and this aptitude—healthily responsive to the opportunities of peace,—became, in our Northern lands, the basis of a new civilisation, and converted military supremacy into a genuine national leadership. The descendants of marauders became an opulent baronage, exercised in arms and helpful to the interests and industries of peace,—helpful, above all, in laying the foundation of that

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civil liberty which has given us so great a heritage, and so pre-eminent a mission. Rollo the Ganger was succeeded by Simon de Montfort and Humphrey of Gloucester. The forms of feudal society passed away, and into the place of the old baronage there came a new landed order, standing in a new relation to the Crown as, also, to its tenantry,—exempt from feudal services and unfortified by feudal rights, but nevertheless unquestionably heir to the feudal leadership. Along this line the best traditions of our English manhood has been formed,—a tradition of honour, courtesy, and freedom, of social helpfulness and public service, such as the world has not elsewhere seen, such as history has not elsewhere been able to produce,—a tradition so valuable that we shall be fortunate, indeed, if we can hand it on unimpaired, across the changes now in progress and the greater changes that are imminent, to the new orders that, in the days of reconstruction, will exercise a new leadership. That tradition, as it lives in our thought to-day, is doubtless an idealisation of history,—not a mere echo. Probably, our governing classes—notwithstanding the individual excellences of character and service that illuminate their history,—have never, as a whole, completely embodied the tradition they have shaped and transmitted. The tradition they have handed on to us is the tradition of an ideal rather than of an achievement, and hence it lives in our hearts to-day, not simply or distinctively as a memory, but characteristically as a sovereign inspiration, and an informing hope.

It is doubtless true that those to whom we attribute this tradition did not always, in their own lives, perfectly illustrate it. Some illustration however they

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must have given, or the tradition itself would never have been formed, and, though that illustration has not been complete enough to give to us the memory of a past Elysium, it has, at least, given to us an ideal which, if we but suffer it to fashion us, will go far to make the future millenary. And this tradition of a benedictory ideal is almost the highest service that a governing class can render. One higher service it can render, and one alone:—it can make that ideal catholicly formative, so that those not born into the direct line of its descent shall yet be shaped by it, and become, as it were by adoption, links in the spiritual succession that hands on to each new generation the achievements and the ideals of the Past, and the hopes that fashion the Future.

Now, of this higher service our English history has not been barren. That unique tradition of manhood—of manhood at once chivalrous and serviceable,—which has been shaped for us by those who in the past have been our leaders, although a class-tradition, has, happily, been widely and helpfully formative in English life. The historical tradition wherein we to-day live has come to us through many channels. It is genuinely a national tradition, not only because it now in fact fashions our lives, but also because every class in the nation has contributed to its many-stranded strength. It comes to us from the nation's complex past, and lives in the nation's complex present. It is neither the product nor the possession of any one class, but it is not too much to say that, among the many lines of tradition that meet in it, the line that has come through our governing classes is the one that is normal. Other classes—for instance, the commercial classes,—have or have had their own more or less

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distinctive tradition,—a tradition which has contributed valuably to English character and to English life,—but the highest elements of our present-day ideal have come through the distinctive tradition of our governing classes.

All class-traditions bear the marks of their origin. A complete ideal of manhood cannot come from the tradition of oppressed or narrowed lives,—from lives condemned, by temporary forms of polity, to Gibeonitic service, or confined within a narrow circle of merely “practical” interests. Such lives may, indeed, contribute elements of indispensable worth to the complex national tradition, for they are often rich in unrecorded but not unheeded lessons of patient industry, of uncomplaining courage, of mutual helpfulness, of clear-eyed enterprise and strong integrity, but public spirit, personal independence, and the self-respect that culminates in chivalrous regard for personal honour, and the grace of humane refinement and educated thought,—these belong to a richer and more generous manhood than that nurtured by merely tributary industry or mercenary enterprise, and they presuppose the impenurious leisure and the wider opportunities that, in fact, if not of right, have hitherto been the privilege of the few.

Privilege never lacks opportunity, and only in so far as its opportunity is rightly and fully used can the privilege itself be morally vindicated. Indeed, the justification of privilege can never become complete unless, directly or indirectly, the privileged become missionary, and endeavour, to the full measure of their power, and to the full extent of their opportunity, to build up the unprivileged into the full possession of that higher manhood which enriches their own lives.

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Privileged classes hold their privilege as trustees for the spiritual life of the nation. Privilege, without commensurate return of service, is always and necessarily unjust, and the return service, at least to-day, is primarily and essentially ethical. The privileged classes are no longer called upon to bear the chief burdens of the State,—to these all classes now contribute, although not yet proportionately,—nor is the State any longer compelled to seek its servants only within their ranks, but we look to them, I do not say hopefully, but certainly rightfully, for helpful leadership into Life's higher and more gracious possibilities. It is not enough if a privileged order use its opportunities only for its own gain,—for its own self-culture. It must be missionary—not only indirectly by example, but directly through work,—missionary, not only of self-culture as men ordinarily conceive of it, but of all the strength and grace of that larger manhood for which every son of man is born into the world, and in which alone nations can find their abiding stability, and their salutary peace. "He that is first among you let him be as him that serves." If the privileged neglect to serve, then is their privilege an unrequited and, therefore, an unjust advantage, and it is "condemned already," however buttressed by law or sanctioned by prescription. Indeed, it is only by missionary service that a privileged class which has inherited a great and generously humane tradition can preserve that tradition unimpaired, or can make the best use of its opportunities even for its own humane advantage.

Without this missionary service the charity of a privileged class can be but feeble and its sympathy narrow, and this feebleness and this narrowness are

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alike inconsistent with the broad humanism of a true manhood,—inconsistent, too, with that broadly humane culture of mind and heart which is the flower of manhood. The highest culture is genuinely catholic, and draws inspiration and strength from the whole field of human life,—it cannot live amid the narrow interests of a privileged coterie that thinks only of itself. Such a coterie may be rich in superficial grace, trivially decorative and captivating to the vulgar imagination, but it cannot know the fresh inspirations of untrammelled Art, or the full sanctity of Thought,—it cannot know the informing sympathies and creative strength of a broad manhood, least of all can it know that highest refinement of feeling and grace of bearing which come only through the active exercises of unfettered and unhindered charity.

Now, something, at least, of this highest service our governing classes in England have rendered to the commonwealth, and, thus, their class tradition has happily become a national inheritance. It is fortunate, too, that the long interval of opportunity has been thus far effectually used, for the times are changing, and new men, with small pre-eminence, save in wealth, are grasping the primacy of social life, and with the new men come new manners. Our new "plutocrats" have not learned the best lessons of English life, and the means by which they have achieved success have been but a poor discipline for the higher manhood, a poor preparation for social leadership. Fortunately, leadership will never be theirs. Without local attachments, fascinated by the tinsel and glitter of metropolitan and cosmopolitan life, they are emulous only of the decadent extravagances of privilege, not of its serviceable duties, and have small thought for any other

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primacy than that of fashion. This trivial primacy they may indeed achieve, but the genuine leadership of the people is passing into quite other hands.

Strictly speaking, then, privilege has, ethically, no more than a conditional validity. Whatever its original sanctions in law or equity, whatever its historical associations, it can have no moral claim to continue after it has ceased to be adequately helpful to the commonwealth. We may go a step further and, disregarding certain merely speculative contingencies, we may say that, for ethical thought, every material privilege is necessarily temporary. It exists that it may educate, and education is, or ought to be, always and only, a preliminary to independently effectual manhood. A governing class exists that it may make its own class-inheritance of manhood genuinely and independently national,—may make it so effectually formative of the nation's general character that the ideal to which that inheritance points shall live in the national tradition, not only through the virtues and achievement of a class, but through the illustrating lives of all. Where this has been done, the work or privilege is accomplished, and the privilege itself should cease.

Probably no governing class has ever fully accomplished the work for which its privilege has given opportunity. Therefore, to the extent of this failure, its privilege has been, not only a burden, but an unrequited burden. Now, whenever a governing class has not seriously endeavoured to discharge the moral obligations of its privilege, it has naturally come to look upon the material advantages that arise from its

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morally conditioned privilege as being unconditionally its own—unencumbered by Right or by Law. Just as naturally, this gives rise to a divergence of material interests between the privileged and the unprivileged, for an unrequited privilege is an unjust tax upon national industry, and the unprivileged—who alone pay that tax—naturally resent it as unrighteous. Then the "Classes" and the "Masses" fall apart into more or less hostile camps, and the helpfulness of the privileged,—which depends upon their sympathy,—becomes yet more restricted. When this happens, it is the knell of privilege, although the day of burial may be long deferred.

Something of this sort is, if I mistake not, now coming to pass in England. Our governing classes have given to us a heritage of priceless worth, but it has become broadly national by assimilation, rather than by education, for the influence of privilege, as formative of character,—although unmistakable and valuable,—has been chiefly indirect. Here, in England, our unprivileged have grown up into the stature of a higher manliness because nourished by the pervading tradition of our English life, and moved by the slow unfolding of their own latent manhood. They have, indeed, been helped by the presence around them of an ideal nobler than their own, but of direct help they have had but little,—little, that is, compared with that morally their due. Our privileged classes, like their compeers elsewhere, have perverted their privileges into "rights," and have used them primarily for private pleasure and advantage.

Their public service, although laudable, has not been a serious vocation; their charity has too often been only the graceful beneficence of a lady's leisure,

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—confirmatory of dependence, rather than helpful towards self-support. And now the time of their opportunity is rapidly passing away, for that divergence of interests which is destructive of helpfulness is already felt, and the thoughts of men are moving out towards far-reaching democratic changes,—towards changes that will, as one would gladly hope, finally sweep away the anachronisms that permit a favoured, and now undistinguished few to act as though the State and industry of England existed primarily for their own advancement and profit.¹

There are those to whom, in all seriousness of thought, "Democracy" is a word of ill-omen, connoting the removal of ancient landmarks, the disruption of social order, the destruction of rightly venerated traditions. To them it stands for the triumph of ignorance and undisciplined passion, for the universal reign of mediocrity and of worse than mediocrity. It would, they think, commit national affairs to those who, whether we consider character, capacity, or training, are conspicuously the least qualified for the conduct of them.² In short, they think that democracy would inevitably place the effective political power of

¹ In these paragraphs I have had more particularly in mind the privileges that issue directly in social and political primacy, but the argument advanced is equally applicable to the privilege that gives industrial primacy,—to the privilege enforced by law, and often defended by economic reasoning, whereby "Capital" is enabled to derive disproportionate gain from the proceeds of industry.

² This last sentence irresistibly invites the question—"Has the present rule of privilege done strikingly better?" Have not the rulers whom it has given us—I am not speaking with especial reference to the present administration—been, upon the whole, sufficiently undistinguished by competence for government to quiet all our fears concerning the influence of democracy upon ministerial efficiency?

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a nation in the hands of the "submerged" and the half-emancipated. But this way of thinking, surely, involves a radical misconception. Democracy is a name which, whatever its history, belongs to-day primarily to the philosophy of politics,—not to "practical" politics. It designates an ideal, and is applicable to an existent polity only in so far as that polity approximates to that ideal. Similarly, its adjective is applicable to this or that particular policy or change only in so far as that policy or change points towards that ideal. Now, what is ideal Democracy?—what is the true ideal of democratic thought, the true goal of democratic hope? Imperishable words recur to memory, and immediately an answer shapes itself,—“Liberty! Fraternity! Equality!” these, we say, are the notes of true Democracy!—Liberty, wherein each man¹ has full opportunity to live out his own life according to the full measure of the manhood that is his,—unfettered by usage or by law, unhindered by ignorance or selfishness, whether around him or within him: Fraternity, wherein helpful, large-hearted Charity is completely catholic, alike in aim and in range, and is as completely active: Equality, wherein each one has his own, and no privilege obstructs or robs! In a true Democracy each man would be completely free, and each man completely helpful. It would be a true brotherhood of men who were completely men. Neither the ignorant nor the selfish—none who were still bound by any of

¹ In passages such as this, “man,” of course, includes “woman.” The general theory of life is the same for each sex, because it is based, not upon man’s nature nor upon woman’s nature, but upon human nature. It is primarily a theory of individual life, and whether a given individual be man or woman is quite irrelevant.

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the many-shaped fetters forged by incomplete manhood for its own undoing,—would therein have any abiding place. Were such found there, the pervading and informing charity around them would lift them into a higher manhood,—for *omnia vincit amor*,—and make them also equal members of that great fraternity, and, in thus saving souls alive, that brotherhood, even while yet itself incomplete (through the presence within it of the incomplete), would prove itself to be genuinely what we have already called it,—a true Democracy,—true, although, for a missionary interval of time, imperfect.

What relevance have those fears and mistrusts of unimaginative prudence, which give pause to so many when they think of democratic change,—what relevance have those to a polity such as this? Obviously, none whatever.

But, it may be urged, this Democracy you speak of is confessedly ideal,—it is not *this* that men usually mean when they speak of Democracy, and the very elements in this ideal that would inspire confidence in transition to it, are conspicuous only by their absence in the nearer prospect opened up by some at least of the changes advocated in the name of Democracy. Probably this is largely true, but it is not conclusive. It provides an argument for caution in reform, not for refusal to reform. Change, indeed,—and democratic change,—is inevitable. Men, whose forebears were content to endure merely tributary lives, have become open-eyed to injustice, and have learned something at least of the worth of liberty. They have learned to think and to act for themselves, and, naturally, they claim a man's prerogatives. It may be that they have acquired the habit of independence,

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without the trained and confirmed aptitudes of heart and mind which alone can make independence completely valuable or the exercise of it entirely safe, but how many of us have been wiser or more fortunate? However strongly we may insist upon a man's individual responsibility for his own character,—and some measure of responsibility for this we probably all recognise, except the few who are fatalists in morals—we cannot, I think, contend that our present populace should bear the full responsibility for its own shortcomings. Some measure of responsibility—surely?—attaches to those of privileged position who, in times past, had, through their privilege, abundant opportunity for moulding the nation's life into broadly effectual manliness, but who knew not “the time of their visitation,” and gave a narrow tithe of service when Charity and Right claimed of them complete self-consecration.

Our politically unfit have, in part, it is true, made their own unfitness, but, in part, they are only what we and our ancestors have suffered them to become. They suffer to-day, in their own persons, from the unhelpfulness of the Past,—can we expect them longer to trust our charity, or to forego the independence that, with small help and against great opposition, they have at last achieved? But their independence might prove mischievous? Certainly, they are untaught in many things, and, now that they are passing out of tutelage, they will probably learn for themselves in the most expensive school of life,—that of Experience,—and part of the expense will doubtless fall upon us. But what would you have? These things constitute the Nemesis of history, which visits the sins of the fathers—and shortcomings

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that are not sins,—upon long subsequent generations of the children.

It should be noticed, however, that these fears and mistrust of Democracy are fears and mistrusts of *political* Democracy. They are awakened by the prospect of political power passing into hands unfit for it. We may, I think, fairly claim that they are exaggerated,—that the "democracy," when intimately known, proves to be better than it seems when viewed across the gulf of social and educational differences,—that in all men there is a latent capacity (which rarely proves wholly ineffectual) for helpful response to the duties and opportunities of a new situation. We may, I think, fairly urge all this, but it seems even more important to point out that these fears and mistrusts (because fears and mistrusts of "*political*" Democracy), are only in part relevant to "*social*" Democracy, which works, primarily and characteristically, not for political changes, but for "*practical*" reforms, for such reforms in the social and industrial order as will make the helpfulness of national life generally catholic,—without "respect of persons."¹ It is essentially a doctrine of social equity,² for it aims at securing to each individual his just share, not only in the produce of national industry, but also in the higher helpfulness of national life. It would make the Fatherland "truly and indifferently" helpful to all its children. It sometimes, perhaps

¹ See Appendix II. "Conservatism and Social Democracy."

² I say "equity" rather than "equality," because "equity" points to an equality determined by ethical considerations, whereas the bare conception of "equality" has no ethical content, and points to a merely numerical or mathematical equivalence. The one is characteristically conservative and constructive; the other is characteristically revolutionary and destructive.

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usually, concerns itself, first of all, with reforms that, immediately, are only "material," for "material" injustice is the most obvious, and, in its worst forms, so narrows the opportunities of life, and is so destructive to manhood, that until it be removed more generous reform is hardly possible. But Social Democracy, even though at first determined to things material, always points beyond them,—points to a policy directly constructive of the higher manliness, for through such a policy alone can it hope to come valuably near its ideal of the "indifferently" helpful State. Hence, in its completeness, Social Democracy is spiritually creative: it aims at building up every member of the body politic into an equal manhood. Its primary concern is with life and the conditions of life, and it uses the machinery of "political" Democracy only perforce,—when the powers that now have rule and opportunity are obstructive or obstinately unhelpful. Then, destruction—the destruction of privilege that is openly unrighteous,—becomes necessary, and if the destruction pass incidentally upon things valuable as well as, intentionally, upon things unrighteous, we should not lay the heavier blame upon the untrained hands that work the ruin, but rather upon the blindness and selfishness that compelled those hands to be destructive.

Here then is a way—practicable, although arduous,—by which those who, not unrighteously, fear the advent of Democracy may escape from their fears. Change—and democratic change—is now inevitable. It rests with us—with those who have present power and opportunity—to determine its character. Destructive it must necessarily be,—destructive of all forms of unrighteous privilege, whether social, industrial, or political,—but it ought not to be, and it need not be,

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ethically destructive, and if we use aright the days of grace yet remaining to us it will not be. Let us frankly accept the new spirit of our new time, and make our remaining opportunity righteously helpful,—through industrial justice that shall secure to each man his own and no more than his own, and through education, broad, deep, and generously humane, that will not stop until all who bear the English name are equal sharers in a common manhood, and, then, whatever destruction Democracy work, it will be only a destruction of things unrighteous, and will not touch that spiritual inheritance in which and for which our English Patriotism lives. Will not touch it? Indeed, but it will, although not to impair it,—only to enlarge. In the past the sources of our higher life have been few and scattered: who can measure the gain that will come to it when that life is informed and sustained by the awakened manhood of a whole people?

The national ideal, then, is distinctly and essentially an ethical ideal, and our inquiry into its essential characteristics bring us, once more, to the conclusion reached by an another road in the earlier part of this essay,—to the conclusion, that is, that the nation is primarily and essentially an instrument for the furtherance of individual lives. As such, it is governed by the general moral ideal, and its own particular ideal does but reproduce, under the conditions of an instrumental life, the distinctive characteristics of that general ideal in which our thoughts about man and the life of man become consummating and sovereign. Just as there is one ideal for all men, so, also, there is one ideal for all nations. But this universality of the ideal does not imply that all

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individual differences, save numerical differences and those incident to geographical position, are to be abolished, and that all individuals of all nations are to be fashioned into one likeness. Not only is there a general ideal for all men, and a general ideal for all nations, but there is a particular and private ideal for each individual man and for each individual nation. And yet there are not many ideals but one ideal, for each particular ideal does but set forth the one sovereign ideal, subject to the conditions of this or that particular life, be that life individual or national.

Yet, this unity notwithstanding, the plurality is real. There is infinite diversity in human character and capability. No man is precisely like another, even in the unexpressed possibilities of his life. He not only has a distinctive present character and capacity of his own, but the line of his spiritual advance—marked out for him by possibilities that are as yet undeveloped,—is equally distinctive and particular. And it seems probable that these differences are ultimate. Therefore, in that perfect society which we call the Kingdom of God there will be no wearisome and unhelpful monotony of character and life. There as here, differences will still make charity "the bond of perfectness," but whereas *here* differences too often keep apart and hinder, *there* they will but make love tenderer and more beneficent, and an infinitely various manhood, made, throughout the whole range of its variety, complete in love, will be "God's highest praise."

But will the present plurality of national ideals be in like manner permanent? I think not. There will be no nations in the final order of Reality, but only one brotherhood,—one community, in the life and order of which all the ends that the diverse national

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organisations of earth variously and with various range of efficiency subserve will be perfectly attained. All existing national ideals, then,—in so far as they are *only* national—are provisional and transitory, and that is the best, that is the richest in hope and promise for the future of earthly history, which leads men nearest to that ultimate instrumental ideal of brotherhood in which all other instrumental ideals will be made complete.

With all this in mind, then, what shall we say about our present national ideals and their place in the world's history, and, first of all, what shall we say about our English ideal?

But what is our English ideal? We may say, of course, that it is the complete expression of our national character and spirit,—the perfection of all that we at present are imperfectly, the completeness of our better heart and mind, the meaning and dynamic truth of our history,—but all this, in so far as it is true of our English ideal, is true of every national ideal. Moreover, it is true also of every individual ideal, for therein, also, we find the meaning and truth of an experience which forms part of history, the completeness of a present character, and the perfection of that which is as yet but imperfect. When we so speak of a national ideal, we are, in fact, generalising from individual ideals, rather than describing the ideal which is characteristic of the nation as an ethical instrument,—we are thinking of the nation as an assemblage of individuals who are severally ends in and for themselves, rather than as an organism which has no separate end of its own, but which has meaning and, consequently, end only as an instrument shaped and determined by individual ends.

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Yet, it is as *this* and not as *that*,—as an instrumental organism not as a geographical aggregate,—that the nation characteristically exists. Its ideal, therefore, must be an ideal of method,—an ideal way of achieving individual ends.

Now, with this in mind, let us ask again what is our English ideal?—how do we Englishmen, in that community of life which makes us a nation, characteristically essay the adventure of life, and endeavour to do our duty?

The answer, surely, is obvious:—the fundamental characteristic of English life is liberty. We are all “born free.” Not only have we a large measure of what is ordinarily called political freedom, but we have, what is even more important, personal freedom. We are no man’s serfs,—not even the king’s, and even when we become refractory we are exempt from the indignity of Cossack knouts, and the brutality of Cossack licence. The law and custom of our land secure to each of us the essential rights of moral personality, and we hold them as our birthright,—a birthright which no privilege dare challenge, or is strong enough to withhold. We refuse to be in leading-strings, even for our seeming good, or to be disciplined into an obedience that our hearts and minds reject. Even the omnipotence of Parliament stops on the threshold of personality, for the men whom—often unwisely enough—we send to Parliament know that we have rights that even the sovereign power may not invade. Even in our reforms we remain free. We will not surrender ourselves either to philanthropists or to officials: we reject the impatient and despotic benevolence that would seek to impose a virtue by law, rather than to build it up in character, and

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although we, or, at least, some of us, affirm the wise man's estimate of Wisdom—"She is more precious than rubies; and all the things that thou canst desire are not to be compared unto her,"—we are sure that freedom would be too high a price to pay for the sort of wisdom that flourishes in Whitehall, and commends itself to our local Civil Service.

Nor is this the idiosyncrasy of a generation: it is the most prominent characteristic of our national history. Not the sole discoverers of liberty, we have, nevertheless, among the greater peoples of the world, been its best exemplars and most faithful guardians. The great Republic of the West was made by Englishmen, who, even in their rebellion, proved themselves true sons of their free Fatherland. The Celtic peoples who fell before us became sharers in our liberty. Even in Ireland, whatever freedom exists came from England, and from the laws and usages of Englishmen, and the continental peoples—Germans, Austrians, Russians,—who are to-day emerging into freedom, or reaching out towards it, are but coming into an inheritance that we have made secure. France, it is true, has, in the name of Freedom, filled a century of modern history with lurid light, but, long ere France awoke, centuries of usage and achievement had made liberty the daily habit of our lives, and to-day, after all their struggles, Frenchmen know not the personal independence that makes our English freedom a sovereign and formative reality.

It is not yet sixty years ago since "the first free word" was spoken in Vienna, but we of the English name have been always free, and for fifteen hundred years our history has been a record not only of free words, but of free deeds.

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We were free when our keels first furrowed the North Sea, and the freedom we brought with us we established and made secure by law, and by custom having the force of law, in our first homes in the conquered British lands. Viking settlements and Norman conquest, however destructive of our earlier polity, brought new populations of freemen on to English lands, and the men thus made unkindly neighbours by war became, at last, fraternal by peace, and slowly there emerged a new English people, who, by centuries of endeavour and achievement, albeit not unmarked by failure and relapse, have built up the greatest tradition of freedom that the world has known. With us, freedom is not only a political form, but an individual reality. It is not only the foundation of our institutions; it is the very breath of our English life, the groundwork of our English character. Our political freedom is a great inheritance, but greater than any rights exercised through Parliament are those personal rights which are the safeguards of individual manhood, and which make each Englishman, whether enfranchised or unenfranchised, emphatically a *free man*. It is true that our freedom is not yet complete, for freedom becomes complete only as manhood becomes perfect and complete, and in none of us has the spirit that is the man yet reached the final stature and proportion of its growth. The superstitions of ignorance and half-enlightenment still exercise a wide sovereignty, untoward circumstance imprisons many within narrow ways wherein there is no room for a man to live a life that is truly a man's, and most of us know more or less of bondage to that lower self whose service is *never* freedom. Something, however, of genuine freedom,

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—something of established right, that in certain valuable ways makes the individual personality inviolable,—the centuries have in fact brought to each one of us, and for what we have not yet attained we face the future hopefully. Education, and better conditions of life and work, will do much, and were our political life as healthily and helpfully humane as it ought to be, much also of forming and informing discipline we might hope for from its free interchange of opinion, its free co-operation, its free exercises of judgment, charity, and patriotism.

Even in this present day of misfortune, when the Government is strong only in the diminishing number of its Parliamentary supporters—many of them more than half-reluctant—and the Opposition is contemptible, our free political life is not unserviceable to the nation's manhood. Because of the comparative insignificance of the Ministry and of Parliament, a greater responsibility has been thrown upon the people, and they, long exercised in the use of freedom, have amply proved themselves worthy of their freedom. The South African War, through the questions arising out of it, and the demands it has made upon the nation's manhood, not only in the field but also at home, has brought to large numbers a liberal discipline in civic virtue,—in statesmanship and the higher Patriotism. It has awakened new thoughts, new hopes, and a new loyalty, and through these the manhood of the Empire has been broadened and strengthened, informed with the spirit and the purpose of a fuller life, and ennobled, here and there, by the consciousness of a higher vocation. Even the Education controversy, despite its discrediting incidents, has not been without positive results of humane value.

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Like the South African War, it has thrown men back towards first principles, and *that*, whatever the occasion of it, is always in itself good, for first principles belong to the domain of ethics, and they lift controversy above the mischievous level of merely partisan dispute, and bring into it the vitalising energy of a moral purpose. Like the South African War, too, this more recent controversy has deepened and widened popular interest in public affairs, and this, too, is, in itself, entirely good, for it is through interest that free institutions become serviceable to manhood.

It is sometimes broadly asserted that free institutions do not make for good government. Perhaps they do not, but, on the other hand, free institutions do not exist solely, or even primarily, for that end. We believe that they indispensably subserve the ends of government, but we do not defend them only or chiefly because they are in this way serviceable. We believe in them because of their educational value,—because political freedom is one of the most helpful disciplines of national character, more especially in a country like our own, where political questions are so various and far-reaching. Our English franchise opens up a wide range of broadening and strengthening, of forming and informing interests and sympathies to which, without it, most of us would be strangers. Even were we not enfranchised, some few of us might, it is true, be more or less intelligently interested in public affairs, and this interest would not be without value as a discipline of heart and mind, but it would not and could not give us that most effectual discipline which comes only through the opportunities of freedom,—through the sympathies, the activities, the responsibilities of a generously free citizenship.

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We defend free institutions, therefore, because they give an indispensable discipline to the nation's manhood,—because, through widened interests and sympathies, and the responsible, free activities of enfranchised citizenship, they develop and inform character in ways that make them invaluable instruments of Life's higher humanism.

Free institutions do not make for good government? But what do we mean by good government? If we define it by its end, we must surely say that its ultimate end is the making of good citizens,—that is, of genuinely good and serviceable men, of men complete in manhood and in truth of character. Immediately, we know, it seeks the good estate of the visible polity wherein it is exercised, but this "good estate," in so far as it is not directly definable in terms of character, has reasonable value only as helpful to character, and, even if we ignore this ethical reference, and regard the end which is thus mediately ethical as wholly "practical," we are compelled to say that, even as merely "practical," that end is most hopefully essayed by serviceable manhood, and that, even in "practical" affairs, prosperity depends upon character.

Only a character disciplined by freedom can save a nation from unhelpful bondage to that favourite superstition of governments—"Law and Order," for such a character is a law unto itself, and neither needs nor will tolerate police leading-strings. We hear much about the beneficence of paternal sovereignty, and, sometimes, in moments of reaction from the incompetence of men unfit to be the leaders of a free people, we listen not unwillingly, but the sovereignties we know in history are masterful, rather than paternal,—using their peoples as tools, rather than caring for

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them as for children who will one day become men,—and even when the accidents of policy, or some touch of sounder feeling, makes one or other of them, in effect, truly paternal, this occasional beneficence is usually of short duration and restricted range. We may go further, and say that it is only by a degradation and perversion of the idea of fatherhood that it becomes possible to contrast paternal sovereignty with free institutions. Fatherhood, as an ethical conception, is so far from being inconsistent with freedom, that it has freedom for its term. It exists that through it children may become truly men,—men in character, as well as in years,—that through it they may be prepared for the responsibilities and relative independence of adult life. We rightly think of it as implying control, but its control is provisional and instrumental, and comes to an end in the freedom of the young life which it has trained for freedom. Thenceforward there is no direction, but only reciprocated and reciprocating love. In olden days fatherhood found predominant expression in mastery: now we know that it exists for the loftier lordship of service, and, according to the measure of our courage and our wisdom, according also to the measure of our love, this knowledge governs our conduct. We are trustees for the world's future, and, as such, our end is not our own advantage, but the well-being of the coming time. We train our children, indeed, for service, but for service to their own day and generation, not to us, and, in order that this service may be broadly effectual, we train them for freedom, because only through freedom can the serviceableness of manhood become complete. It is this subordination to an ideal of freedom that gives to fatherhood its distinctive ethical character, and yet

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it is precisely this that those overlook who find in paternal monarchy the type of the most helpful sovereignty. To them paternal monarchy means a permanent autocracy, but this is precisely what fatherly rule, if it be true to the ideal of fatherhood, can never be. Autocracy—that is, permanent autocracy,—can be called paternal only if we ignore the ethical gains of more than two thousand years of human history, and revert to the thought of that happily far-off time when the *paterfamilias* was merely the master of a tributary and half-servile household.

Only, then, by depraving the ideal of fatherhood can a permanently autocratic sovereignty—however benevolent in intention and beneficent in act,—be called paternal. We may, indeed, be tempted to carry the argument further, and to deny that kingship can ever rightfully claim to be paternal. It seems an easy thing to say that fatherhood, as we primarily know it, depends essentially, for its ethical character, upon relations that subsist within the family, and that these relations, because characteristic of the family, are never found, in the larger organism of the State, between a nation and its sovereign. It is easy to say this, and there is this measure of truth in it,—that fatherhood, as an ethical relation, is historically a result of family life, and, it may be, without the daily discipline of that life, fatherhood would not exist. But this does not carry us beyond the thought that the family is the school of fatherhood: it does not warrant the conclusion that the especial determination of purpose and endeavour which constitutes the distinctive note of ethical fatherhood can exist only within the family. How shall we describe that characteristic determination? May we not say that it results from the

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thought of responsibility for the training of another life,—from this thought as interpreted by Love. Now, love, although it is the soul's response to the gift of life, is never self-regarding, and never works for selfish ends. Potential in human nature from the beginning, it is called into activity by the beneficence of circumstance, and is itself always a reciprocal beneficence, which seeketh not its own but the good of its object. Wherever selfish purpose or selfish hope is present, love is absent, for love cannot live with selfishness. Its characteristic activity is always and essentially altruistic service. It comes to human hearts, as their consummating benediction, "not to be ministered unto but to minister," and to give itself to others, without thought of recompense, that they too may know life's higher blessedness.

Therefore, when paternal love interprets paternal duty it finds the term of that duty, not in the father's gain, but in the child's. Parentage, merely as such, does not imply fatherhood,—or, at least, not the ethical fatherhood of which we are now speaking. *That* comes into being only when the parent becomes provider, protector, educator, and it approaches the full reality of its being only as, by the inspiration of love, his care for the life he has begotten becomes quite unselfish. This unselfish care is the characteristic note of true fatherhood, for by it, and by it alone, fatherhood can truly do its true work,—can train into serviceable manhood the young life that will one day pass out of tutelage, though not out of discipline, and take its own independent place in the world's work. This training of another life for that other life's individual purposes is the distinctive work of all fatherhood that deserves its name, and it is in this

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work that the essential nature of fatherhood becomes characteristically expressed. Thus, ethical fatherhood is distinct from merely natural paternity. It arises, it is true, out of the parental relation which is fully constituted by the merely "natural" fact of begetting, but this fact, although the ground of fatherhood as we primarily know it, does not seem to be an indispensable preliminary to the exercise of that nurturing love which constitutes paternal care. There have, for instance, been stepfathers, and fathers by adoption, who, in all that makes fatherhood an intelligent beneficence, have in no way fallen short of the best examples of their time. In these cases, then, we have a morally effective fatherhood existing independently of "natural" parentage. The condition preliminary to it is not the "natural" fact of begetting, but those other facts,—also, in and by themselves, "natural"—which have placed one life under tutelage to another, and wherever we have this relation, or one essentially akin to it, there, also, it would seem, we may have the true spirit of true fatherhood.

For this reason we rightly call our bishops "Fathers in God," for to them pre-eminently pertains the care of souls. There are those who think of them as characteristically agents and transmitters of sacramental grace, and others who regard them, in this realm of England at least, as primarily officers of the State, and both appeal to history,—variously interpreting it, and misinterpreting it,—but to every bishop of our Church, on the day of his consecration, there comes the solemn charge to "feed the flock of God" committed to his care, and this charge, although it does not exhaustively define his office, conclusively indicates its essential character. By this Petrine

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commission and charge he becomes primarily a shepherd of souls, and thenceforth it is his first duty to edify the Church of God, and more especially the several households of faith which constitute the sphere of his immediate work. His office is, in the first place, pastoral, and, whatever powers are inherent in it, or are attached to it by the law or usage of Church or State, are, in idea at least, auxiliary to his care of souls. Is he a minister of sacramental grace? That grace is given to build up men into righteousness and true holiness of life. Is he an interpreter and enforcer of laws? Those laws, whether ecclesiastical or civil, are framed for the good estate of the catholic Church, although, it may be, legislators have sometimes sadly misconceived that good estate, and have worked mischief where they intended good. Nor is this all,—not only are his powers, in aim, if not always in effect, ancillary to his pastorate, but, in the exercise of them, he is, or should be, governed by the sovereign claims of his pastoral work, so that he can never, without unfaithfulness, suffer mischievous legislation to constrain him to an obedience harmful to his flock.

Now, this shepherding of souls—this care of the churches,—is essentially paternal. As a spiritual activity, it is not only comparable with, but generically identical with, that parental beneficence which gives us both the idea and the ideal of fatherhood.

It is true that in the family the objects of paternal care are children, whereas a bishop is immediately a shepherd of adult souls,¹ but his distinctive work as

¹ He is, of course, also a shepherd of Christ's little ones, but, usually and normally, his care for these is mediated through the parental care which he guides and informs.

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bishop is to care for these, as a father for his children, that he may build them up into the completeness of the Christian life,—into the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ. Because he is thus charged with the care of other lives,—with care, not for their outward estate, but for their essential well-being, his office is characteristically paternal, and he is rightly called, in things sacred, the father of his people.

As with bishops, so with kings. To them also pertains a care of souls that makes their office genuinely paternal. In a country like Russia, where the Government, although autocratic, is yet, by the confessed obligation of the ruler to seek his people's good, widely different, in its essential character, from the unconditioned despotisms of the unreformed East,—in a country like Russia the personal initiative of the sovereign is so obvious, or at least is so constant, so near, and so natural a possibility, that the thought of paternal kingship suggests no constitutional difficulties. In a country like our own, however,—where the substance of legislative power no longer remains with the Crown, and where, by well-established custom, such influence upon administration and legislation as the Crown might still constitutionally exercise is not exercised,—the individuality of the sovereign is so little apparent in the conduct of public affairs that not even the most old-fashioned loyalty any longer speaks of the king as *pater patriæ*. It does not follow from this that loyalty has grown weaker, but, certainly, the informing spirit of it has changed. The Crown remains the centre of authority, but the powers of the Crown are largely exercised by ministers whose practical responsibility is not essentially misinterpreted when it is described as responsibility to

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the nation rather than to the sovereign. Therefore, in countries like our own, the old conception of paternal kingship has passed into the limbo of forgotten ideals. Were it again advocated, a myriad voices would declare it unconstitutional. But the popular imagination is not content to confine itself within the prosaic limits of this uninspiring conclusion. To it, the light of an older day still lingers round the throne, and it still invests the Crown with vague prerogatives of beneficent intervention that escape the definitions of our text-books.

It may well be that the unspoiled imagination of the illiterate, when moved to ingenuous activity in these high matters, sometimes yields results which the severely academic mind would find hard to vindicate as constitutional, but even the most austere thinker among us must admit that the straitest constitutional restrictions still leave open to a constitutional sovereign a wide range of personal influence within which, if so minded, he may do much to justify the attributions of popular thought. For example, consider the position of our own king. Over wide ranges of social life what influence is comparable with his, and whose influence could be made more powerfully beneficent? We, who are kept, by the pressure of circumstances that we sometimes deem unfortunate, in close touch with life's sterner and more urgent realities, are now and again tempted to think lightly, and perhaps scornfully, of the ceremonial of a Court, and to attach small importance to the social primacy of the Crown. But that primacy is not merely nominal: it is largely regulative, and its influence upon national life, and, therefore, upon national character, reaches far beyond Court circles, and touches more than the conventions

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of fashionable propriety. For better or for worse, the social influence of the Crown reaches the nation's heart, and can either degrade it or ennoble it,—can either waste its strength by the rodent canker of empty frivolity, or quicken it to higher purpose and worthier endeavour. An ordinary citizen may find an unrighteous excuse for his licence in the obscurity of his station, but a king's actions cannot be hidden. Observed by all men, his lightest word is weighty, his slightest action powerful, and this conspicuous pre-eminence entails a responsibility of which he cannot for a moment divest himself, before either God or man. Even the amusements and occupations of his private leisure are of national importance, for the rumour of them flies quickly abroad, and, for good or for evil, the nation's life is moulded by the reported example of the king.

In itself, this responsibility of the king is but a particular instance of that general responsibility for the use of influence which is a necessary result of the moral nature of man and of the social character of human life as we historically know it. No human lives are entirely private. The most remote and the most obscure have some human environment or associations in and through which they are, or may become, exemplary, and for the intrinsic character of his example, although not always for its actual results, each man, by the very constitution of his nature, is inevitably responsible.

Now, most of us are so inconspicuous and so little noticed that our conduct is operative as an example only within a comparatively narrow range, but the king is so highly placed, and so generally observed, that the influence of his example reaches far and wide,—even beyond the limits of his kingdom. Like

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a "city set upon a hill" he cannot be hid. Consequently, his responsibility is all the greater.

Moreover, the very nature of the king's office creates for him a duty which is not attached to any private station.

We radically misconceive the nature of kingship if we think of the sovereign as merely the titular head of the State, and the depository of certain political and administrative powers. In a long-established monarchy like our own, constitutional usages do but regulate, they do not otherwise define, the powers of the Crown, and its duties, as such, they leave untouched. Our king is more than a guided pen,—he is crowned and anointed for higher purposes than merely to give or to withhold his signature according to a minister's advice. Placed by his office above the distractions and temptations of party conflict, he should be vigilant for his people in all things pertaining to their safety and to their health. His lightest word is weighty, and, now and again, in the secret councils of the nation, his voice should be heard—if not in command, at least in suggestion and warning. His least wish passes as imperative, and now and again, when ministers blunder or are negligent, his mind should be declared,—not lightly or capriciously, but magnanimously, and with serious purpose,—not merely to support or thwart a party policy, but to save a people. We have already seen, and gladly seen, the beneficence of kingly tact and kingly judgment in foreign affairs; we ask now that the same broad intelligence be made similarly helpful at home. We do not ask the king to step beyond the safe limits of constitutional usage, but we ask that, within those limits, his will may co-operate with ours

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in setting our house in order. Assured of a people's support, he can do easily and at once what we, the plain folk of the empire, cannot do, or can do only with difficulty and delay. Therefore, in this present tyranny of incompetence, let the king act, and, if ratification be necessary, we will ratify his acts. We need efficient administration, and throughout the services the king's word travels rapidly and with power. Therefore, let the king speak.¹

Now, the influence thus possessed by the king does not exist primarily for his own private advantage, or that he may impose his individual will, as an individual will, upon the nation's life. That influence is a part of the sovereign power of the nation, which resides plenarily and ultimately in the nation itself, and of which the king is an instrument,—made such by our choice and by that grace of God which is always beneficent with the obligations of duty. But, if the kingly office be an organ of the body politic, and the kingly power and influence expressions of that common life which makes the nation a living whole, the action of the Crown cannot rightly be arbitrary, for it is subordinate to that informing moral ideal which, by its sovereignty in the body politic, makes the nation an ethical organism. As the nation exists for the benefit of its individual citizens,—for the furtherance of their several individual lives,—so also does the king. But herein, as we have already seen, we have the essence of fatherhood, which consists precisely in this bounden

¹ I have spoken only of home and foreign affairs, but it seems probable that the growth of our great self-governing colonies into national and imperial self-consciousness will give new opportunities for the beneficent intervention of the Crown in the shaping of the higher policy of the Empire.

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care for the lives of others. Therefore, the kingly office, even as conditioned by the law and custom of our own free constitution, is essentially paternal:¹ much more obviously is it such in countries where the sovereign has a larger initiative. But in this paternal power, when truly conceived and rightly exercised, there is no antithesis to freedom, for it exists only "to subserve the ends of freedom,—exists in order that, by its helpfulness, men may grow into a larger liberty and a completer manhood." When used otherwise, it is without authority, and cannot rightfully command allegiance.

In a sense, then, the king may rightly be called *pater patriæ*,—the father of the fatherland,—but not in any sense that can make "personal government" a helpful alternative for a free people. Here, in England, we are—at least for the moment, while the Report of the War Commission is yet a recent memory,—painfully aware of the shortcomings and weaknesses of our political and administrative order, but we are persuaded that the remedy is to be found, not in *less* freedom, but in *more* freedom. We, the plain citizens of England, must make ourselves effectively masters in our own house, and must

¹ We reach a similar result if we say that kingly influence is only an individual influence exercised according to the distinctive opportunities of the kingly office, for that influence is an influence upon human lives, and can be rightful only when instrumental to Charity. Ultimately all human relationships—even industrial relationships—are or should be relationships of reciprocal service, wherein each edifies the other in love. Wherever the opportunities of station or office give influence or authority over other lives, that influence or authority is essentially paternal. As a spiritual activity it is governed by the ideal of service, and it exists to subserve the ends of freedom,—exists in order that, by its helpfulness, men may grow into a larger liberty and a completer manhood.

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sweep away all the impertinence of secret and half-avowed privilege that now protects the incompetent in their misdoing, and opens up to them short and easy ways to high office in the State and to decorative, and sometimes decorated, uselessness in the public service. We know all that unfriendly critics can tell us about the incidental faults and weaknesses of representative government. We are familiar with the demagogue and charlatan, and with the enterprising lawyer, whose seat in Parliament is part of his professional capital: we know that party government too often makes partisans rather than patriots, that the ballot-box is an uncertain discoverer of truth, and that the crude polemic of the hustings does not invite the country's best intelligence to the country's service. Yes, we know all this, but we know, too, how the discipline of Freedom, rude though its instruments be, and unlovely its more obvious methods, has built up our English character into the serviceable strength of an independent manliness that rival polities cannot equal. We are not blind to the defects of our body politic, but these arise, not from our freedom, but from the incompleteness of our freedom,—in no small degree from the privileges and superstitions of caste which the accidents of our political and social order still make powerful,—and, once more, the remedy is to be found not in less freedom, but in more. We cannot emulate the systematic completeness, the mechanical perfection that is always possible where one strong intelligence controls the life of a silently subservient people, and we have no wish to emulate it. We know that, to the doctrinaires of Authority, the freely progressive life of a free people always appears unordered, and only clumsily serviceable for the practical ends of policy,

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but we know also,—what they do not know,—by what spirit that seeming chaos is informed, and how the seeming disorder of a free estate is elaborative of a nation's greatest strength,—elaborative of a self-reliant and public-spirited manhood. Through a transient incompleteness of Freedom we may lose, or seem to lose, some measure of present efficiency:—we can remedy that by the instruments Freedom has shaped for us, and out of the resources of manhood that Freedom has made ready to our hand, and, meanwhile, in all that makes a people's life organic to life's highest end,—in all that makes Patriotism an ennobling devotion,—our balance of gain is incalculably great.

I have spoken of national ideals, but, indeed, there is only one national ideal,—only one form in and through which the ends for which a nation exists can be attained. That ideal is the ideal of a free citizenship—of free men in a free state—which history has wrought out in the world-wide brotherhood of the English peoples. *That* is the unique ideal of national life. Strictly speaking, it has no competitor. There are, indeed, polities which do not recognise it, but in those polities, the same spiritual forces are operative that have shaped our English history to the ends of Freedom, and, in the fulness of time, those forces will shape those polities also to the same sovereign ends. All men, everywhere, have a common human nature, or, in other words, their several and separate individual natures are generically identical,—dynamic, with similar energies, towards one goal, and that goal is precisely our English goal of a free manhood in a free State. This does not mean that they will all become Englishmen, but it does mean that one day, within whatever

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forms of polity they now live, they will consciously reach out towards that generously humane ideal, which, notwithstanding our many shortcomings, is now characteristically our own, and in that endeavour they will become, not Englishmen, but more completely themselves, according to the variant forms of manhood they severally, in their diverse national characteristics, set forth. John Bull may, in truth, be the entirely estimable person we, of course, believe him to be, but, at the best, he is only *primus inter pares*. He does not exhaust the healthy possibilities of human nature. Each considerable nation—the United States, France, Germany, Russia, China, Japan,—has its own distinctive type of manhood, and by each of these types something permanently valuable will be fashioned for and transmitted to the consummating future of our race.

No doubt many differences of national character and temperament can be referred to differences in political history and, as the several polities of the world pass under the common government of Freedom, these differences will gradually disappear. Free men have certain common characteristics all the world over. But we cannot usefully attempt to explain all the differences between national types in this way. There are, at least, certain aptitudes and predispositions of temperament which must probably be regarded as genuine varietal forms of the one nature that is common to us all, and, through the discipline and invitations of freedom, these forms will develop, each towards its own completeness, along diverse lines, and, ultimately, each will contribute its own distinctive qualities and powers of manhood to the consummating harmony of the final brotherhood.

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No polity can be called free in which these ultimate differences of type have not full opportunity for development,—for self-realisation,—each in its own distinctive way. Now, it is in our own Empire that this ideal of a free polity is most nearly approached. Our double tradition of individual freedom and of a broadly representative form of government gives to us, and to our descendants in the United States, an unique position among the great peoples of the world. Other nations have what are spoken of as free constitutions, but they are constitutions dominated by what we may perhaps call the classical tradition of the primacy of the State,—of the State as an entity separable, not only in thought, but also in practical policy, from the individuals constituting it,—and in these nations the government is armed with powers over the individual citizen which are in striking contrast with the northern tradition of personal freedom upon which the polities of the English-speaking people are characteristically founded.

We are, it is true, far from having developed this double tradition into the completeness of freedom,—more especially have we yet much to learn from it in our government of the peoples that are called "subject-peoples," but it is something that we have this tradition, and reverence it as primary. It is this that gives us our sovereign vocation as an imperial people, and that gives to our imperial polity an unique position in world-history, for within that polity the world's noblest and most helpful secular tradition and ideal finds its kinliest home and widest opportunity. We are the trustees of the world's consummating hope, and of that hope the outward fabric of our Empire is at once the fortress and the shrine.

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This, then, is our English Imperialism,—not a political ambition, and not commercial lust, but a spiritual mission, and a spiritual aspiration,—the noblest chivalry and the noblest philanthropy that the world's secular history has brought forth.¹

¹ See Appendix III., "The Government of Subject Races."

CHAPTER VII

THE EXPANSION OF PATRIOTISM

OUR English ideal, then, is characteristically an ideal of individual freedom. It sets before us individual life as, in itself, and not merely as contributory to the State, uniquely valuable, and it points to *this*—to individual life in its concrete reality, and not to the State in its abstract separateness,—as the sovereign end in history. It affirms, or implies, the right of each individual to live out his own life to its completeness, according to the full measure of the manhood that is his. It is, thus, but another expression of the principle of individual autonomy,—a form of that general ideal of self-realisation in which, as we have already seen, those facts of human nature which are the true dynamic ultimates, alike in individual life and in universal history, come to their rightful supremacy.

But this ideal of individual freedom, as we English folk have received it, is an ideal regulative, not only of the private endeavour of individual lives, but also of national policy and polity. It is our characteristic English ideal, not simply because we English men and women individually find in it that which satisfies the reason and lawfully commands the conscience, but also because we have made it sovereign in our national and imperial life. It is regulative not only of individual English lives, but of the complex development and widely various activities of our English World-State.

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In this way the ethical conception of self-realisation, which is primarily interpretative of individual life, becomes similarly significant for our national history.

Now, the political authority thus given to the conception illustrates and emphasises two truths of primary importance:—

(1) that, ideally at least, our English State exists for the sake of English manhood, and

(2) that the ideal of freedom is an ideal to be realised, not in some imagined separateness of individual life, but in corporate development and endeavour.

The ideal of individual freedom, of individual self-realisation, does not imply "atomistic individualism"—what some wrongly call "Anarchy"—either in ethics or in politics, for, as we have already seen, the nature which that ideal interprets and commands is essentially a social nature,—one that can attain completeness only in and through social life. Sympathy and co-operation have been in the past what, happily, we know them to be with increasing power in the present,—two of the most effective agents in the development of character and manhood, and we cannot set any term to their beneficent work short of a recognised and catholic brotherhood, from whose charity no human need will be excluded, and to whose charity every human power will become contributory,—not grudgingly nor incompletely, but magnanimously, and according to the full measure of its possibility.

Sympathy and co-operation, however, not only elaborate and build up individual manhood: they are also widely constitutive of the world's outward order, and, doubtless, for that universal brotherhood to which they point, they will, one day and somewhere, make

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ready the kindly shelter and necessary helpfulness of a universal polity.

Are we therefore to say that patriotism should pass into cosmopolitanism? Assuredly not, unless we give to cosmopolitanism a new meaning, for at present it stands, not for the completeness of patriotism, but for its negation.

The cosmopolitan is not distinguished from the patriot by the possession of a wider Fatherland, for he has no Fatherland. He claims to be a citizen of the world, but the pretentious words denote only a negative,—only that he has no part in the inheritance of his own people, and no share in their loyalty. They do not mean that, by a life more widely and richly communicant at the altar of History, he is made heir to a greater past, and ennobled by a worthier allegiance. Separate by his own act from the heritage of his people, he is separate also from their vocation and their endeavour, and, while they, along the crowded ways of Life's daily work, are building up manhood into some new effectiveness of strength, some new beneficence of charity, and are fashioning a kindlier polity for the future, he is doing—what? Probably, only amusing himself!

There are, of course, interests and helps in life which are not provincial. Science, Philosophy and Art are catholic disciplines,—beneficent, either in potency or in act, across all political and racial frontiers. Greece, for instance, has given to the world a lasting heritage of thought into which all nations may enter, and for two thousand years, wherever Greek letters have gone, Greek thought has been nobly invigorative. But that creative and illuminating thought was not, in its first beginnings,

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the child of solitude, nor does it now bring forth its richest harvests in seclusion. It sprang out of the varied interests and quick activities of bygone Greece, and it lives to-day most helpfully with the most abundant yield and promise of good,—where most in contact with our busiest life. Coming down along a secluded tradition of the denationalised, it were a feeble streamlet,—nourishing only a pallid and unprofitable vintage,—but, current along the broad channels of a nation's life, it were an abounding beneficence, filling every field of civic husbandry with a richness perennially renewed.

It is, then, a vain and mischievous thing to seek the treasures of humane culture along some private road,—remote from the enlightening needs and quickening opportunities of our common life. Its rarest treasures are in frequented places, and they are to be found only by the soul which, in the familiar charities of our common life, has known the sanctities of sympathy and service.

There are some who take another way into cosmopolitanism. These are, distinctively and professedly, moralists rather than humanists. Indeed, though they are often loudly missionary of cheap half-truths, most of them are entirely free from both the affectations and the realities of culture: they have preserved their intellectual spontaneity, untrammelled and unchecked by any of the disciplines of Thought. Distinctively, men of the modern world, they do not permit the past to burden them, either with its problems or its achievements. They are philanthropically engrossed with the needs and opportunities of the Present, and, except for an occasional flight of fancy to the Reformation, they rarely venture into a Past remoter than those initial events of our modern *Aufklärung*—the Repeal of the Corn Laws

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and Mr. Gladstone's first Administration—unless, indeed, they wish to make some new discovery in Archæology the journalistic "sensation" of the hour. Not only does this intellectual detachment save their thought from the burden of knowledge, and from the unkindly discipline of informed criticism, but, because of it, they find refreshing novelty in familiar problems, and brilliant performance in unhelpful crudities. They are, fortunately, not numerous,—although sometimes, through the opportunities and temptations of popular journalism, they come into misleading prominence,—but they are very much in earnest, as becomes men who consistently claim to speak for the progressive conscience of the age, and, with small opportunity, they become abundantly zealous for anti-national good works. They are, perhaps, not unpatriotic, but patriotism wins their sincere approval only when it effervesces in moral platitudes,—when it becomes genuine and practical they call it a superstition. At least, that is their judgment upon English patriotism: towards foreign patriotism, it may be, they exercise a wider charity.

These enthusiasts tell us—

(1) that, when the policy of England becomes immoral, every right-thinking Englishman—every Englishman who values his country's good name—is bound to do his utmost to counteract it; and

(2) that brotherhood—universal brotherhood—is a higher conception than patriotism.

1. "When the policy of England becomes immoral"—but is the policy of England ever immoral? Incidentally, her ministers have often been disgraced by feebleness and ignorance, and these are, undoubtedly, mischievous forms of immorality, but they are forms that inhere directly in individuals, and not in policy,

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and they do not *necessarily* make the policy that issues from them immoral. When we speak of a policy as immoral we are passing judgment, immediately, upon the policy itself,—not upon the ministers responsible for it, but upon the end they propose, or upon the means they employ, or upon both. Now, can we, with this directness of meaning, ever truly say that English policy is immoral? It is, of course, not infrequently *mistaken*—our ministers have no small aptitude for failure—but does it ever deserve to be pilloried before the peoples and Governments of the world—before Russia, Germany, and France,—as *immoral*? The charge of immorality is often brought against it by our domestic censors, but how is that charge supported? We know full well how it was once supported. By violent abstractions and exaggerations, by a fanaticism greedy of serviceable slander, by the pretentious puerilities of a half enlightenment that can see in our territorial expansion only brigandage, and in annexation only theft.

Our argument does not, however, require us to insist that this familiar case is typical, nor even, in any given case, to rebut the charge of immorality, because, to the first proposition of those who, in the name of a higher righteousness, proclaim the occasional sinfulness of patriotism, our answer, subject only to a reservation that can hardly be thought of as practical, is simply this:—that no moral error in policy can so entirely set a man free from his duty to his Fatherland as to leave him at liberty to side with his country's enemies.¹

¹ It is, of course, possible to draw a distinction between deliberate alliance with a foe, and such incidental association as would arise from mere identity or similarity of present endeavour. Neither form of treason is permissible.

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Patriotism arises out of participation in a common life,—out of membership in one body. It is the natural response of the soul to the life that it receives through the human fellowship to which it historically belongs. Its nature, as we have seen, determines its duties. As it springs out of life received, so, also, it lives, not in a sterile sentiment, but in a reciprocal gift of life. Just as the patriot is informed for good by the common life in which he shares, so that common life has to be built up into new strength and more availing charity by his own responsive devotion,—by the purposeful dedication of manhood and possessions to the commonweal. Does he find unrighteousness in the commonwealth? He becomes a missionary of reform, but in reforming he seeks to edify, not to destroy,—to strengthen, not to weaken. Do his fellow-citizens set before themselves some foreign adventure which his conscience disapproves, or do they, in their endeavour after some rightful end, make use of means that he thinks wrong? It is his "bounden duty and service" to do what he can to bring them to a better mind, but it can never be his duty to destroy or injure the house wherein he and they alike live, and alike find shelter and more than shelter. The stronger his dissent, the stronger should be his passion for reform, but it should never cease to be fraternal. It may be that his words fall on deaf ears,—but in that he will find occasion, not for enmity, but for patience, and for faith, and for a more abounding charity. He will not fill the world with loud advertisement of his country's fault, nor ally himself with those who find their gain in his country's loss, and, least of all, will he employ the strange persuasive of calumnious clamour. Whether he succeed or fail,

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his first duty is to his own country, and that duty is sovereign. Its authority ceases only if the common civic life in which he shares bring to him no form of human good,—nothing that makes his life better worth the living,—and if there be no tie of sympathy or pity linking his heart to the people who, by the Providence of God, are nearest him. Let us imagine the worst. Suppose him to belong to an entirely corrupt State,—to a State whose past is a nightmare, whose present a pestilence. Has he no pity for the men and women visibly perishing around him, or for the children born into infamy? Has he no thought for the future? Assuredly he has, and pity and hope will make him the pioneer of a new way, along which, it may be, coming generations will find an ennobling home.

2. But we are told that brotherhood—universal brotherhood, is a higher conception than patriotism.

Now it is, of course, true that the moral ideal for the individual is an ideal of a brotherliness so perfect that none are excluded from the helpfulness of its charity, and that human history will one day be consummated in a catholic brotherhood. It is, however, also true that patriotism is an expression of brotherliness, and the nation at least an incipient form of brotherhood, and that patriotism is inconsistent with a larger brotherliness only when we make it deny its own nature, by setting limits to the charity out of which it grows. Patriotism is not an isolated virtue,—unconnected with the other human affections. The charity that lives in them, lives also in it. Like them, it arises out of the known and felt beneficence of our common life. Like them, it grows out of the helpfulness of man to man, and is itself a responding helpfulness. The ties that bind a patriot to his country are, in their

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essential nature, identical with those that, in the other human affections, knit life to life in sympathy and service, and they are all forms of that consummating charity which is "the bond of perfectness." Patriotism is charity determined by the facts of national life: those facts give it wide and helpful opportunities, and prepare for it adjusted instruments, but they do not set limits to it. If our charity be not, in fact, wider than our patriotism, this limitation of it comes, not from our patriotism, but from the hardness or isolation of hearts that have no affections outside the Fatherland,—of hearts that confess or have no fellowship in sympathy, in pity, or in help, with any of the forms of human strength and grace nurtured under foreign skies, or with the human need there appellent.

"Charity begins at home," but only because *there* a closer intimacy, through helpfulness and need, first evokes it. It begins at home, but it does not end there, for, as the growing intercourse of the peoples, in things material and in things spiritual, joins them together in new intimacies of co-operative, ministrant, and dependent life, the charity of men becomes broader, and its catholic mission more effectual. It passes out beyond the home, and beyond the Fatherland, across political differences and geographical distances,—creating a community wider than that of any existing polity,—and, wherever it goes, it plants the seeds of brotherhood. Nor does it plant them in vain, for the fields of History are kindly and the forces of History subservient, and, in the fulness of the days, there will be a world-wide harvest. Then, patriotism will not be set aside, but it will be consummated, for, in a universal polity, men everywhere will find their common Fatherland, and, in a perfect brotherliness, the charity that now makes

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them patriots will become complete. In this way,—through new discoveries of mutual helpfulness, and new awakenings of pity,—the growing intercourse of the peoples is knitting men together in a broadening fraternity which is already wider than any national patriotism.

This extra-national brotherliness, however, is not, in itself, inconsistent with patriotism, for it is but another form of the charity which gives to each individual nation that distinctive common life out of which patriotism springs, and it is preparing the way for the final patriotism of that perfect brotherhood wherein the peoples, now separate and often hostile, will find completeness of life in the perfect peace of perfect helpfulness.

The question may, however, be asked: "Are we, then, to stand aside and permit a policy that is morally wrong to be followed to its conclusion?" By no means. The nation should, if possible, be brought to a better mind, and, if the advocacy of a more excellent way prove successful, the wrong policy will be abandoned,—if abandonment be possible. If the wrong lay in the end sought, that end will, *if possible*, be set aside; if it lay in the means used those means will, *if possible*, no longer be employed. But it must be remembered that, in practical affairs, we cannot, either conveniently or rightly, act as we are at liberty to do in academic discussion. We cannot change sides and purposes according to the balance of an argument addressed to an isolated issue. It may, for instance, be a perfectly true conclusion that, in given circumstances and for given ends, the country ought not to go to war. But if war be commenced, the supposed validity of this

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earlier conclusion does not necessarily make the counter-policy of "Stop the War!" either politic or righteous. As moralists, no less than as politicians, we determine our judgment not according to the issue of a past controversy, but according to present circumstances. Alike for the moralist and for the politician, a situation is transformed by war. Not only do new dangers arise, but, it may be, new ambitions are created, or unsuspected ambitions made manifest. The outbreak of war makes inquiry into the initial righteousness of the war entirely academic, and denunciation of it a noisy irrelevance. Before war commenced, the conclusion "In these circumstances, or for this end, the nation ought not to go to war" may have been entirely valid, and, because valid, peremptorily binding upon the conscience, but the moment hostilities began it became, not invalid, but immaterial. War having once commenced, the nation has to ask itself, not "In those past circumstances what ought we to have done," but "In these new circumstances, what ought we to do?" and the answer to the latter question does not depend upon the answer to the former. It does, however, in part depend upon the answer to another question, which has not yet been mentioned,—"Is the end for which the war was commenced righteous or unrighteous?" If the end be unrighteous, war ought not to be continued *only to attain that end*.

But, obviously, a valid answer to the question, "What ought we now to do?" cannot be discovered by a simple reference to the righteousness or the unrighteousness of the end sought. That discovery can be made only by an examination of the entire body of relevant facts. The moral character of the end is, indeed, one of those facts, but it is only one.

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Although, therefore, it will contribute to the answer, it cannot by itself determine the answer. Precisely what its influence ought to be, can be ascertained only by a careful comparison of the several co-determinants. Unfortunately, the science of ethics does not furnish any rule whereby a useful estimate of its relative importance can be reached *a priori*. The comparison must therefore be made anew in each new case. Circumstances can, of course, easily be perceived in which the predominance of other factors would render this one comparatively unimportant.

There are, it may be, some who would ask "Is there, then, no abstract law of Right, to which our allegiance is unconditionally due?" Certainly there is an abstract law of Right, but it exists only as a thought, and in the mind of man it is a thought reached by abstraction,—by abstraction, that is, from the concrete righteousness of the individual right things which, by experience of their goodness, awaken our loyalty, and, through that experience, furnish our thoughts with ideal forms of concrete goodness that become sovereign over our endeavour. The ultimate end of moral action is never obedience to a law, but always the practical achievement, in character or manhood, of some concrete form of human goodness—or, in the Platonic language, some concrete embodiment of "The Good." Sometimes, of course, it has other ends,—as, for example, in many political reforms, wherein the ethical and immediately present is not true manhood but a sound polity,—but these other ends are always entirely ancillary to the ultimate end, and have no moral value except as thus ancillary. A true polity, for instance, possesses moral value, not in itself, but only because and in so far as it is serviceable to manhood,—only in

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so far as it disciplines and develops character and capacity, and furnishes opportunity and means for healthful and helpful life. "It is not good for man to be alone." The history of his progress is always a social history, for he grows according to the invitation and constraint of his surroundings. In the forms and various activities of the society around him, the individual finds, as it were, an embodied morality, prepared for the education of his life. By the pressure and invitation of social forms and usages, through the opportunities for industry and intercourse given by social life, human capacity is disciplined, and human possibilities are developed. In this way the individual is trained into concrete forms of righteousness before he can conceive of an abstract law of Right, and before he can consciously follow an ideal. Nor is society thus helpful only in earlier years. It may and should cease to control our judgment; it can never, if we ourselves be not unresponsive, cease to quicken charity or to strengthen faith, and the more fully we enter into its life the more abundant will be our gain. But not only is man trained by society, he also reacts upon it. We all do so, inevitably and without intention, through character and conduct, and through the practical activities of our lives, but there are some who do so, not only thus incidentally, but also intentionally,—in purposeful exercises of loyalty, sympathy, and pity. It is this reaction that gives us social progress, for, by it, more or less of the ethical gains achieved by individual lives, more or less of the ethical worth wrought out in individual characters, becomes incorporated,—taken up into the structure and life of the body politic, which thus becomes the home of a higher and more kindly nurture, the instrument and the shelter of a

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wider and fuller life. In this way society becomes more and more helpful to man, and in this increasing helpfulness consists its progress. To make society thus perfectly helpful is the ethical end of politics. To make a political society thus perfectly helpful is the informing ideal of patriotism. If the true end of political action be the serviceable welfare of the body politic, the true subject of political judgment—even when that judgment is most clearly informed by the moral ideal,—is, not this or that isolated event or line of policy, but the entire contemporary state of the national life as whole. In other words, we judge the given event or policy, not in abstract isolation, but in its complete reality,—that is, an integral in the unity of national life. If we take it out of that unity we make it unreal, and our judgment upon it becomes an irrelevance.

The conclusion of this chapter can, perhaps, easily be surmised. For all the present purposes of political conduct and ethical thought, anti-patriotism must be accounted a form not of righteousness, but of unrighteousness. Patriotism, however, does not call upon us to renounce the thought of final brotherhood,—concerning which some, who make no pretence to patriotism or who have it but occasionally, grow emotionally eloquent,—because in that very brotherhood patriotism will find its completeness. Human interests and human charity have thus far built up men into nations and groups of nations. One day the synthesis will become complete in a universal polity wherein all men will find a common Fatherland. We may say, if we will, that the true end of a political history is, not a *polity*, but a *spirit*,—a spirit of

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perfectly helpful brotherliness,—found, not in a few, but in all. That spirit, however, can be nurtured only within the kindly shelter of a helpful polity, and, so long as men are divided into different nations, into different autonomous groups,—so long will brotherliness be incomplete. A plurality of polities implies several local forms of patriotism. It also implies a plurality of policies, and these may not all and always be harmonious. Moreover, only by the education of a common life—of a life as members of one body,—can men be trained into brotherliness. There must, then, one day and somewhere, be one polity and one patriotism, even as there will also be one charity. Thus, *men will reach final brotherliness through the expansion of patriotism, and the expansion of patriotism will follow the expansion of politics*, for by that expansion patriotism will become informed with a broader charity and be trained to a wider helpfulness.

Now, political expansion is brought about principally by those interests and activities that we ordinarily call practical. These, of course, as human, are subject, for praise or blame, to ethical censure, but they are not ordinarily informed by a conscious ethical purpose. Probably Mr. Rhodes, in his northward advance from Kimberley, gave us the closest approximation that modern history records to an ethical expansion of Empire. Usually, however, territorial expansion is brought about by commerce, by colonisation, and by political endeavours to secure the military safety of a country, or to increase its influence, or to further its industrial development. Some day, perhaps, community of sentiment between separate peoples may bring about political union, and thus create a larger polity to be the home of a larger patriotism, but we

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cannot reckon this among the agents of expansion now operative.

Political expansion, then, is at present always, or usually, non-ethical. It is, however, entirely and healthily natural, for it arises, not out of the militant knaveries of an artificial statecraft, devised only for the amusement of potentates, nor out of the ambitions of an empty "militarism," as some unhelpful theorists would have us believe, but out of interests, activities, and policies that are, in themselves, both natural and lawful. It is, indeed, but an extension into a wider field of that dynamic energy of life which has built up for us the outward fabric of our present polities. I have spoken of it as non-ethical, but although in itself not obviously righteous, it is preparatory to righteousness, for, in the moral order of history, the widening of polity is ancillary to a widening community of life, and to a widening charity. Here, in England, our "anti-patriotic" moralists, intelligent only of placarded emotions, and eager to condemn what they do not understand, are insistent that our imperial expansion be judged in the court of conscience according to the harshest interpretation of these non-ethical beginnings. This demand we deliberately and entirely reject, for these beginnings are *only* beginnings, and they prepare the way for an ethical expansion which, as moralists, no less than as patriots, we value highly,—an expansion which they also would value were their judgment not misled by unrealities. We English folk are trustees for the Future—trustees, not only for unborn generations of our own peoples, but, also, for the world, for we are guardians and ministers of an ideal that will be "for the healing of the nations," and we shall best discharge our trust by broadening the

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polity in which, as we rightly believe, that ideal finds its widest opportunity and its kindest home.

We must see to it, however, that our expansion does not end in vulgar aggrandisement. The broadening of the Empire must result in the broadening of the Fatherland; our patriotism must be widely imperial, and not simply English. But imperial patriotism implies an imperial tradition and a common imperial life. Therefore, we must not rest content until our English heritage become the common and equal possession of all our peoples, and until in every part of the Empire it find shelter and tributary increase. Then it will be, not an English, but an imperial heritage,—not an English, but an imperial tradition, for it will receive from each of our separate peoples, not only new strength and greater volume, but also a new richness. Each of our peoples will contribute to it whatever heritage of humane worth they have received from their own past, whatever tradition of manhood they have independently built up, and whatever new tradition they form under the encouragement of the new beneficence of our imperial life. Then the Empire will be truly the home of a common imperial life, and in the Empire as a whole and not, less helpfully, in this or that part of it, all the peoples of the Empire will find their common Fatherland.

One word more;—The theory of progress is a theory, not of earthly history, but of individual life. Now, of individual life we believe that only a part is spent upon earth. The greater part we believe will be lived out beyond the grave, and that hidden part we think of as not only the better part, but as, also,—probably,—the more progressive part. Therefore, we cannot say that the consummating life of perfect charity

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will be reached upon earth. We know, indeed, that the final consummation of history *cannot* take place upon earth, for in that consummation "the spirits and souls of the righteous" will have part, and all who have died in faith, not having received the promises, but having seen them afar off, and also, it may be, all who, without present righteousness or faith, have passed, in pride or hopelessness, from the sins and failures of earth to the unmanifested charity beyond.

But earthly history will, at least, achieve earthly brotherhood? It may;—we cannot say that it will. We have at least to face the possibility that brotherhood, even in its earthly possibilities, will not become complete on earth,—the possibility that, until the end of earthly time, nation will remain separate from nation, and separate forms of patriotism divide the loyalty of man. What then shall we say? Simply this,—and our words may be taken as a present precept for this present time of national separateness and rivalry, when patriotism leads good men into different and sometimes hostile camps,—let every man be content to do his duty in that station in life into which it shall please God to call him. The issues of history are in God's hands, not in ours, and *there* we may safely leave them, for His charity is perfect, and His will sovereign alike in this world and the next.

APPENDIX I

NATURALISATION AND PATRIOTISM

Is there, necessarily, anything inconsistent or incredible in the claim of a naturalised foreigner to be a patriot in the land that has adopted him into its citizenship? I think not, and I desire to protest as strongly as possible against the suggestion, sometimes heard, that a man of foreign origin cannot be a good patriot in his new Fatherland. "His new Fatherland?" Nay, sometimes that new land is his *only* Fatherland, for the land of his birth has been, at the best, but an unhelpful step-father.

A chance acquaintance once said to me,—“You who were born an Englishman, cannot know how much that means. I do, for I am a Jew, and was born in Russia under the Emperor Nicolas, and I know the difference.” He knew the difference, and to him the citizenship of this free England of ours probably stood for more than it stands for to most native Englishmen. He knew, at least, something of what freedom means for the healthy integrity and manliness of life, and *that* is not a bad initial equipment for English patriotism.

If it be true that patriotism depends upon the felt vital worth of the national life to those who have part in it, then—surely?—there is no reason, in the nature of the case, why a naturalised foreigner should not be a true patriot in the land of his new citizenship. If only that new citizenship *mean* something to him,—something of value to his life, then the path to patriotism is open. The fact that patriotism depends solely upon a primary spiritual relationship—upon a primary spiritual relationship to the body politic,—sets it free at once from all limitations of race, or parentage, or creed. Every man who exercises his citizenship honourably is a patriot, or is on the high road to patriotism.

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Now, why should not a naturalised alien so exercise it? Is it said that he has not our English past behind him? True, but he has our English present around him, and it is by the present that we live, not by the past. In so far as we are patriots, we are such because our country is of present living worth to us,—enlarging and confirming our manhood, ennobling our lives with lofty and unselfish purpose, hallowing them with a devotion that, if need be, will not shrink from the martyr's sacrifice. It is, of course, true that to this living worth our country's past largely contributes. But how does it do so? Not *as past*, but as present, as a present and inspiring memory, as a living tradition of free manhood, of honour, of public service, a tradition enshrined in our institutions, and breathing in every pulsation of our national life,—a tradition into which we are born, as into our native air, and which silently informs our thought, and shapes our character, whether we are mindful of it or no, so that consciously or unconsciously we, in our turn, become bearers of the sacred flame, and hand on that living Past to become the informing and inspiring Present of the unborn Future. And this living Past is around us all in this our Present, and to all alike it brings the same gift of larger life and worthier manhood. Why cannot the stranger who has become one of us share in that gift? Is it said that the memory and the tradition that make us patriots mean nothing to him? But is it so? Remember, as a matter of practical politics,—or rather, perhaps, as a matter of journalistic controversy,—we are not now concerned with immigrants from the remoter parts of Africa or Asia, but with men born at no greater distance from us than the further shores of the North Sea and the Baltic,—men certainly of like passions with ourselves, and, on the whole, of like higher capabilities. In so far as we Englishmen are patriots because of our history, it is because the manhood that is in us responds to the living tradition of manhood that surrounds us in our ever-present Past. That tradition equally surrounds the strangers who have come to us from the Elbe and the Vistula,—why should not they, also, in some effectual measure, and to some sufficient degree, make a like response,—a like response of manhood to manhood, and to the opportunities for

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manhood that history has opened up to us in our free English citizenship. They may not, they will not, become Englishmen all at once, but, unless the English spirit be something utterly and narrowly provincial,—which, if what has been said in the foregoing pages be true, it most certainly is *not*,—there must surely be that in them which will respond to it, and will assimilate it at this point or at that,—somewhat of latent manhood which our English tradition and practice will quicken and confirm, somewhat of patriotic possibility which that tradition and practice will in time, and, perhaps, in no long time, develop into helpful actuality.

It is part of our glory as Englishmen that this is so. English nationality is not a matter of caste-inheritance. It is open to all who are willing to enter into our life. True citizenship comes by spiritual incorporation, and our history bears abundant witness how effectually that incorporation can take place. Why, then, should we question or deny, upon any narrow grounds of birth, the patriotism of those who have voluntarily sought the citizenship into which we were born?

APPENDIX II

CONSERVATISM AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY

IT may perhaps appear paradoxical to contrast "political" Democracy as "Liberal" with "social" Democracy as "Conservative," and yet it may not be unhelpful. Because Liberalism is characteristically a creed of reform, it might seem that social Democracy, as a policy of reform, has closer and wider affinities with Liberalism than with its opposite, for, as a matter of history, Conservatism is not professedly reformatory. The movement of events, however, has made Conservatism, *per accidens*, what it has not been characteristically, and, now, the two parties that divide, or claim to divide, the political allegiance of English people are both parties of reform. What, then, is the difference between them?

It would be unfair and untrue to say that Conservatism acts upon the maxim "Everything for the people: nothing by the people":—unfair, because Conservatism, albeit not without reluctance and hesitation, has accepted the principle of popular government; untrue, because, most certainly, Conservatism has not yet risen to the great-hearted beneficence of "Everything for the people." On the other hand the dominant maxim of Liberalism has undoubtedly been "Everything by the people." In early days, when *Laissez-faire* was the sovereign rule of the thought that characteristically deemed itself progressive, there was a marked tendency among Liberal politicians and thinkers to make legislative reforms chiefly "political,"—to place political power in the hands of the people, and then to leave them to work out their own salvation. Nor did this arise from any indifference to social and industrial reform,—for it is from its social and industrial ideals that Liberal thought has always received its informing inspiration,—but,

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in part, from a generous faith in Liberty, worthy of the best traditions of our English life, and, in part, from the practical necessity of doing away with political privileges which, having outlived whatever usefulness to the Commonwealth they at one time possessed, had become merely the guardians of narrow class-interests, and were obstinately obstructive to social and industrial change. Thus, partly from principle and partly from the pressure of circumstances, the older Liberalism became identified with the policy of "Everything by the people,"¹ and the tradition of this policy has been handed down to the men who to-day so feebly continue the Liberal succession.

It is true that the programme of modern Radicalism is as conspicuously social and industrial as that of the older Liberalism was "political," but this change has, in no small degree, become possible by the accomplishment of the earlier programme, which has removed so many of the obstacles that aforesaid made direct social and industrial reform well-nigh impracticable. The old tradition has, however, been taken up into the new policy. Radicalism always desires to act through the machinery of direct popular representation and control, and this is probably the most obvious difference between it and reforming Conservatism.

The early Conservative reformers were kept from "political" Democracy by a definite political theory of their own. They dreamt of a transformed England—happy and prosperous through the beneficence of those called to high estate,—which would, under new conditions, reproduce,

¹ We must be careful not to confound the characteristically Radical principle of direct popular control with that older and more justly venerated principle—common to all political parties in England,—of "No Taxation without Representation." As principles, the two are entirely distinct, nor can one be represented as an inference from the other. Because the nation may not be taxed without its consent,—although, in fact, peers, and, in so far as they contribute to the Exchequer, all women possessed of separate estate, and all men who are not parliamentary electors are so taxed,—it by no means follows that public money ought not to be spent except by or under the direct control of persons immediately representative of the people. The two propositions are entirely distinct, and no logic can bind them together as premise and conclusion.

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and continue through helpful charity, the old dependence, half feudal and half patriarchal, of class upon class. These men, however earnest in their purpose of reform, could, of course, find no place in their thought for theories or plans of popular control. Of their successors, it is not easy to speak quite accurately. The earlier dream, we know, has vanished, but what has taken its place? The answer must, I think, be—"Nothing." Modern Conservatism has not shaped for itself any philosophy of politics,—any constructive theory of reform. Intellectually it has no independent existence. In domestic affairs, it is simply a hesitant Radicalism, without the belief that makes Radicalism a genuine, although a mistaken, faith. As reformatory, it lives by borrowing, and it has nothing of its own to lend in return. And yet its reforms, although Radical in genesis, are not usually Radical in spirit, for as a rule they either do not employ the characteristic Radical machinery of direct popular representation and control, or use it only sparingly and subordinatedly.¹ How are we to explain this characteristic of Conservatism? The simple dialectic of party warfare has furnished an answer which finds ready acceptance. Conservatives, we are told, naturally and inevitably "mistrust the people." Do they, and, if they do, is this the reason why their reformers do not usually employ the Radical machinery of reform?

In a certain sense, the early Conservatives did "mistrust the people." They saw no reason for believing that the polity of the Golden Age could be immediately evoked from ballot boxes. Rightly or wrongly, they thought that "the people" needed education and guidance,—that substantial and immediately practical help, from those able and willing to help, would be better for them than

¹ I say "as a rule" because, as the Conservative party has unfortunately no vigilant body of first principles to watch over its political imports, fragments of unmistakably Radical machinery find their way into Conservative reforms. We find such a fragment, for instance, in the famous "Kenyon-Slaney" clause, which no amount of argument can make Conservative,—unless, indeed, Conservatism be merely a halting Radicalism that advances as slowly as possible, and gives up as little as possible. If it were only this, which happily it is not, it could claim allegiance only from the selfish and unbelieving, and "the Conservative working man" would be a grotesque anomaly.

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unenlightened liberty. Thus far, then, they mistrusted "the people," but this mistrust was the ground only of their negations, and side by side with their negations they had a policy of constructive reform which implied a trust deeper than their mistrust.

Every sincere endeavour for reform, to whatever school of political thought it belongs, necessarily implies a fundamental confidence in human nature,—in its capacity for better things, in its willingness to give allegiance to whatever proves itself profitable unto life,—and these Conservative reformers of two generations ago must sincerely have believed that their transformed and transfigured feudalism would commend itself in practice to the "people's" heart and mind. Among contemporary Conservatives there are, doubtless, many whose Conservatism is purely self-interested;—who regard their votes as an extra police-precaution; who are wealthy, and wish only to retain their wealth; privileged, and wish only to retain their privilege. These men frankly and naturally "mistrust the people." But what shall we say of those whose Conservatism is a patriotic faith, and who are not fearful of change? Do they "mistrust the people"?

The early Conservative reformers had a definite theory of society which clearly separated them from the political Democracy of their day. Their successors, however, have no such theory. The old social ideals of Conservative reform have vanished, and their place remains vacant. We have no longer any philosophy of politics and of society that can be called distinctively Conservative. We have, indeed, more or less active Conservative thought, but that thought is original and constructive only in the direction of Imperialism, and even there it has not been able to formulate a philosophy of Imperialism, or a definite theory of foreign policy, or even to give healthy vigour to our practical conduct of foreign affairs. In domestic affairs, it refrains from challenging the "democratic" tendencies of the day, and its distinctive contributions to reform seem intended to make democratic change as "harmless" as possible. Even the reforms it supports are, for the most part, genetically Radical. They do not spring from any distinctively conservative theory of social or industrial

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Right. And, yet, they are not Radical reforms. Wherein then does their intrinsically conservative character consist? Chiefly, I think, in this,—in the fact that, as a rule, little or no provision is made in them for the instrumental agency of direct popular representation and control.¹

Now, once more, how are we to explain this characteristic of Conservative reforms? Do our present-day Conservatives indeed “mistrust the people”? Perhaps, in a certain way, and to some extent they do, even as their reforming predecessors did, and for similar reasons, but their mistrust does not imply antagonism. They value the rich inheritance of life that the Past has built up for us, and are rightly concerned to transmit it unimpaired to succeeding generations. It is this regard for the spiritual continuity of English life, for the integrity of our English inheritance, that makes them conservative, and they naturally mistrust changes that seem to threaten disruption or loss. Hence, often without analysing their feeling, or making it articulate in systematised thought, they naturally incline to attach primary importance to moral and material reforms, rather than to political,—to think of these as the precursors of political change, rather than as the results,—and, in their practical policy, to do things *for* the people rather than *by* the people. There are, of course, many Conservatives (unfortunately, very many) to whom this does not in the least apply,—some, who are merely selfishly obscurantist and obstructive, and others who support reforms only because their fears constrain them, who make small concessions that they may keep great gains. It is not of these that I am speaking, but only of those who, neither obscurantist nor obstructive, are entirely honest in their purpose of reform. These men have not developed their faith into a philosophy. He who would interpret them must be his own pioneer.

Let us, then, attempt a new valuation of English parties.

It is difficult to discover, except in the one point of

¹ When, as sometimes happens, Conservatives make Radical use, in some particular reform, of this distinctively Radical machinery, the acutest party apologist will probably find it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to discover in that reform any intrinsic ground for calling it Conservative rather than Radical.

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method already mentioned, any noteworthy empirical difference between them in the handling of domestic affairs. That methodological difference, however, is the result of an ulterior difference which is not merely methodological and seems ultimate. I have said that the Conservative party to-day has not an articulate philosophy. I do not say that it is without principles, but its principles are immanent in temperament and feeling,—not developed into a systematised body of thought. Their opponents are, it is true, in no better case. The Liberal party is too heterogeneous to have a common creed, although its members may, from time to time, momentarily agree upon a common policy. The "official Liberals" of to-day are, I think, essentially opportunist. Themselves members of the privileged classes, they have, without injury to their personal and class interests, to secure and, if possible, retain the support of men springing from other orders, who, although zealously credulous of certain superstitions of their own, are militantly incredulous of the traditional superstitions of English respectability, as, also, unfortunately, of other things that are not superstitions. This divergence of interest and sympathy makes a common creed impossible.

But although the Liberals have not a philosophy, they have inherited a number of maxims which they use as fundamental. One of these—ordinarily miscalled "the principle of direct popular control,"—we have already had occasion to notice: another—"the State ought to have no concern with religion, as such"—has a broad field of maleficent service prepared for it by reverend hands. These maxims—used as regulative data, and quite unsynthesised,—constitute the body of Liberal principles. Yet, principles they certainly are not,—except, perhaps, in some secondary and derivative sense. A principle—whether of private conduct or of public policy,—is a sovereign ethical rule. These maxims are merely—what? Isolated fragments of a half-forgotten creed, abstractions elaborated by the necessities and opportunities of past controversies, doctrines fashioned by the first essays of discontent to prove itself rational. They are historically interesting as illustrating the circuitous path of our progress

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towards a clear political intelligence, but they are not ultimate, they are not imperative, they do not constitute a reasoned creed.

Although unsystematised, they are, however, akin. Logically they depend upon a set of conceptions which the progressive thought of the world has long left behind,—upon an abstract conception of “natural rights,” and upon equally abstract conceptions of the individual and the State.

Now, it is perfectly true that all sound political philosophy rests upon, and all healthy political practice at least implies, a fundamental doctrine of “natural rights,”—of rights essentially inherent in the individual. But these rights are politically sovereign only because, and in so far as, they express the nature and are ancillary to the end of man’s sovereign and self-realising personality. Indeed, it is this personality itself, in its concrete individual reality, that is the true lord alike of polity and of policy, and political maxims—political “principles” if you will,—are immediately sovereign only because and in so far as they rightly interpret its nature and vocation. If we take them in abstract separateness from that dynamic nature and controlling end, we can neither prove them to be true, nor infer from them a constructive policy. In the process of abstraction we “de-moralise” them,—we leave behind all that gives to them ethical content, validity, and end. As abstract, they are merely academic texts,—occasionally serviceable in parliamentary rhetoric, dangerously plausible to the uncritical, but useless for the practical purposes of constructive thought and work.

Righteousness—truth in conduct—has its ground, not in any abstract conception, not even in an abstract ideal, but in the living spirit of man. All particular rights are but limited expressions of his one essential right,—the right to full opportunity for self-realisation. From this they derive their character as rights: by this the range of their validity is defined. Apart from this, they have neither ethical content, nor ethical direction. That all men should be free is perfectly and universally true, if by freedom we mean ethical opportunity,—if we think of freedom, not as an end in itself, but as a means to the

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development of character and manhood, and permit the end to determine the range of the means.¹ But, if we separate the thought of freedom from the thought of self-realisation, freedom can then mean only mere emancipation, and *this* has neither ethical content nor ethical end. By this abstraction we empty the conception of freedom of its ethical meaning, and we leave the maxim "all men should be free" without demonstrable validity. If we take no account of the nature of man as a self-realising potency that is the ground of right, why, indeed, should all men be free?

Moreover, if the maxim, when thus "de-moralised,"—emptied of ethical content, deprived of ethical purpose, cut off from the directive and limiting sovereignty of the moral ideal,—be made determinant of policy, its direct result, in a society like our own, variously diversified by centuries of incident and adventure, can only be destructive.

Were we creating a new world, it might indeed regulate our construction, by warning us what to avoid, but in a world that has already a long history behind it—a world wherein men are already variously associated in various forms of service and mastery,—it can guide us only in destruction. We can infer from it what ought not to be: we cannot infer from it what ought to be.

If all men should be free, then, clearly, institutions and usages that make men servile should be destroyed. But by what new construction should they be replaced? We can discover this only from the concrete nature of man's free personality. From the abstract "principle" of freedom—which, as abstract, denotes nothing more than mere emancipation,—we cannot infer a polity of freedom, we cannot even infer the well-accredited precept that men, when once emancipated, should be left to work out their own salvation.

The Education controversy will become a thing of the past, and its threatening heroics will be carried away by the winds of History into empty space, but while it lasts it gives us admirable illustration, not only of the dependence

¹ The range of freedom, that is, within the individual life.

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of Radical politicians upon abstract formulæ, but, also, of the characteristic use of those formulæ as instruments of destruction.

It were quite possible to give a reasoned vindication of the principle of direct popular control. One could speak—

(a) of the importance, for individual life and character, of the discipline and opportunity of active citizenship, and

(b) of the national welfare, and the dependence of it upon individual manhood, and upon a widely spread participation in public affairs.

But, as thus vindicated, the principle is no longer abstract, but concrete. It has a definite ethical content and end derived from ultimate conceptions concerning individual life and the nature of the national organism. Moreover, the end which thus informs it also limits it. Because it is thus informed, we can vindicate it as a practical rule,—not as an ultimate and unconditioned principle, rightfully sovereign in all circumstances, but as a conditioned instrument. It is, however, only one of many instruments whereby manhood is trained into serviceable citizenship,—one of many by which the nation, as an ethical organism, achieves its end, by which it reaches complete and catholic helpfulness. Similarly, the right of participation in public affairs is not the only individual right that Parliament has to protect or enforce. For instance, the law permits—now, it is true, only conditionally,—the existence of non-provided schools,—of schools, that is, which are established by private effort for the purpose of giving a certain kind of instruction which their founders think valuable. Whatever be our opinion of this liberty, it is clear that under it certain definite rights have become obvious,—rights which are not only legal, but, also, ethical. Now, can the entire management of the non-provided schools be placed under “direct popular control” consistently with the due recognition of those rights? It surely rests with the advocates of change to show that it can be. Nothing is gained, but much that is morally valuable missed or lost, by noisy declamation about “the principle of direct popular control,” for that “principle” is not unlimited, but limited, not unconditioned, but conditioned.

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It is clearly apparent, however, that those who are now foremost in advocating what they conceive to be "the rights of the people" in our non-provided schools, are not primarily concerned with the particular administrative question I have indicated. They strongly object to certain forms of religious teaching, they professedly object to denominational teaching of any sort being given in schools that are now almost entirely maintained out of "public funds," and they think that the existing dualism in our educational machinery gives an unfair advantage to the Church of England,—more especially in country districts. Therefore, they use the abstract principle of "direct popular control" as an instrument, not for equitably solving an administrative difficulty, but for furthering their larger policy of abolishing a teaching to which they object, and a privilege they deem to be unjust. I do not say that they are wrong to do so: I simply note that here we have a characteristic instance of the destructive use of an abstract formula.

It will be said that sometimes destruction becomes necessary, and that then men may lawfully use instruments of destruction. True, but instruments are *only* instruments,—the tools, not the sanctions, of purpose, and yet it is characteristically as sanctions that they are controversially used. Abstract principles, *as such*, can never by themselves constitute or furnish a sanction for conduct. If ever they appear to constitute or furnish one, it is only because of some unexpressed connection with a background of thought that contains the true sanction, but which they themselves, as abstract principles, do not disclose,—it is only in virtue of a silent reinforcement from conceptions of human nature and of human life which are not abstract but concrete. Conclusive warrant for a policy of destruction can be derived only from our ultimate thought concerning the nature and vocation of man, and the warrant we thence derive is given, not because the thing to be destroyed is inconsistent with a worshipped phrase, but because it is a practical hindrance to man in the pursuit of his practical vocation.

We may, of course, be asked—Cannot an abstract principle be used, not for its own sake as an abstract principle,

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but as the symbol or epitome of that spiritual background which, in and by itself, it does not suffice to disclose? Some, indeed, may urge that, in fact, that background is always tacitly presupposed as the context of every political principle which, if regard were had only to the manner of its occasional presentation, would be classified as abstract.

The question must be answered in the affirmative, but the contention must, I think, be negatived. The question must be answered in the affirmative, because it is, indubitably, quite permissible to attribute such a representative character to a principle which, but for that attribution, would be only abstract. But, by this attribution, the subject-principle would cease to be abstract, and would become concrete, for it would become representative of truths that are distinctively and essentially concrete. Moreover, the attribution once made, logical and practical primacy would belong to the truths represented, not to the "principle" representing those truths, and *they*, not *it*, would constitute the real basis of policy, the real ground of argument. Therefore, the question must be answered in the affirmative. The contention must, however, be negatived. In a particular case we may have warrant for regarding the principle advanced as presupposing or representing the context just indicated, but such a case would, I think, be exceptional. It happens, I think, only infrequently, that the controversial use of an abstract principle suggests the presence of a context of concrete truth. In the education controversy, for instance, there is no hint of context: the principle of direct popular control stands naked and alone, and, characteristically enough, it is used primarily for destruction.

Were a context of concrete truth actually present, that context would be so predominant in thought, so powerfully determinant of feeling, so obviously implied in argument, that it would be manifestly and directly sovereign, alike in policy and in discussion. But out of the swelling rhetoric there comes no hint of context,—nothing but heroic declamation about a phrase, and the end sought is destruction. Destruction? Yes, we may be told, but only as the precursor of construction, for those who are now attacking

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what seems to them an unjust privilege seek to destroy only that they may afterwards build again—only that, on the cleared ground, they may erect the fair fabric of a better educational system. Possibly, but whence comes that constructive purpose? Not from any abstract principle, but from sympathies and hopes which are deeper than all principles, and which need no principles to sanction them, for they themselves are the sanctions of whatever principles our changing thought from time to time works out. In other words that purpose comes not from an abstract, but from a concrete Right.

The Liberal party, then, is the inheritor of an obsolete tradition of thought. Its "principles" are fragmentary maxims from an outworn creed, and, because they are characteristically abstract, they are helpful only as the amputator's knife is sometimes helpful.

To-day, however, we, in England, have little need for a policy that is merely surgical. Many things in our polity should be altered, but the instruments of change should be constructive ideas, and not barren formulæ of destruction. Education, Local Government, the Poor Law, agriculture and our commercial industries, the social condition of the working classes, the political position of the middle classes, and, above all, our land-system, urgently call for reform or for serious and reconstructive thought. Empty formulæ will not help us. We must have a positive doctrine of individual and national life, and *this* the parliamentary Liberal party does not possess. Its abstract "principles" contain no creative potency, and disclose no ideal. It faces our variously creative life with empty hands,—bankrupt in thought, persuasive only through the fading memories of its less recent past, powerful only through discontent. It is not wholly untouched by that new imperial self-consciousness which is transforming the issues and methods of our larger policy, but that new imperial life is little more than an unwelcome and inevitable constraint upon its purpose,—not a sovereign inspiration and a quickening strength. Its narrow formulæ have no place for that creative energy of awakening brotherhood which is giving to the

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world a new Power, and to the English peoples a new ideal.¹

Let us now cross the floor of the House.

It were idle to pretend that the Conservatives have not been influenced by the characteristic *credenda* of their opponents. It may be that Conservatism—inarticulate and uncertain,—has preserved unspoiled whatever be the essentials of its faith, but, more than once, the details of Conservative policy have borne the impress of anti-Conservative superstitions. Nor is this to be wondered at. Conservatism, although widely illustrated in temperament and practical attitude, has never quite reached clear self-consciousness: it has never developed its implicit faith into a clearly articulate body of reasoned thought.² Consequently it has been without any adequate intellectual safeguards against the pretensions of “principles” which, whatever their defects, had their origin in a reasoned endeavour to set forth ultimate political truth. But Conservatives have never accepted, *ex animo*, the maxims which have thus, at times, influenced them. Rather has their characteristic attitude towards them been one of practical distrust.

As we have already seen, abstract political “principles”—precisely, because abstract—have no constructive potency. They can destroy, but they cannot build up. At the most, they but clear the ground for a new construction which they have not planned. Now, sometimes, of course, destruction is righteous,—as, for example, when it removes unjust privileges that only narrow and impoverish a nation’s life—but because an abstract principle (precisely

¹ It is, of course, true that the Liberal party has, at present, the support of important political factors that, probably, will one day shape a new constructive policy. But these allies do not inherit the traditions of “official” Liberalism, and they vote Liberal only because they have not yet reached full political self-consciousness, or are not yet strong enough to stand alone. There seems to be no conclusive reason for thinking that the new idealism of Labour, when it comes, will be at all tolerant of the sounding and barren phrases that are now so convenient a refuge for front-bench opportunism.

² For example, it has never yet given a complete answer to Lord Beaconsfield’s pertinent question—“What do you mean to conserve?”—“Coningsby,” Book vi., chap. iii.

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because it is abstract) is ethically uninformed, and contains within itself nothing that can control it to ethical ends, there is always risk lest its destruction become mischievous, lest, in pulling up the tares it pulls up the wheat also.

It is this risk that Conservative distrust, at its best, endeavours to avoid. That distrust, at its best, is not, directly, distrust of "the people," but a distrust of Parliamentary Radicalism,—of its unreasoned abstractions and "unmoralised" reforms.

But a great party cannot live upon mere distrust, nor safely commit its policy to the occasional promptings of an inarticulate faith. It must have its own clearly-defined principles,—its own characteristic apologetic.

Now, where do we find the philosophical ground of Conservatism? We find it, I suggest, in the conception of the State as an ethical organism,—in precisely that conception of the State, as at once the expression and the instrument of individual lives, which is set forth in the foregoing pages.

A Conservative recognises that customs and institutions are social growths—shaped and informed by the complex life of the social organism. He judges of their value, not according to any academic formulæ, but according to the part they play and the ends they subserve in the complex whole of national life, and, in estimating the personal rights that arise out of them, he has regard to the whole history that has shaped and informed them, and not merely to one incident of that history—e.g. a State licence—artificially isolated from its natural context.

Again, Conservatism is characteristically ethical and historical. Its predominant interest is not in institutions and usages,—which are but expressions and instruments of life,—but in life itself, and its characteristic endeavour is to preserve the continuity of life. It knows that the civic virtues—the virtues of free men in a free State—are not *constructions*, but *growths*, and that the opportunities of liberty, although, as opportunities, they are necessary to the development of a generously serviceable manhood, are most useful only when they are more than opportunities,—only when they are beneficent in nurture, only when they

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bring men into broader and more helpful contact with the nation's living tradition of helpful citizenship. That tradition—itsself no *mere* tradition, but a besetting inspiration, and an informing strength,—is the true constituent of national unity, and by its continuous and broadening life the gains of each succeeding generation are built up into the spiritual fabric of the body politic. To safeguard the integrity of that spiritual body—our true Fatherland,—is the characteristic vocation of Conservatism. Therefore, its most distinctive policies are constructive, and its most distinctive reforms are those that increase without impairing the spiritual content of the nation's life. The Conservative reformer is not satisfied with mere emancipation. His conception of freedom is concrete, not formal, ethical, not legal, and he deems the gift of freedom to be half withheld unless the newly enfranchised receive the informing and renewing grace of the nation's most generous and most helpful life. He sets men free by making them recipients and continuators of the spiritual tradition that he guards, and he endeavours to make and keep the national polity healthfully organic, not only to a privileged class, be that class "aristocratic" or "democratic," but to *all* who are contributory to that tradition,—even though they be Welsh churchmen.

But it may be asked, how does all this demonstrate the suggested likeness between Conservatism and social Democracy? It demonstrates it, I think, by showing that Conservatism is directly concerned for social health, rather than for abstract rights,—for reforms that are of immediately practical helpfulness, rather than for those that immediately are only political. Now, "social" Democracy is distinguished from "political" Democracy by precisely the same "practical" determination of its immediate interest.

Even if this be granted, however, it will probably be urged that this resemblance is only formal and accidental,—that, in essential nature, Conservatism and social Democracy are radical contrasts.

There is, no doubt, much in contemporary Conservatism to suggest this, for it is the present misfortune of the

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Conservative party to draw to itself all those who, in matters of domestic reform, are the least progressive,—all the “children of the *status quo*,” who desire no change, and who, as often as not, trouble themselves to vote only when they can become obstructive. But these men stand only for negation, and they are able to call themselves Conservative, only because the better mind of Conservatism has not yet become articulate in positive principles. Strictly speaking, they are not Conservatives, but only allies of the Conservatives, and, although they count for something at the polling booths, the price paid for their support is a heavy one. It is they who are, chiefly, if not wholly, responsible for the intellectual sterility of Conservatism. It is they, with their timorous affirmations and selfish fears, who keep Conservatism from developing a constructive domestic policy of its own, worthy of an earnest man's allegiance and a patriot's vote—they who have alienated from it the best of the industrial classes and have reduced its claims upon the nation's confidence as nearly as possible to this ignoble zero—to a doubtful probability that it can, *for a time*, give a barely tolerable change from Liberal mismanagement. These men may seem the strength of the Conservative party, but, in domestic affairs, they are effectual only in resistance,—their strength is the inertia of death. They are a dead-weight,—useful, indeed, as a barrier, when a barrier is required, but prohibitive of progress, and, because progress is the present and abiding law of our free English life, the party that commits itself to them, and takes from them the rule and measure of its policy, dooms itself to ineffectiveness in the whole wide field of domestic policy, and becomes, in a very real sense, “anti-national.”

Fortunately, these dead-weights are not indispensable, even as a barrier. The English character is not revolutionary. Long freedom has made our manhood temperate, and has given to the nation a reserve of common sense which, if brought into action, would entirely outmatch the forces that make for mischief. But this common sense, although men usually call it “practical,” is essentially ethical. Usually inarticulate, except in the silent reasonableness of its judgments, it implies, nevertheless, a certain view of life,—a certain undeveloped *Welt-*

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Anschauung, as the Germans would say,—a certain valuation of the things that enter into life, and its support cannot be permanently won by mere negations. It cannot be won at all except by an appeal to the undeveloped ethic that silently informs it: it cannot be won permanently except by a practical ethic at once constructive and progressive, for it has itself been shaped by centuries of progress, and the hope of progress is strong within it. Now, cannot Conservatism make such an appeal? I venture to think that it can, or, at least, that it can if it will,—if only it will take courage to make its better possibilities actual.

Conservatism, of course, by its very name is primarily concerned for preservation. But for the preservation of what? Of our English Commonwealth, with all its rich inheritance from the past, with all its great possibilities for the future? True, but that Commonwealth is not a dead thing, shaped by history, as it were, out of unaltering and unalterable stone, nor did it suddenly take possession of these islands as a finished polity,—“shot out of a pistol,” to use Hegel’s expressive phrase. As we have it to-day, it is the handiwork of the centuries,—the result of a long process of evolution, and that process has not yet reached its term. Preservation must therefore mean preservation in dynamic efficiency: it must preserve the nation as a developing polity. Any other sort of preservation would be embalming, and embalming presupposes death. We can no more arrest the onward tide of history than Canute could arrest the natural tide that beats against these English shores. If we try to, our fate will be worse than his, for he escaped with wet feet, but we shall hardly save our souls or our possessions.

At one time it might have been possible to think of the nation as a relatively permanent polity, and of change as a non-essential incident in its life,—affecting only details of secondary importance, and due to causes which could themselves be regarded as non-essential accidents in the nation’s history. Had men not learned that the principle of evolution is sovereign in human history and in human life, no less than in realms purely biological, they could, perhaps, still think of a given national polity as permanent,

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—at least in its broad outlines and general structure. They would, of course, recognise that, through the inevitable mutation of human affairs,—through alterations in the distribution of wealth and influence within the nation, through the advance of education, and the spread of new political and social ideas, through the awakening of sympathy with the less fortunate members of the body politic,—more or less of change might now and again become desirable, or even practically necessary, but whatever change statesmen might from time to time essay would be regarded as change *within the existing organisation*, and as affecting only certain particular and subordinate details of the polity presently existent, not as part of a process which had shaped and built up that polity in the past, and would, in the fulness of time, transform it into a new order. Thought of this “statical” kind would, as a rule, conceive it to be the first duty of statesmanship to preserve the existing fabric of national life, and, to it, the most obvious political contrast would be that between Conservatism and the forces that make, or seem to make, for revolution.¹

But the day for this pre-Darwinian and pre-Hegelian Conservatism has completely passed, and we could not return to it if we would. We have learned that a nation's life is essentially dynamic, and normally progressive,—that all forms of social, political, and industrial polity are creations of this dynamic and progressive life, and change as it changes,—that the need for reform arises, not from merely secondary accidents of history, but from inner spiritual necessities, which are, in the first place, necessities

¹ It should be noticed, too, that in a world given over to this way of thinking, the forces that make for change would probably appear as characteristically Radical, for they would, almost inevitably, range themselves under some abstract doctrine of individual rights. Such a world would have no doctrine of national development, no philosophy of progress, except, perhaps, as a theory of past changes, and, therefore, some doctrine of natural rights—of the “rights of man,”—would be the only ground upon which a demand for radical reform—for reform affecting the general structure of the then existent order,—could base itself. But the progress in life and thought that has made static Conservatism impossible, has, also, made the Radicalism of abstract formulæ obsolete.

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in individual lives, but are essential and creative not only in individual lives, but also in national history.

The polity, therefore, which Conservatism seeks to preserve, is normally a progressive polity, and the preservation of it can mean only this,—the maintenance of it in healthy progressive life, through which the spiritual activities that have built it up may pass on towards their completeness. Conservatism, therefore, must become a doctrine and a policy not only of preservation, but of progress.

Nor need we remain in doubt as to the meaning or direction of progress. As we have already seen, the nation is characteristically an ethical organism, and this preliminary truth has led us on to the conception of a consummating national ideal which we have been able in several ways positively to characterise. This ideal, then, must become sovereign in Conservative thought and policy. But that ideal is, as we have also seen, characteristically and essentially a democratic ideal,—the polity it sets before us is a pure and complete Democracy, in which all that social Democracy seeks and hopes for will be presently and completely actual. Therefore, we may say, either that social Democracy is Conservatism in practice,—the logical consequence of that maxim which Lord Beaconsfield for a moment made distinctively Conservative,—*salus populi suprema lex*,—or else, that Conservatism, in its completely logical form, is the natural instrument of social Democracy.

But, it may be asked, might not precisely the same thing be said of Radicalism? Certainly, if Radicalism were to abandon the obsolete abstractions presupposed by its characteristic maxims, and were to seek for itself a new foundation in the fully developed conception of social welfare, but, were it to do this, it would become identical with progressive Conservatism,—with Conservatism as it might be, and as it ought to be.

What place, then, is left for Radicalism as we now know it?

The philosophy of politics has no place for it. Truth, when fully articulate and completely organised, constitutes a closed system, *extra quam nullus saluus*,—a system to which there can be no valid rival construction, no

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philosophical alternative except scepticism, and outside of which nothing can be reasonable. Doctrinal Radicalism, because its regulative maxims are presented in "splendid isolation" from that developing and creative life which is the concrete ground of righteousness, belongs, essentially, to the chaos of Unreason. In practical politics, however, there would still be a place for Radicalism. No party policy is always perfect,—hardly ever is human purpose perfectly carried out, and, even were Conservatives to frankly and fully accept our modern philosophy of progress, and to become broadly and progressively humane, in the true spirit of that generous faith, there would, undoubtedly, still be shortcomings and mistakes, alike in their practical policy and in their administration, and these would give to Radicalism occasional opportunities for critical and constructive helpfulness.

APPENDIX III

THE GOVERNMENT OF SUBJECT RACES

WHAT is the exact relation of our Imperial polity to those coloured races whom we usually speak of as "subject"? Is there a place for them within the fabric of our Imperial order, or do they stand outside of it—subject to our rule; tributary, perhaps, to our Imperial life, but not participant in that life?

We masterful, and rightly masterful, English folk easily fall into a way of speaking as though the Empire were exclusively our own,—or, at least, were exclusively for men of our own colour and, more or less, of our kindred, and we are apt to think of the coloured races whom history has given into our hands as being *among* us, but not *of* us.

In a sense, and to a certain extent, we are right. The Empire is distinctively English, not only because it has been built up chiefly by English enterprise and by English achievements in peace and in war, but, also, and essentially, because we are the creators and chief ministers of the tradition that informs it and gives to it spiritual unity and significance. With us that tradition is original: others participate in it only through us, or because of the work we have accomplished in the world, and when we come face to face with those who do not seem to participate in it at all,—who, indeed, do not appear capable of participating in it,—we find ourselves in the presence of a difference which may well appear one of kind, not of degree.

And, yet, so to regard that difference would be radically inconsistent with our own ideal, and with the ethical faith that gives it value. That ideal is an ideal of individual completeness of life realised in a society at once genuinely and completely free, and genuinely and completely fraternal.

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That faith rests upon a conception of human nature, which, if true, is true not only for this individual or for that, for this race or that, but for all individuals and for all races. Within our Imperial polity there should be no place for those who are *only* subject or tributary. If such exist within our borders, it can only be because our thought of our Imperial vocation has become depraved, or because we have not yet fully and clearly perceived that vocation.

Now, if it be true that the Empire should not contain within itself elements that are merely subordinate and contributory, it is yet more obviously true that the Empire should not rest upon supports that are merely servile. We may not entrust the defence of the Empire to mercenaries, nor its industry to helots. Our Imperial ideal is sovereign over all who belong to the Empire, whatever their colour, race, or faith, and it rightfully claims to determine with authority our conduct towards them. They, like us, are moral agents,—men “of like fashion as we are” in all that essentially makes us men,—informed by a kindred spirit, and moving on, amid the same great alternatives of right and wrong, to the same goal. They cannot speak for themselves, but, if we could know their natures perfectly, we should find, in their incompleteness, hints and possibilities of that same completeness to which we ourselves aspire,—hints and possibilities which are even now feebly and blindly dynamic, and which helpful charity may quicken and strengthen until hint becomes promise, and somewhat of possibility becomes realised in the actual.

The difference then, although genuine, is, after all, a difference in degree, not in kind. We English folk are far from our own English ideal. If nearer to it than are others, it is owing to the course of our island history, which has prepared for us a more excellent heritage than theirs. But others are only *more remote*, not *alien*, and their remoteness should but make our charity more active,—it cannot make them merely our instruments. Indeed, no man can ever be *merely* an instrument. Luxury, ambition, and wealth—each mindful of no law but its own self-regarding will,—may enslave men to their service, but however complete their outward subjection, however complete

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the inward submission, there is, in each life thus made servile, that which cannot pass under any human lordship,—which cannot permanently call any man master upon earth. The spirit is made for freedom, and sooner or later it will claim its freedom. For a while it may be ignorant of its right, but even during the times of that ignorance, that right is none the less real, none the less sovereign, and upon no pretext whatever can it be rightfully infringed. Unrighteously infringed it may be and often is, but the infringement is always an offence, and, speaking strictly, as truly mischievous to him who commits it as to him who suffers it,—as truly mischievous, if not always as obviously, or as disastrously mischievous.

Because our lives become complete only in charity, because their consummating ideal is an ideal of freedom and of brotherhood, we cannot, without entering upon forbidden paths, trespass upon another's right,—even though it be a right of which he is unaware,—and if we do so trespass our own lives suffer loss. Charity is not a self-pleasing and optional benevolence: it is a self-determined duty. We may ignore that duty if we will, but, if we do, our own lives suffer loss, for, in ignoring that duty, we make our lower propensities sovereign, we turn aside, blindly or wilfully, from our ideal.

That ideal, moreover, is an ideal for others, for *all* others, as well as for ourselves, because their lives also become complete in the charity that consummates our own; because their lives also, in silent possibility, if not always in conscious aspiration, reach out towards the liberty and brotherhood in which we ourselves find our goal. We and they—whatever differences of colour, and race, and spiritual achievement now divide us,—belong to one spiritual order,—an order which makes us all “members one of another.” Therefore, the ties that bind us to those whom we call “subject” are not only the external ties of mere political association, but the inner ties of sympathy and helpful charity.

And, indeed, it is the distinguishing characteristic of our Imperial polity—a characteristic that makes it of such significance and promise for the future history of the world,—that within that polity, political ties can never be *merely*

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political. Our Empire is distinctively an ethical construct,—held together, not by force or policy, but by participation in a common tradition and a common life. Therefore, in so far as outward polity is moulded by inner spirit, the political ties that outwardly express the Empire's unity are never *merely* political,—they are always informed by an ethical life, fashioned and governed by an ethical purpose. The “golden link of the Crown,” wrought out of perishable metal, does but symbolise the imperishable gold of that helpful and creative sympathy which binds the widely sundered families of British folk together into one household of faith, and links them to subject peoples in magnanimous charity. This, at least, is our ideal. This is what would be, were we but faithful to our own best selves,—faithful to the trust that history has committed to our hands, and to the informing tradition of manhood that has led us thus far upon our course, and made us what we are.

What then must be our conclusion? Surely this, that within our Empire there should not be any merely “subject” races, for those who have been made subordinate to our rule, have been made subordinate, not only for our own profit, but for theirs,—that they, in time, may grow up into the stature of our larger manhood, and become co-heirs of our past, and equal participators in our present.

This does not mean that these subject peoples ought to be at once admitted to the full privileges of British citizenship. Their position within the Empire ensures, or should ensure, the fullest recognition of their essential rights as men, but those further rights which we call privileges, because they belong only to a certain class,—to those, that is, whose characters have, more or less, been fashioned and built up by our English tradition of helpful liberty,—can become theirs only as they themselves become informed by that same tradition. We are not compelled to repeat the mistake of our American cousins, and to bring upon ourselves the mischief wrought in the Southern States by an all too generous franchise for the blacks. We English folk naturally speak of our political privileges as *rights*, and to us they are indeed rights,—essential and inalienable,—but they are none the less privileges, for they

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are consequent upon our national achievement of manhood, and can be claimed by others only as they advance towards a like achievement. Few, if any, political mistakes could be more disastrous than that of treating all men as by right politically equal. They are not politically equal, and their political "rights" are not equal.

At what point a subject race becomes entitled to self-government, or to a share in the self-government of the country in which it lives, must be settled by practical statesmanship: political theory can indicate only a few guiding principles, perhaps, indeed, only one,—namely this, that political rights are dependent upon political competence. Once in exercise they will powerfully influence character, but more or less of spiritual achievement should precede the first exercise of them.

In a country like England, where there is a long-established tradition of political life, where personal freedom has prepared the way for political responsibility, and where there is already a large body of electors not unworthy of their privilege, we may rightly place a large trust in the discipline of responsible liberty, and may safely give to the franchise an extension which in other countries would be imprudent. But in a country unversed in political freedom, the first steps in constitutional progress must usually be slow and short. In every country, if it be humanely progressive, a time will come when it will be easy to point to a number of men who are individually well qualified for a seat in a legislative assembly,—men who, were they Englishmen, might well seek the suffrages of any English constituency. Now, when this time comes to an unenfranchised country under English rule, there will almost certainly be impatient English reformers who will ask, "Why should not these men have political privileges equal to our own?"—"Why should they not, through representative institutions, take a direct part in the government of their own land?" The answer is easy—"Because, at present, their fellow-countrymen are not ready for representative institutions."

To-day, India is in this condition. It would be easy to *nominate* a thoroughly efficient legislative Assembly for India, for there are many natives well fitted for full political responsibility; it would be impossible to *elect* one, for in

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India there are at present few, if any, possible constituencies. Therefore, India must wait,¹ and the educated must be content to educate,—to lift up their fellow-countrymen into a larger manliness, that will break through the deadening constraint of India's less remote past, and fit her sons for the beginnings of freedom.

I say "educate," and, yet, education, as ordinarily understood, would not be sufficient. Indeed, if we are careful to speak quite strictly, we must say that, *as ordinarily understood*, it is not essential. A character apt for the exercises and for the responsibilities of freedom,—*this* is the one essential qualification for the privileges of citizenship, and it is a qualification that cannot be measured or discovered by any available educational test. An illiterate Englishman, who, although untouched by English culture, has yet, to some extent, been shaped and informed by that generous tradition of helpful freedom, which no one born on English soil and nurtured to manhood amid English surroundings can wholly escape, may be better qualified for the exercise of political privileges than a Brahmin, who although versed in the learning of the East and West, has never known in his own life the quickening pulse of independent manhood.

English history and English thought, as humane studies, are noble disciplines of manhood. Through them a man may serve himself heir to the world's noblest secular inheritance,—through them he may burst whatever "invidious bars" of birth would hold him down, and may become a peer in that peerless succession of thinkers and doers who have made the spiritual tradition of England a priceless benediction, but they cannot do their perfect work except in a nature already in some measure quickened and disciplined by freedom. Given such a nature, the good seed will fall into good ground, and bring forth "some thirty, some sixty, some a hundred fold." Even if such a nature be not given, they may yet do much,—they may arouse generous aspiration, and quicken the slumbering soul with the first pulse of freedom, but the lessons thus learnt in the closet must be proven and mastered in practical life—not

¹ This must not be taken as my last or only word about the government of India.

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necessarily, at first, in what is ordinarily called political life—before the manhood which, through them, thus makes discovery of itself, become serviceable for the higher duties of citizenship.

It may, therefore, well be that the literate peoples of the East will be among the last to enter upon the full privileges of English citizenship, and that simple folk, who have escaped their long experience of political and religious servitude will step in before them. One thing however is clear—be the days of preparation for these “subject” peoples long or short “our bounden duty and service,” as Englishmen and as patriots, is, through all those days, so to conduct our Imperial rule as to make it, to all those peoples, the unsetting light of a great beneficence. Our Empire requires the full strength of all its sons, and *they* are its sons no less truly than *we*, although, at present perhaps, but little children. We must see to it that their sonship becomes complete. If we do not, they will become sources of weakness, not of strength,—it may be, sources of fatal weakness.

For these reasons I would protest as strongly as possible against the tendency now manifest in certain quarters to regard certain of the coloured peoples of the Empire as simply convenient tools for English enterprise. No man, whatever his colour, is *merely* a tool, and if the lords of capital persist in using him as such, he will, in time, prove perilously two-edged.

One word more. Our subject peoples are not mere *aggregates*. All of them form societies,—various in organisation, it is true, and widely different in character, but all agreeing in this—that, in greater or less measure, they give to their members a corporate, a common life, and build them up into a living body which informs them with its tradition, and surrounds them with its discipline. These local organisations, be they national or tribal, it should ordinarily be our policy to, *as far as possible*, strengthen and improve.

Unfortunately, European civilisation and government are too often mischievously disintegrant of these native communities,—radically modifying their life, breaking down their institutions, breaking through their established forms

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and usages. A people thus disorganised and disinherited is ethically homeless.

Well-meaning administrators sometimes tell us that natives should be dealt with as individuals, and not as members of organised political societies. Short of slavery, virtual or actual, one can hardly conceive a more mischievous policy. It is, of course, true that even black men are individuals, but they are not *mere* individuals. They have developed certain forms of social life, and this development has been the condition, as it is also the sign, of whatever progress in manhood they have made. Destroy this organised life, and you destroy—almost do you destroy a people's conscience. You destroy the agency through which their daily life receives ethical content and discipline. What wonder if they then degenerate!



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